Dear JCS Editors:

Please find enclosed a submission to the Journal of Computer Security. Our manuscript draws on material from three published papers and my Ph.D. dissertation. The prior publications are:


Many of the contributions of this paper appear in (1). This article expands upon and strengthens the formal results, as well as corrects several nontrivial technical errors in that work. Correcting these errors required several additional supporting lemmas and proof mechanisms which were not present in the original publication.

Furthermore, subsequent work (2 and 3) based on FLAC by Cecchetti et al. and Gollamudi et al. exposed alternate design decisions that improve the connection between FLAC and cryptographic implementations of its protection abstractions. These changes were subtle, but required a significant rewrite of the primary formal results. We feel the changes are objectively better than the original abstractions, and so have incorporated them into the core FLAC formalism so that future work based on FLAC may benefit.

Sincerely,

Owen Arden
A Calculus for Flow-Limited Authorization

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Abstract. Real-world applications routinely make authorization decisions based on dynamic computation. Reasoning about dynamically computed authority is challenging. Integrity of the system might be compromised if attackers can improperly influence the authorizing computation. Confidentiality can also be compromised by authorization, since authorization decisions are often based on sensitive data such as membership lists and passwords. Previous formal models for authorization do not fully address the security implications of permitting trust relationships to change, which limits their ability to reason about authority that derives from dynamic computation. Our goal is a way to construct dynamic authorization mechanisms that do not violate confidentiality or integrity.

We introduce the Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC), which is both a simple, expressive model for reasoning about dynamic authorization and also an information flow control language for securely implementing various authorization mechanisms. FLAC combines the insights of two previous models: it extends the Dependency Core Calculus with features made possible by the Flow-Limited Authorization Model. FLAC provides strong end-to-end information security guarantees even for programs that incorporate and implement rich dynamic authorization mechanisms. These guarantees include noninterference and robust declassification, which prevent attackers from influencing information disclosures in unauthorized ways. We prove these security properties formally for all FLAC programs and explore the expressiveness of FLAC with several examples.

1. Introduction

Authorization mechanisms are critical components in all distributed systems. The policies enforced by these mechanisms constrain what computation may be safely executed, and therefore an expressive policy language is important. Expressive mechanisms for authorization have been an active research area. A variety of approaches have been developed, including authorization logics \cite{28,39}, often implemented with cryptographic mechanisms \cite{19,13}; role-based access control (RBAC) \cite{20}; and trust management \cite{29,40,9}.

However, the security guarantees of authorization mechanisms are usually analyzed using formal models that abstract away the computation and communication performed by the system. Developers must
take great care to faithfully preserve the (often implicit) assumptions of the model, not only when implementing authorization mechanisms, but also when employing them. Simplifying abstractions can help extract formal security guarantees, but abstractions can also obscure the challenges of implementing and using an abstraction securely. This disconnect between abstraction and implementation can lead to vulnerabilities and covert channels that allow attackers to leak or corrupt information.

A common blind spot in many authorization models is confidentiality. Most models cannot express authorization policies that are confidential or are based on confidential data. Real systems, however, use confidential data for authorization all the time: users on social networks receive access to photos based on friend lists, frequent fliers receive tickets based on credit card purchase histories, and doctors exchange patient data while keeping doctor–patient relationships confidential. While many models can ensure, for instance, that only friends are permitted to access a photo, few can say anything about the secondary goal of preserving the confidentiality of the friend list. Such authorization schemes may fundamentally require some information to be disclosed, but failing to detect these disclosures can lead to unintentional leaks.

Authorization without integrity is meaningless, so formal models are typically better at enforcing integrity. However, many formal models make unreasonable or unintuitive assumptions about integrity. For instance, in many models (e.g., [28], [2], [29]) authorization policies either do not change or change only when modified by a trusted administrator. This is a reasonable assumption in centralized systems where such an administrator will always exist, but in decentralized systems, there may be no single entity that is trusted by all other entities.

Even in centralized systems, administrators must be careful when performing updates based on partially trusted information, since malicious users may try to use the administrator to carry out an attack on their behalf. Unfortunately, existing models offer little help to administrators that need to reason about how attackers may have influenced security-critical update operations.

Developers need a better programming model for implementing expressive dynamic authorization mechanisms. Errors that undermine the security of these mechanisms are common [30], so we want to be able to verify their security. We argue that information flow control is a lightweight, useful tool for building secure authorization mechanisms. Using information flow control is attractive since it offers compositional, end-to-end security guarantees. However, applying information flow control to these mechanisms in a meaningful way requires building on a theory that integrates authority and information security. In this work, we show how to embed such a theory into a programming model, so that dynamic authorization mechanisms—as well as the programs that employ them—can be statically verified.

Approaching the verification of dynamic authorization mechanisms from this perspective is attractive for two reasons. First, it gives a model for building secure authorization mechanisms by construction rather than verifying them after the fact. This model offers programmers insight into the sometimes subtle interaction between information flow and authorization, and helps programmers address problems early, during the design process. Second, it addresses a core weakness lurking at the heart of existing language-based security schemes: that the underlying policies may change in a way that breaks security. By statically verifying the information security of dynamic authorization mechanisms, we expand the real-world scenarios in which language-based information flow control is useful and strengthen its security guarantees.

We demonstrate that such an embedding is possible by presenting a core language for authorization and information flow control, called the Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC). FLAC is a functional language for designing and verifying decentralized authorization protocols. FLAC is inspired by
the Polymorphic Dependency Core Calculus [2] (DCC).\(^1\) Abadi develops DCC as an authorization logic, but DCC is limited to static trust relationships defined externally to DCC programs by a lattice of principals. FLAC supports dynamic authorization by building on the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM) [7], which unifies reasoning about authority, confidentiality, and integrity. Furthermore, FLAC is a language for information flow control. It uses FLAM’s principal model and FLAM’s logical reasoning rules to define an operational model and type system for authorization computations that preserve information security.

The types in a FLAC program can be considered propositions [43] in an authorization logic, and the programs can be considered proofs that the proposition holds. Well-typed FLAC programs are not only proofs of authorization, but also proofs of secure information flow, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of authorization policies and of the data those policies depend upon.

FLAC is useful from a logical perspective, but also serves as a core programming model for real language implementations. Since FLAC programs can dynamically authorize computation and flows of information, FLAC applies to more realistic settings than previous authorization logics. Thus FLAC offers more than a type system for proving propositions—FLAC programs do useful computation.

This paper makes the following contributions.

– We define FLAC, a language, type system, and semantics for dynamic authorization mechanisms with strong information security:
  * Programs in low-integrity contexts exhibit noninterference, ensuring attackers cannot leak or corrupt information, and cannot subvert authorization mechanisms.
  * Programs in higher-integrity contexts exhibit robust declassification, ensuring attackers cannot influence authorized disclosures of information.

– We present two authorization mechanisms implemented in FLAC, commitment schemes and bearer credentials, and demonstrate that FLAC ensures the programs that use these mechanisms preserve the desired confidentiality and integrity properties.

We have organized our discussion of FLAC as follows. Section 2 introduces commitment schemes and bearer credentials, two examples of dynamic authorization mechanisms we use to explore the features of FLAC. Section 3 reviews the FLAM principal lattice [7], and Section 4 defines the FLAC language and type system. FLAC implementations of the dynamic authorization examples are presented in Section 5, and their properties are examined. Section 6 explores aspects of FLAC’s proof theory, and Section 7 discusses semantic security guarantees of FLAC programs, including noninterference and robust declassification. We explore related work in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.

Many of the contributions of this paper were previously published by Arden and Myers [5]. This article expands upon and strengthens the formal results, as well as corrects several technical errors in that work. Most of the semantic security proofs in Section 7 are either new to this work or were redeveloped from scratch to account for changes made to the semantics and type system.

Furthermore, subsequent work based on FLAC by Ceccetti et al. [15] and Gollamudi et al. [22] exposed alternate design decisions that improve the connection between FLAC and cryptographic implementations of its protection abstractions. We feel some of these changes are objectively better than the original abstractions, and so incorporate them into the core FLAC formalism so that future work based on FLAC may benefit. Significant departures from the original formalization are footnoted, but minor changes and corrections are included without comment.

\(^1\)DCC was first presented in [4]. We use the abbreviation DCC to refer to the extension to polymorphic types in [2].
2. Dynamic authorization mechanisms

Dynamic authorization is challenging to implement correctly since authority, confidentiality, and integrity interact in subtle ways. FLAC helps programmers securely implement both authorization mechanisms and code that uses them. FLAC types support the definition of compositional security abstractions, and vulnerabilities in the implementations of these abstractions are caught statically. Further, the guarantees offered by FLAC simplify reasoning about the security properties of these abstractions.

We illustrate the usefulness and expressive power of FLAC using two important security mechanisms: commitment schemes and bearer credentials. We show in Section 5 that these mechanisms can be implemented using FLAC, and that their security goals are easily verified in the context of FLAC.

2.1. Commitment schemes

A commitment scheme [36] allows one party to give another party a “commitment” to a secret value without revealing the value. The committing party may later reveal the secret in a way that convinces the receiver that the revealed value is the value originally committed.

Commitment schemes provide three essential operations: commit, reveal, and open. Suppose $p$ wants to commit to a value to principal $q$. First, $p$ applies commit to the value and provides the result to $q$ which does not reveal the value to $q$. When $p$ wishes to reveal the value, it supplies $q$ with a reveal operation for the commitment it sent previously. Then $q$ uses reveal to open the received value, revealing it to $q$.

A commitment scheme must have several properties in order to be secure. First, $q$ should not be able to open a value that hasn’t been committed to by $p$, since this could allow $q$ to manipulate $p$ to open a value it had not committed to. Second, $q$ should not be able to learn a secret of $p$ that has not been committed to or revealed by $p$. Third, $p$ should not be able to modify the committed value after it is received by $q$.

One might wonder why a programmer would bother to create high-level implementations of operations like commit, reveal, and open. Why not simply treat these as primitive operations and give them type signatures so that programs using them can be type-checked with respect to those signatures? The answer is that an error in a type signature could lead to a serious vulnerability. Therefore, we want more assurance that the type signatures are correct. Implementing such operations in FLAC is often easy and ensures that the type signature is consistent with a set of assumptions about existing trust relationships and the information flow context the operations are used within. These FLAC-based implementations serve as language-based models of the security properties achieved by implementations that use cryptography or trusted third parties.

2.2. Bearer credentials with caveats

A bearer credential is a capability that grants authority to any entity that possesses it. Many authorization mechanisms used in distributed systems employ bearer credentials in some form. Browser cookies that store session tokens are one example: after a website authenticates a user’s identity, it gives the user a token to use in subsequent interactions. Since it is infeasible for attackers to guess the token, the website grants the authority of the user to any requests that include the token.

Bearer credentials create an information security conundrum for authorization mechanisms. Though they efficiently control access to restricted resources, they create vulnerabilities and introduce covert channels when used incorrectly. For example, suppose Alice shares a remotely-hosted photo with her friends by giving them a credential to access the photo. Giving a friend such a credential doesn’t disclose their friendship, but each friend that accesses the photo implicitly discloses the friendship to the hosting
service. Such covert channels are pervasive, both in classic distributed authorization mechanisms like SPKI/SDSI [19], as well as in more recent ones like Macaroons [13].

Bearer credentials can also lead to vulnerabilities if they are leaked. If an attacker obtains a credential, it can exploit the authority of the credential. Thus, to limit the authority of a credential, approaches like SPKI/SDSI and Macaroons provide constrained delegation in which a newly issued credential attenuates the authority of an existing one by adding caveats. Caveats require additional properties to hold for the bearer to be granted authority. Session tokens, for example, might have a caveat that restricts the source IP address or encodes an expiration time. As pointed out by Birgisson et al. [13], caveats themselves can introduce covert channels if the properties reveal sensitive information.

FLAC is an effective framework for reasoning about bearer credentials with caveats since it captures the flow of credentials in programs as well as the sensitivity of the information the credentials and caveats derive from. We can reason about credentials and the programs that use them in FLAC with an approach similar to that used for commitment schemes. That we can do so in a straightforward way is somewhat remarkable: prior formalizations of credential mechanisms (e.g., [13,25,11]) usually do not consider confidentiality nor provide end-to-end guarantees about credential propagation.

3. The FLAM Principal Lattice

Like many models, FLAM uses principals to represent the authority of all entities relevant to a system. However, FLAM’s principals and their algebraic properties are richer than in most models, so we briefly review the FLAM principal model and notation. Further details are found in the earlier paper [7].

Primitive principals such as Alice, Bob, etc., are represented as elements $n$ of a (potentially infinite) set of names $\mathcal{N}$. In addition, FLAM uses $\top$ to represent a universally trusted principal and $\bot$ to represent a universally untrusted principal. The combined authority of two principals, $p$ and $q$, is represented by the conjunction $p \land q$, whereas the authority of either $p$ or $q$ is the disjunction $p \lor q$.

Unlike principals in other models, FLAM principals also represent information flow policies. The confidentiality of principal $p$ is represented by the principal $p^\mathcal{C}$, called $p$’s confidentiality projection. It denotes the authority necessary to learn anything $p$ can learn. The integrity of principal $p$ is represented by $p^\mathcal{I}$, called $p$’s integrity projection. It denotes the authority to influence anything $p$ can influence. All authority may be represented as some combination of confidentiality and integrity. For instance, principal $p$ is equivalent to the conjunction $p^\mathcal{C} \land p^\mathcal{I}$, and in fact any FLAM principal can be written $p^\mathcal{C} \land q^\mathcal{I}$ for some $p$ and $q$. The closure of the set of names $\mathcal{N}$ plus $\top$ and $\bot$ under the operators $\land$, $\lor$, $\leftarrow$, $\rightarrow$, forms a lattice $\mathcal{L}$ ordered by an acts-for relation $\geq$, defined by the inference rules in Figure 1. We write operators $\leftarrow$, $\rightarrow$ with higher precedence than $\land$, $\lor$; for instance, $p \land q^\mathcal{I}$ is equal to $p^\mathcal{C} \land (p \land q)^\mathcal{I}$. Projections distribute over $\land$ and $\lor$, so, for example, $(p \land q)^\mathcal{I} = (p^\mathcal{C} \land q^\mathcal{I})$. The confidentiality and integrity authority of principals are disjoint, so the confidentiality projection of an integrity projection is $\bot$ and vice-versa: $p^\mathcal{C} \rightarrow = \bot = (p^\mathcal{I})\rightarrow$.

An advantage of this model is that secure information flow can be defined in terms of authority. An information flow policy $q$ is at least as restrictive as a policy $p$ if $q$ has at least the confidentiality au-

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2Using $\mathcal{N}$ as the set of all names is convenient in our formal calculus, but a general-purpose language based on FLAC may wish to dynamically allocate names at runtime. Since knowing or using a principal’s name holds no special privilege in FLAC, this presents no fundamental difficulties. To use dynamically allocated principals in type signatures, however, the language’s type system should support types in which principal names may be existentially quantified.

3FLAM defines an additional set of operators called ownership projections, which we omit here to simplify our presentation.
\[ L \models p \geq q \]

\[ L \models p \downarrow \quad [\text{TOP}] \quad L \models \top \geq p \quad [\text{REFL}] \quad L \models p \geq p \quad [\text{PROJ}] \quad L \models p \geq q \quad \frac{L \models p \geq q}{L \models p \geq q^\pi} \quad [\text{PROJ}^\prime] \quad L \models p \geq p^\prime \]

\[ L \models p_k \geq p \quad \frac{\forall k \in \{1, 2\}}{L \models p_1 \land p_2 \geq p} \quad [\text{CONJL}] \quad L \models p \geq p_1 \quad \frac{\forall k \in \{1, 2\}}{L \models p \geq p \land p_2} \quad [\text{CONJR}] \quad L \models p \geq p_1 \land p_2 \quad \frac{L \models p \geq p_1 \land p_2}{L \models p \geq p_1 \lor p_2} \quad [\text{DISJL}] \quad L \models p \geq p_1 \lor p_2 \quad \frac{L \models p \geq p_1 \lor p_2}{L \models p \geq p} \quad [\text{DISJR}] \quad L \models p \geq p_1 \lor p_2 \quad \frac{L \models p \geq p \lor q}{L \models q \geq r} \quad [\text{TRANS}] \quad L \models p \geq q \quad L \models q \geq r \quad \frac{L \models p \geq q}{L \models p \geq r} \]

Fig. 1. Static principal lattice rules, adapted from FLAM [7]. The projection \( \pi \) may be either confidentiality (\( \rightarrow \)) or integrity (\( \leftarrow \)).

thority \( p^\rightarrow \) and \( p \) has at least the integrity authority \( q^\rightarrow \). This relationship between the confidentiality and integrity of \( p \) and \( q \) reflects the usual duality seen in information flow control [12]. As in [7], we use the following shorthand for relating principals by policy restrictiveness:

\[
\begin{align*}
p \subseteq q & \triangleq (p^\rightarrow \land q^\rightarrow) \geq (q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow) \\
p \sqcup q & \triangleq (p \land q)^\rightarrow \land (p \lor q)^\rightarrow \\
p \sqcap q & \triangleq (p \lor q)^\rightarrow \land (p \land q)^\rightarrow
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, \( p \subseteq q \) indicates the direction of secure information flow: from \( p \) to \( q \). The information flow join \( p \sqcup q \) is the least restrictive principal that both \( p \) and \( q \) flow to, and the information flow meet \( p \sqcap q \) is the most restrictive principal that flows to both \( p \) and \( q \).

In FLAM, the ability to “speak for” another principal is an integrity relationship between principals. This makes sense intuitively, because speaking for another principal influences that principal’s trust relationships and information flow policies. FLAM defines the voice of a principal \( p \), written \( \nabla(p) \), as the integrity necessary to speak for that principal. Given a principal expressed in normal form\(^4\) as \( q^\rightarrow \land r^\rightarrow \),

Thus, \( p \subseteq q \) indicates the direction of secure information flow: from \( p \) to \( q \). The information flow join \( p \sqcup q \) is the least restrictive principal that both \( p \) and \( q \) flow to, and the information flow meet \( p \sqcap q \) is the most restrictive principal that flows to both \( p \) and \( q \).

For example, the voice of Alice, \( \nabla(\text{Alice}) \), is \( \text{Alice}^\rightarrow \). The voice of Alice’s confidentiality \( \nabla(\text{Alice}^-) \) is also \( \text{Alice}^- \).


FLAC uses information flow to reason about the security implications of dynamically computed authority. Like previous information-flow type systems [38], FLAC incorporates types for reasoning about

\(^4\)In normal form, a principal is the conjunction of a confidentiality principal and an integrity principal. See [7] for details.
\( n \in \mathcal{N} \) (primitive principals)
\( x \in \mathcal{V} \) (variable names)

\[
p, \ell, pc ::= n \mid T \mid \bot \mid p^{\tau} \mid p^{\sigma} \mid p \land p \mid p \lor p
\]

\[
\tau ::= (p \triangleright p) \mid \text{unit} \mid \tau + \tau \mid \tau \times \tau
\]

\[
v ::= () \mid \langle w, w \rangle \mid \langle p \triangleright p \rangle \mid \eta_{\ell} w
\]

\[
w ::= v \mid w \text{ where } v
\]

\[
e ::= x \mid w \mid e \tau \mid \text{proj}_i e \mid \text{inj}_i e
\]

\[
| \text{case } e \text{ of inj}_1(x).e \mid \text{inj}_2(x).e
\]

\[
| \text{bind } x = e \text{ in } e \mid \text{assume } e \text{ in } e
\]

\[
| e \text{ where } v
\]

**Fig. 2. FLAC syntax.** Terms using where are syntactically prohibited in the source language and are produced only during evaluation.

\[
e \longrightarrow e'
\]

**[E-APP]** \( (\lambda(x: \tau)[pc].e) w \longrightarrow e[x \mapsto w] \)

**[E-TAPP]** \( (\Lambda X[pc].e) \tau \longrightarrow e[X \mapsto \tau] \)

**[E-UNPAIR]** \( \text{proj}_i \langle w_1, w_2 \rangle \longrightarrow w_i \)

**[E-CASE]** \( \text{case } (\text{inj}_i w) \text{ of inj}_1(x).e_1 \mid \text{inj}_2(x).e_2 \longrightarrow e_i[x \mapsto w] \)

**[E-BIND]** \( \text{bind } x = \eta_{\ell} w \text{ in } e \longrightarrow e[x \mapsto w] \)

**[E-ASSUME]** \( \text{assume } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle \text{ in } e \longrightarrow e \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle \)

**[E-UNIT]** \( \eta_{\ell} w \longrightarrow \eta_{\ell} w \)

**[E-EVAL]** \( e \longrightarrow e' \)

\[
E ::= [] \mid E \ e \mid w \ E \mid E \ \tau \mid \langle E, e \rangle \mid \langle w, E \rangle \mid \text{proj}_i E \mid \text{inj}_i E \mid \eta_{\ell} E
\]

\[
| \text{bind } x = E \text{ in } e \mid \text{assume } E \text{ in } e \mid \text{case } E \text{ of inj}_1(x).e \mid \text{inj}_2(x).e \mid E \text{ where } v
\]

**Fig. 3. FLAC operational semantics**

information flow, but FLAC’s type system goes further by using Flow-Limited Authorization [7] to ensure that principals cannot use FLAC programs to exceed their authority, or to leak or corrupt information. FLAC is based on DCC [2], but unlike DCC, FLAC supports reasoning about authority deriving from the evaluation of FLAC terms. In contrast, all authority in DCC derives from trust relationships defined by a fixed, external lattice of principals. Thus, using an approach based on DCC in systems where trust relationships change dynamically could introduce vulnerabilities like delegation loopholes, probing and poaching attacks, and authorization side channels [7].
(\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : \tau)

[\text{VAR}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau, \Gamma' ; \text{pc} \vdash x : \tau \\
[\text{UNIT}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash () : \text{unit} \\
[\text{DEL}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \langle p \geq q \rangle : (p \geq q)

[\text{LAM}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau_1, \Gamma' ; \text{pc} \vdash e : \tau_2 \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \lambda (x \tau_1)[\text{pc}']. e \vdash (\tau_1 \vdash \rightarrow \tau_2)}

[\text{APP}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : (\tau_1 \vdash \rightarrow \tau_2) \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash (e \ e') : \tau_2}

[\text{PAIR}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \langle e_1, e_2 \rangle : \tau_1 \times \tau_2}

[\text{UNPAIR}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash (\text{proj}_1 e) : \tau_1}

[\text{INJ}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \text{inj}_i e : \tau_1 + \tau_2}

[\text{CASE}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e_1 : \tau_1, e_2 : \tau_2 \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \text{case } e \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x) . e_1 | \text{inj}_2(x) . e_2 : \tau}

[\text{UNITM}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : \tau \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \eta_{e} e : \ell \text{ says } \tau}

[\text{BINDM}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : \ell \text{ says } \tau' \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \text{bind } x = e \text{ in } e' : \tau}

[\text{ASSUME}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e' : \tau \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \text{assume } e \text{ in } e' : \tau}

[\text{WHERE}] \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash v : (p \geq q) \\
\frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash \text{ where } v : \tau}

\text{Fig. 4. FLAC type system.}

Figure 2 defines the FLAC syntax. The core FLAC operational semantics and evaluation contexts [45] in Figure 3 are mostly standard except for \text{E-ASSUME} and \text{E-UNITM}, which we discuss below, along with additional rules that handle the propagation of the \text{where} \text{terms} introduced by \text{E-ASSUME}.

The core FLAC type system is presented in Figure 4. FLAC typing judgments have the form \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash e : \tau. The \textit{delegation context}, \Pi, \text{contains} a set of labeled dynamic trust relationships \(\langle p \geq q \rangle\) where \(p \geq q\) (read as "\(p\) acts for \(q\)") is a delegation from \(q\) to \(p\). The \textit{typing context}, \Gamma, is a map from variables to types, and \text{pc} is the \textit{program counter label}, a FLAC principal representing the confidentiality and integrity of control flow. The type system makes frequent use of judgments adapted from FLAC’s inference rules [7]. These rules, adapted to FLAC, are presented in Figure 5.\footnote{FLAC’s rules [7] also include \textit{query} and \textit{result} labels as part of the judgment context that represent the confidentiality and integrity of a FLAC query context and result, respectively. These labels are unnecessary in FLAC because we use FLAC.}
[R-STATIC] \[ \mathcal{L} \models p \geq q \quad \frac{\Pi \models p \geq q}{\Pi \models p \geq q} \]

[R-ASSUME] \[ \frac{(p \geq q) \in \Pi}{\Pi \models p \geq q} \]

[R-COND]

[R-COND]

[R-TRANS]

\[ \Pi \models p \geq q \quad \Pi \models q \geq r \]

\[ \Pi \models p \geq r \]

Fig. 5. Inference rules for robust assumption, adapted from FLAM [7].

Since FLAC is a pure functional language, it might seem odd for FLAC to have a label for the program counter; such labels are usually used to control implicit flows through assignments (e.g., in [37,33]). The purpose of FLAC’s pc label is to control a different kind of side effect: changes to the delegation context, \( \Pi \).\(^6\) In order to control what information can influence whether a new trust relationship is added to the delegation context, the type system tracks the confidentiality and security of control flow. Viewed as an authorization logic, FLAC’s type system has the unique feature that it expresses deduction constrained by an information flow context. For instance, if we have \( \varphi \xrightarrow{\rho} \psi \) and \( \varphi \), then (via APP) we may derive \( \psi \) in a context with integrity \( p^- \), but not in contexts that don’t flow to \( p^- \). This feature offers needed control over how principals may apply existing facts to derive new facts.

Many FLAC terms are standard, such as pairs \( \langle e_1, e_2 \rangle \), projections \( \mathsf{proj}_i e \), variants \( \mathsf{inj}_i e \), polymorphic type abstraction, \( \Lambda X [pc]. e \), and case expressions. Function abstraction, \( \lambda (x : \tau) [pc]. e \), includes a pc label that constrains the information flow context in which the function may be applied. The rule APP ensures that function application respects these policies, requiring that the robust FLAM judgment \( \Pi \models pc \subseteq pc' \) holds. This judgment ensures that the current program counter label, \( pc \), flows to the function label, \( pc' \).

Branching occurs in case expressions, which conditionally evaluate one of two expressions. The rule CASE ensures that both expressions have the same type and thus the same protection level. The premise \( \Pi \models pc \subseteq \tau \) ensures that this type protects the current pc label.\(^7\)

Like DCC, FLAC uses monadic operators to track dependencies. The monadic unit term \( \eta^\ell \mathsf{v} \mathsf{(UNITM)} \) says that a value \( v \) of type \( \tau \) is protected at level \( \ell \). This protected value has the type \( \ell \) says \( \tau \), meaning that it has the confidentiality and integrity of principal \( \ell \). Because \( v \) could implicitly reveal information about the dependencies of the computation that produced it, \mathsf{UNITM} requires that \( \Pi \models pc \subseteq \ell \).\(^8\)

\(^6\) DFLATE [22], an extension of FLAC, uses the same pc label to control implicit flows due to communication. Extensions of FLAC to support mutable references could control implicit flows similarly.

\(^7\) This premise simplifies our proofs, but does not appear to be strictly necessary; \mathsf{BINDM} ensures the same property.

\(^8\) Neither DCC [4] nor the original FLAC formalization [5] included this premise. DCC does not maintain a pc label at all. FLAC originally used a version of the DCC rule, but Cecchetti et al. [15] and Gollamudi et al. [22] added the pc restriction in support of a non-commutative says. See Section 6.1 for additional details.
Computation on protected values must occur in a protected context (“in the monad”), expressed using a monadic bind term. The typing rule BindM ensures that the result of the computation protects the confidentiality and integrity of protected values. For instance, the expression bind $x = \eta_p v \in \eta_p x$ is only well-typed if $\ell'$ protects values with confidentiality and integrity $\ell$. Since case expressions may use the variable $x$ for branching, BindM raises the $pc$ label to $pc \sqcup \ell$ to conservatively reflect the control-flow dependency.

Protection levels are defined by the set of inference rules in Figure 7, adapted from [42]. Expressions with unit type (P-UNIT) do not propagate any information, so they protect information at any $\ell$. Product types protect information at $\ell$ if both components do (P-PAIR). Function types protect information at $\ell$ if the return type and function label does (P-FUN), and polymorphic types protect information at whatever level the abstracted type and type function label does (P-TFUN). Finally, if $\ell$ flows to $\ell'$, then $\ell'$ says $\tau$ protects information at $\ell$ (P-LBL).9

Most of the novelty of FLAC lies in its delegation values and assume terms. These terms enable expressive reasoning about authority and information flow control. A delegation value serves as evidence that enable new flows to create new flows between protection levels. In the typing context $\emptyset; x:p^- \text{ says } \tau; q^-$ (i.e., $\Pi = \emptyset, \Gamma = x:p^- \text{ says } \tau, \text{ and } pc = q^-$), the following expression is not well typed:

$$\text{bind } x' = x \text{ in } \eta_q x'$$

since $p^-$ does not flow to $q^-$, as required by the premise $\Pi \vdash \ell \subseteq \tau$ in rule BindM. Specifically, we cannot derive $\Pi \vdash p^- \subseteq q^-$ says $\tau$ since P-LBL requires the FLAM judgment $\Pi \vdash p^- \subseteq q^-$ to hold.

However, the following expression is well typed:

$$\text{assume } \langle p^- \triangleright q^- \rangle \text{ in } \text{bind } x' = x \text{ in } \eta_q x'$$

The difference is that the assume term adds a trust relationship, represented by an expression with an acts-for type, to the delegation context. In this case, the expression $\langle p^- \triangleright q^- \rangle$ adds a trust relationship that allows $p^-$ to flow to $q^-$. This is secure since $pc = q^-$, meaning that only principals with integrity $q^-$ have influenced the computation. With $\langle p^- \triangleright q^- \rangle$ in the delegation context, added via the Assume rule, the premises of BindM are now satisfied, so the expression type-checks.

Creating a delegation value requires no special privilege because the type system ensures only high-integrity delegations are used as evidence that enable new flows. Using low-integrity evidence for authorization would be insecure since attackers could use delegation values to create new flows that reveal secrets or corrupt data. The premises of the Assume rule ensure the integrity of dynamic authorization computations that produce values like $\langle p^- \triangleright q^- \rangle$ in the example above.11 The second premise, $\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \nabla(q)$, requires that the $pc$ has enough integrity to be trusted by $q$, the principal whose security is affected. For instance, to make the assumption $p \triangleright q$, the evidence represented by the term $e$ must have at least the integrity of the voice of $q$, written $\nabla(q)$. Since the $pc$ bounds the restrictiveness of the

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9DCC [4] and the original FLAC formalization included an additional protection rule that considered $\ell$ to be protected by $\ell'$ says $\tau$ if $\tau$ protects $\ell$ (even if $\ell'$ does not). This rule was removed by Ceccetti et al. and Gollamudi et al. [22] to make says non-commutative.

10This correspondence with delegation values makes acts-for types a kind of singleton type [18].

11These premises are related to the robust FLAM rule Lift.
dependencies of \( e \), this ensures that only information with integrity \( \nabla(q) \) or higher may influence the evaluation of \( e \). The third premise, \( \Pi \models \nabla \langle p^- \rangle \gg \nabla \langle q^- \rangle \), ensures that principal \( p \) has sufficient integrity to be trusted to enforce \( q \)'s confidentiality, \( q^- \). This premise means that \( q \) permits data to be relabeled from \( q^- \) to \( p^- \).\(^{12}\)

Assumption terms evaluate to where expressions (rule \( E\)-ASSUME). These expressions are a purely formal bookkeeping mechanism (i.e., they would be unnecessary in a FLAC-based implementation) for tracking implicit flows due to dynamic delegations. They record and maintain the authorization evidence used to justify new flows of information during evaluation. They are not part of the source language and generated only by the evaluation rules. The term \( e \) where \( \langle p \gg q \rangle \) records that \( e \) is evaluated in a context that includes the delegation \( \langle p \gg q \rangle \).

The rule \textit{WHERE} gives a typing rule for where terms; though similar to ASSUME, it requires only that \( \nabla \langle q \rangle \) delegate to the distinguished label \( \overline{pc} \). The use of \( \overline{pc} \) is purely technical: our proofs in Section 7 use \( pc \) to help reason about what new flows may have created by assume terms. The only requirement is that \( \overline{pc} \) be as trusted as the \( pc \) label used to type-check the source program (or programs) that generated the where term. Since the \( pc \) increases monotonically when typing subexpressions, the typical choice for \( \overline{pc} \) for a source program \( e \) such that \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \) would be \( pc \).\(^ {13}\)

Figure 6 presents evaluation rules for where terms. The rules are designed to treat where values like the value they enclose. For instance, applying a where term (rule \textit{W-APP}) simply moves the value it is applied to inside the where term. If the where term was wrapping a lambda expression, then it may now be applied via \textit{APP}. Otherwise, further reduction steps via W-APP may be necessary. We use the syntactic category \( w \) (see Figure 2) to refer to fully-evaluated where terms, or where values. In other words, a where value \( w \) is an expression consisting of a value \( v \) enclosed by one or more where clauses. A where value usually behaves like a value, but it is occasionally convenient to distinguish them.\(^ {14}\)

\(^{12}\)More precisely, it means that the voice of \( q \)'s confidentiality, \( \nabla \langle q^- \rangle \), permits data to be relabeled from \( q^- \) to \( p^- \). Recall that \( \nabla(Alice^-) \) is just Alice's integrity projection: Alice\(^{+} \).

\(^{13}\)Choosing \( \overline{pc} \) to be \( \top^- \) is always valid, but selecting a more restrictive label permits finer-grained reasoning about what downgrades may occur in \( e \).

\(^{14}\)The original FLAC formalization did not distinguish where values and values, and did not include the rules in Figure 6. Unfortunately, this resulted in stuck terms when where terms were not propagated appropriately.
### 5. Examples revisited

We can now implement our examples from Section 2 in FLAC. Using FLAC ensures that authority and information flow assumptions are explicit, and that programs using these abstractions are secure with respect to those assumptions. In this section, we discuss at a high level how FLAC types help enforce specific end-to-end security properties for commitment schemes and bearer credentials. Section 7 formalizes the semantic security properties of all well-typed FLAC programs.

#### 5.1. Commitment Schemes

Figure 8 contains the essential operations of a commitment scheme—commit, reveal, and open—implemented in FLAC. Principal $p$ commits to pairs of the form $(n,v)$ where $n$ is a term that encodes a
type-level integer $N$.\footnote{Any reasonable integer encoding is permissible provided that each integer $N$ is a singleton type.} To prevent $q$ from influencing which committed values are revealed, $p$ commits to a single value for each integer type.

The $\text{commit}$ operation takes a value of any type (hence $\forall X$) with confidentiality $p^\rightarrow$ and produces a value with confidentiality and integrity $p$. In other words, $p$ endorses [48] the value to have integrity $p^\rightarrow$.

Attackers should not be able to influence whether principal $p$ commits to a particular value. The $pc$ constraint on $\text{commit}$ ensures that only principal $p$ and principals trusted with at least $p$’s integrity, $p^\rightarrow$, may apply $\text{commit}$ to a value.\footnote{We make the reasonable assumption that an untrusted programmer cannot modify high-integrity code, thus the influence of attackers is captured by the $pc$ and the protection levels of values. Enforcing this assumption is beyond the scope of FLAC, but has been explored in [6].} Furthermore, if the programmer omitted this constraint or instead chose $\bot$, say, then $\text{commit}$ would be rejected by the type system. Specifically, the assume term would not type-check via rule $\text{ASSUME}$ since the $pc$ does not act for $\nabla(p^\rightarrow)$, which is equal to $p^\rightarrow$.

When $p$ is ready to reveal a previously committed value, it instantiates the function $\text{reveal}$ with the integer type $N$ of the committed value and sends the result to $q$. The body of $\text{reveal}$ creates delegations $\langle \nabla(q^\rightarrow) \rangle \geq \nabla(p^\rightarrow)$ and $\langle q^\rightarrow \rangle \geq \nabla(p^\rightarrow)$, permitting the inner function to relabel its argument from $p$ to $q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow$. The outer assume term establishes that principals speaking for $q^\rightarrow$ also speak for $p^\rightarrow$ by creating an integrity relationship between their voices. With this relationship in place, the inner assume term may delegate $p$’s confidentiality to $q$.\footnote{Specifically, it satisfies the $\text{ASSUME}$ premise $\Pi \vdash \nabla(p^\rightarrow) \geq \nabla(q^\rightarrow)$.}

Only principals trusted by $\nabla(p^\rightarrow)$ and $p^\rightarrow$ may instantiate $\text{reveal}$ with the integer $N$ of the commitment, therefore $q$ cannot invoke $\text{reveal}$ until it is authorized by $p$. If, for example, the type function had $pc$ annotation $q$ instead of $\nabla(p^\rightarrow)$, it would be rejected by the type system since the assume term would not check under the $\text{ASSUME}$ rule. Note however, that once the delegation is established, the inner function may be invoked by $q$ since it has the $pc$ annotation $q^\rightarrow$. Without the delegation, however, the $\text{bind}$ term would fail to type-check under $\text{BINDM}$ since $p$ would not flow to $q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow$.

Given a function of the type instantiated by $\text{reveal}$ and a committed value of type $p$ says $X$, the open function may be invoked by $q$ to relabel the committed value to a type observable by $q$. Because open may only be invoked by principals trusted by $q^\rightarrow$, $p$ cannot influence which value of type $p$ says $(N,X)$ open is applied to. If $q$ only accepts a one value for each integer type $N$, then the argument must be the one originally committed to by $p$. Furthermore, since the $\text{reveal}$ function provided to $p$ is parametric with respect to $X$, it cannot return a value other than (a relabeled version of) its argument. The return type $q^\rightarrow$ says $q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow$ says $X$ protects this relationship between the committed value and the opened one: it indicates that $q$ trusts that $q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow$ says $X$ is the one originally committed to by $p$.

In DCC, functions are not annotated with $pc$ labels and may be applied in any context. So a DCC function analogous to $\text{reveal}$ might have type

$$\text{dcc\_reveal} : \forall N. \forall X. p \text{ says } (N,X) \rightarrow q^\rightarrow \land p^\rightarrow \text{ says } (N,X)$$

However, $\text{dcc\_reveal}$ would not be appropriate for a commitment scheme since any principal could use it to relabel information from $p$-confidential ($p^\rightarrow$) to $q$-confidential ($q^\rightarrow$).

The real power of FLAC is that the security guarantees of well-typed FLAC functions like those above are compositional. The FLAC type system ensures the security of both the functions themselves and the programs that use them. For instance, the following code should be rejected because it would permit $q$ to...
reveal $p$’s commitments.

\[ \lambda N[q^{-}] \lambda X[q^{-}] \lambda (x:p \land q^{-} \ \text{says} \ X)[q^{-}] \ \text{assume} \langle q \geq p \rangle \ \text{in} \ \text{reveal} \ N \ X \ x \]

The $pc$ constraints on this function all have the integrity of $q$, but the body of the function uses assume to create a new delegation from $p$ to $q$. If this assume was permitted by the type system, then $q$ could use the function to reveal $p$’s committed values. Since ASSUME requires the $pc$ to speak for $p$, this function is rejected.

FLAC’s guarantees make it possible to state general security properties of all programs that use the above commitment scheme, even if those programs are malicious. For example, suppose we have $pc_{p} = \nabla (p), pc_{q} = \nabla (q)$, and

\[ \Gamma_{cro} = \text{commit, reveal, open, (reveal } N' \text{), } x:p^{-} \ \text{says} \ \tau, y:p \ \text{says} \ (N, \tau), z:p \ \text{says} \ (N', \tau) \]

Intuitively, $pc_{p}$ and $pc_{q}$ are execution contexts under the control of $p$ or $q$, respectively. $\Gamma_{cro}$ is a typing context for programs using the commitment scheme. For presentation purposes, we have omitted the types of $\text{commit, reveal, and open}$ in $\Gamma_{cro}$. Their types are as defined previously. The variable $x$ represents an uncommitted value with $p$’s confidentiality, whereas $y$ and $z$ are a committed value. The type ($\text{reveal } N'$) is shorthand for $\text{reveal}$ instantiated with integer type $N'$ and represents that $z$ has been revealed to $q$ by $p$.

Since we are interested in properties that hold for all principals $p$ and $q$, we want the properties to hold in an empty delegation context: $\Pi = \emptyset$. Below, we omit the delegation context altogether for brevity.

FLAC’s noninterference guarantee helps rule out information that an attacker can influence or learn. Using results presented in Section 7, we can prove that:

- $q$ cannot open a value that hasn’t been committed. For any $e$ and $\tau'$ such that $\Gamma_{cro};pc_{q} \vdash e : q^{-} \land p^{-} \ \text{says} \ \tau'$, the result of evaluating $e$ is independent of $x$; specifically, for any $v_{1}$ and $v_{2}$, if $e[x \mapsto v_{1}] \rightarrow^{*} v_{1}'$ and $e[x \mapsto v_{2}] \rightarrow^{*} v_{2}'$, then $v_{1}' = v_{2}'$.

- $q$ cannot learn a value that hasn’t been revealed. For any $e$, $\ell$, and $\tau'$ such that $\Gamma_{cro};pc_{q} \vdash e : \ell \land q^{-} \ \text{says} \ \tau'$, then the result of $e$ is independent of $x$ and $y$.

For these properties we consider programs using our commitment scheme that $q$ might invoke, hence we consider FLAC programs that type-check in the $\Gamma_{cro};pc_{q}$ context. In the first property, we are concerned with programs that produce values protected by policy $p$. Since such programs produce values with the integrity of $p$ but are invoked by $q$, we want to ensure that no program exists that enables $q$ to obtain a value with $p$’s integrity that depends on $x$, which is a value without $p$’s integrity. The second property concerns programs that produces values at $\ell \land q^{-}$ for any $\ell$; these are values readable by $q$. Therefore, we want to ensure that no program exists that enables $q$ to produce such a value that depends on $x$ or $y$, which are not readable by $q$.

Each of these properties hold by a straightforward application of our noninterference theorems (Theorem 2). This result is strengthened by our robust declassification theorem (Theorem 1), which ensures that attacks by $q$ on $p$’s programs cannot subvert the intended declassifications.
5.2. Bearer Credentials

We can also use FLAC to implement bearer credentials, our second example of a dynamic authorization mechanism. We represent a bearer credential with authority $k$ in FLAC as a term with the type

$$\forall X[pc]. \ k^- \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } X$$

which we abbreviate as $k^- \xrightarrow{pc} k^-$. These terms act as bearer credentials for a principal $k$ since they may be used as a proxy for $k$’s confidentiality and integrity authority. Recall that $k^- = k^- \land \bot^-$ and $k^- = k^- \land \bot^-$. Then secrets protected by $k^-$ can be declassified to $\bot^-$, and untrusted data protected by $\bot^-$ can be endorsed to $k^-$. Thus this term yields the full authority of $k$, and if $pc = \bot^-$, the credential may be used in any context—any “bearer” may use it. From such credentials, more restricted credentials can be derived. For example, the credential $k^- \xrightarrow{pc} \bot^-$ grants the bearer authority to declassify $k$-confidential values, but no authority to endorse values.

We postpone an in-depth discussion of terms with types of the form $k^- \xrightarrow{pc} k^-$ until Section 6.2, but it is interesting to note that an analogous term in DCC is only well-typed if $k$ is equivalent to $\bot$. This is because the function takes an argument with $k^-$ confidentiality and no integrity, and produces a value with $k^-$ integrity and no confidentiality. Suppose $L$ is a security lattice used to type-check DCC programs with suitable encodings for $k$’s confidentiality and integrity. If a DCC term has a type analogous to $k^- \Rightarrow k^-$, then $L$ must have the property $k^- \subseteq \bot$ and $\bot \subseteq k^-$. This means that $k$ has no confidentiality and no integrity. That FLAC terms may have this type for any principal $k$ makes it straightforward to implement bearer credentials and demonstrates a useful application of FLAC’s extra expressiveness.

The $pc$ of a credential $k^- \xrightarrow{pc} k^-$ acts as a sort of caveat: it restricts the information flow context in which the credential may be used. We can add more general caveats to credentials by wrapping them in lambda terms. To add a caveat $\phi$ to a credential with type $k^- \xrightarrow{pc} k^-$, we use a wrapper:

$$\lambda(x):k^- \xrightarrow{pc} k^-)[pc]. \lambda(y):[pc]. \lambda(z):[pc]. xX$$

which gives us a term with type

$$\forall X[pc]. \ \phi \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } X$$

This requires a term with type $\phi$ (in which $X$ may occur) to be applied before the authority of $k$ can be used. Similar wrappers allow us to chain multiple caveats; i.e., for caveats $\phi_1 \ldots \phi_n$, we obtain the type

$$\forall X[pc]. \ \phi_1 \xrightarrow{pc} \ldots \xrightarrow{pc} \phi_n \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } X$$

which abbreviates to

$$k^- \xrightarrow{\phi_1 \times \cdots \times \phi_n;pc} k^-$$

We will also use the syntax $(k^- \xrightarrow{\phi_1 \times \cdots \times \phi_n;pc} k^-)$ $\tau$ (suggesting a type-level application) as an abbreviation for

$$\phi_1[X \mapsto \tau] \xrightarrow{pc} \ldots \xrightarrow{pc} \phi_n[X \mapsto \tau] \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } \tau \xrightarrow{pc} k^- \text{ says } \tau$$
Like any other FLAC terms, credentials may be protected by information flow policies. So a credential that should only be accessible to Alice might be protected by the type $Alice^\rightarrow \text{says}(k_1 \xrightarrow{\phi_{pc}} k^\rightarrow)$. This confidentiality policy ensures the credential cannot accidentally be leaked to an attacker. A further step might be to constrain uses of this credential so that only Alice may invoke it to re-label information. If we require $pc = Alice^\rightarrow$, this credential may only be used in contexts trusted by Alice: $Alice^\rightarrow \text{says}(k_1 \xrightarrow{\phi_{Alice^\rightarrow}} k^\rightarrow)$.

A subtle point about the way in which we construct caveats is that the caveats are polymorphic with respect to $X$, the same type variable the credential ranges over. This means that each caveat may constrain what types $X$ may be instantiated with. For instance, suppose $isEduc$ is a predicate for educational films; it holds (has a proof term with type $isEduc \ X$) for types like $Bio$ and $Doc$, but not $RomCom$. Adding $isEduc \ X$ as a caveat to a credential would mean that the bearer of the credential could use it to access biographies and documentaries, but could not use it to access romantic comedies. Since no term of type $isEduc \ RomCom$ could be applied, the bearer could only satisfy $isEduc$ by instantiating $X$ with $Bio$ or $Doc$. Once $X$ is instantiated with $Bio$ or $Doc$, the credential cannot be used on a $RomCom$ value. Thus we have two mechanisms for constraining the use of credentials: information flow policies to constrain propagation, and caveats to establish prerequisites and constrain the types of data covered by the credential.

As a more in-depth example of using such credentials, suppose Alice hosts a file sharing service. For a simpler presentation, we use free variables to refer to these files; for instance, $x_1 : (k_1 \text{ says ph})$ is a variable that stores a photo (type ph) protected by $k_1$. For each such variable $x_1$, Alice has a credential $k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{ph}} k^\rightarrow$, and can give access to users by providing this credential or deriving a more restricted one. To access $x_1$, Bob does not need the full authority of Alice or $k_1$—a more restricted credential suffices. Alice can provide Bob with a credential $c$ of type $(k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{Bob}} k^\rightarrow)$ ph. By applying this credential to $x_1$, Bob is able to access the result of type $k_1^\rightarrow$ says ph since its confidentiality is now public.

This example demonstrates an advantage of bearer credentials: access to $x_1$ can be provided to principals other than $k_1$ in a decentralized way, without changing the policy on $x_1$. Suppose Alice has a credential with type $k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{ph}} k^\rightarrow$ and wants to issue the above credential to Bob. Alice can create such a credential using a wrapper that derives the more constrained credential from her original one.

\[\lambda(c : k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{ph}} k^\rightarrow)[Alice^\rightarrow].\]
\[\lambda(y : k_1 \text{ says ph})[Bob^\rightarrow].\]
\[\text{bind } y' = y \text{ in } (c \text{ ph})(\eta_k \rightarrow y')\]

This function has type $(k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{ph}} k^\rightarrow) \xrightarrow{Alice^\rightarrow} (k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{Bob}} k^\rightarrow) \text{ ph}$: given her root credential $k_1 \xrightarrow{\text{ph}} k^\rightarrow$, Alice (or someone she trusts) can create a restricted credential that allows Bob (or someone he trusts) to access values of type ph protected under $k_1$. 

Bob can also use this credential to share photos with friends. For instance, the function

\[ \lambda(c: (k_1 \xrightarrow{Bob^{-}} k_1^{-}) \text{ph})[Bob^{-}] \]

assume \( \langle \text{Carol}^{-} \supseteq Bob^{-} \rangle \) in

\[ \lambda(y: k_1 \text{ says ph})[\text{Carol}^{-}] \]

bind \( y' = y \text{ in } (c \text{ ph}) (\eta_{k^{-}} y') \)

creates a wrapper around a Bob’s credential that is invokable by Carol. Using the assume term, Bob delegates authority to Carol so that his credential may be invoked at \( pc \text{ Carol}^{-} \).

The properties of FLAC let us prove many general properties about such bearer-credential programs; here, we examine three properties. For \( i \in \{1..n\} \), let

\[ \Gamma_{bc} = x_i: k_i \text{ says } \tau_i, c_i: \text{Alice says } (k_i^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_i^{-}) \]

where \( k_i \) is a primitive principal protecting the \( i^{th} \) resource of type \( \tau_i \), and \( c_i \) is a credential for the \( i^{th} \) resource and protected by Alice. Assume \( k_i \notin \{\text{Alice}, \text{Friends}, p\} \) for all \( i \) where \( p \) represents a (potentially malicious) user of Alice’s service, and Friends is a principal for Alice’s friends, (e.g., Friends = (Bob \lor Carol)). Also, define \( pc_p = p^{-} \) and \( pc_A = Alice^{-} \).

- \( p \) cannot access resources without a credential. For any \( e, \ell, \) and \( \tau' \) such that \( \Gamma_{bc}: pc_p \vdash e : \ell \cap p^{-} \text{ says } \tau' \), the value of \( e \) is independent of \( x_i \) for all \( i \).

- \( p \) cannot use unrelated credentials to access resources. For any \( e, \ell, \) and \( \tau' \) such that

\[ \Gamma_{bc}, c_p: (k_1^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_1^{-}); pc_p \vdash e : \ell \cap p^{-} \text{ says } \tau' \]

the value \( e \) computes is independent of \( x_i \) for \( i \neq 1 \).

- Alice cannot disclose secrets by issuing credentials. For all \( i \) and \( j \neq 1 \), define

\[ \Gamma'_{bc} = x_i: k_i \text{ says } \tau_i, c_i: \text{Alice says } (k_i^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_i^{-}), \]

\[ c_F: \text{Friends says } (k_1^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_1^{-}) \]

Then if \( \Gamma'_{bc}: pc_A \vdash e : \ell \cap p^{-} \text{ says } (k_j^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_j^{-}) \) for some \( e, \ell, \) and \( \tau' \), the value of \( e \) is independent of \( x_j \).

These properties demonstrate the power of FLAC’s type system. The first two ensure that credentials really are necessary for \( p \) to access protected resources, even indirectly. In the first, \( p \) has no credentials, and the type system ensures that \( p \) cannot invoke a program that produces a value \( p \) can read (represented by \( \ell \cap p^{-} \)) that depends on any variable \( x_i \). In the second, a credential \( c_p \) with type \( k_1^{-} \xrightarrow{\ell^{-}} k_1^{-} \) is accessible to \( p \), but \( p \) cannot use it to access other variables. The third property eliminates covert channels like the one discussed in Section 2.2. It implies that credentials issued by Alice do not leak information, in this case about Alice’s friends. By implementing bearer credentials in FLAC, we can demonstrate these three properties with relatively little effort.
6. FLAC Proof theory

6.1. Properties of \textit{says}

FLAC’s type system constrains how principals apply existing facts to derive new facts. For instance, a property of \textit{says} in other authorization logics (e.g., Lampson et al. [28] and Abadi [2]) is that implications that hold for top-level propositions also hold for propositions of any principal $\ell$:

$$\vdash (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rightarrow (\ell \text{ says } \tau_1 \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } \tau_2)$$

The $pc$ annotations on FLAC function types refine this property. Each implication (in other words, each function) in FLAC is annotated with an upper bound on the information flow context it may be invoked within. To lift such an implication to operate on propositions protected at label $\ell$, the label $\ell$ must flow to the $pc$ of the implication. Thus, for all $\ell$ and $\tau_1$,

$$\vdash (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rightarrow (\ell \text{ says } \tau_1 \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } \tau_2)$$

This judgment is a FLAC typing judgment in \textit{logical form}, where terms have been omitted. We write such judgments with an empty typing context (as above) when the judgment is valid for any $\vdash$, $\Gamma$, and $pc$. A judgment in logical form is valid if a \textit{proof term} exists for the specified type, proving the type is inhabited. The above type has proof term

\[
\lambda(f:(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2))[^{\ell}].
\lambda(x:\ell \text{ says } \tau_1)[^{\ell}]. \text{bind } x' = x \text{ in } \eta_{\ell} f x'.
\]

In order to apply $f$, we must first \textit{bind} $x$, so according to rules $\text{BINDM}$ and $\text{APP}$, the function $f$ must have a label at least as restrictive as $\ell$, and $\text{UNITM}$ requires the label of the returned value must also be as restrictive as $\ell$. We can actually prove a slightly more general version of the above theorem:

$$\vdash (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rightarrow (\ell \text{ says } \tau_1 \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } \tau_2)$$

This version permits using the implications in more restrictive contexts, but doesn’t map as well to a DCC theorem since the principal of the return type differs from the argument type.

These refinements of DCC’s theorems are crucial for supporting applications like commitment schemes and bearer credentials. Recall from Sections 5.1 and 5.2 that the security of these mechanisms relied in part on restricting the $pc$ to a specific principal’s integrity. Without such refinements, principal $q$ could open principal $p$’s commitments using $\text{open}$, or create credentials with $p$ authority: $p \Rightarrow p'$. Other properties of \textit{says} common to DCC and other logics (cf. [1] for examples) are similarly refined by $pc$ bounds. Two examples are: $\vdash \tau \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } \tau$ which has proof term: $\lambda(x:\tau)[^{\ell}]. \eta_{\ell} \tau$ and

$$\vdash \ell \text{ says } (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rightarrow (\ell \text{ says } \tau_1 \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } \tau_2)$$
with proof term:

\[
\lambda(f: \ell \text{ says } (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2))[\ell]. \text{bind } f' = f \text{ in } \\
\lambda(y: \ell \text{ says } \tau_1)[\ell]. \text{bind } y' = y \text{ in } \eta_{\ell \text{ bind } f'} y'
\]

Some theorems of DCC cannot be obtained in FLAC, due to the \(pc\) restriction on UNITM as well as the more restrictive protection relation. For example, chains of \text{says} are not commutative in FLAC. Given \(\ell_1, \ell_2,\) and \(pc,\)

\[\not\models \ell_1 \text{ says } \ell_2 \text{ says } \tau \overset{pc}{\rightarrow} \ell_2 \text{ says } \ell_1 \text{ says } \tau\]

unless \(\Pi \models \ell_1 \sqcup pc \subseteq \ell_2\) and \(\Pi \models \ell_2 \sqcup pc \subseteq \ell_1,\) which implies \(\ell_1, \ell_2,\) and \(pc\) must be equivalent in \(\Pi.\) CCD [3], a logic related to DCC, is also non-commutative with respect to \text{says}, but does not have an associated term language.

Preserving the nesting order of \text{says} types is attractive for authorization settings since it encodes the provenance of statements. It also enables modeling of cryptographic mechanisms in FLAC (cf. [22]) where \(\ell \text{ says } \tau\) is interpreted as a value of type \(\tau\) protected by encryption key \(\ell^{\text{enc}}\) and signing key \(\ell^{\text{sign}}.\) Preserving the order of nested types in this context is critical for modeling decryption and verification of protected values.

### 6.2. Dynamic Hand-off

Many authorization logics support delegation using a “hand-off” axiom. In DCC, this axiom is actually a provable theorem:

\(\models (q \text{ says } (p \Rightarrow q)) \rightarrow (p \Rightarrow q)\)

where \(p \Rightarrow q\) is shorthand for

\[\forall X. (p \text{ says } X \Rightarrow q \text{ says } X)\]

However, \(p \Rightarrow q\) is only inhabited if \(p \subseteq q\) in the security lattice. Thus, DCC can reason about the consequences of \(p \subseteq q\) (whether it is true for the lattice or not), but a DCC program cannot produce a term of type \(p \Rightarrow q\) unless \(p \subseteq q.\)

FLAC programs, on the other hand, can create new trust relationships from delegation expressions using \text{assume} terms. The type analogous to \(p \Rightarrow q\) in FLAC is

\[\forall X[pc]. (p \text{ says } X \overset{pc}{\Rightarrow} q \text{ says } X)\]

which we wrote as \(p \overset{pc}{\Rightarrow} q\) in Section 5.2. FLAC programs construct terms of this type from proofs of authority, represented by terms with acts-for types. This feature enables a more general form of hand-off, which we state formally below.
Proposition 1 (Dynamic hand-off). For all \( \ell \) and \( pc' \), let \( pc = \ell^{-} \land \nabla(p^{-}) \land q^{-} \land \nabla(pc') \)

\[
(\nabla(q^{-}) \triangleright \nabla(p^{-})) \xrightarrow{pc} (p \subseteq q) \xrightarrow{pc} (pc' \subseteq q) \xrightarrow{pc} \\
\forall X[pc']. (p \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc'} q \text{ says } X)
\]

Proof term.

\[
\lambda(pf_1:\nabla(q^{-}) \triangleright\nabla(p^{-}))[pc]. \text{assume } pf_1 \text{ in} \\
\lambda(pf_2:(p \subseteq q))[pc]. \text{assume } pf_2 \text{ in} \\
\lambda(pf_3:(pc' \subseteq q))[pc]. \text{assume } pf_3 \text{ in} \\
\Lambda X[pc']. \lambda(x:p \text{ says } X)[pc']. \text{bind } x' = x \text{ in } \eta q x'
\]

The principal \( pc = \ell^{-} \land \nabla(p^{-}) \land q^{-} \land \nabla(pc') \) restricts delegation (hand-off) to contexts with sufficient integrity to authorize the delegations made by the assume terms. In other words, the context that creates these delegations must be authorized by the combined authority of \( \nabla(p^{-}), q^{-}, \) and \( \nabla(pc') \).

The three arguments are proofs of authority with acts-for types: a proof of \( \nabla(q^{-}) \triangleright \nabla(p^{-}) \), a proof of \( p \subseteq q \), and a proof of \( pc' \subseteq q \). The \( pc \) ensures that the proofs have sufficient integrity to be used in assume terms since it has the integrity of both \( \nabla(p^{-}) \) and \( q^{-} \). Note that low-integrity or confidential delegation values must first be bound via bind before the above term may be applied. Thus the \( pc \) would reflect the protection level of both arguments. Principals \( \ell^{-} \) and \( pc' \) are unconstrained, but the third proof argument ensures that flows from \( pc' \) to \( q \) are authorized, since a principal with access to \( q \)'s secrets could infer something about the context (protected at \( pc' \)) in which the hand-off function is applied. Other dynamic hand-off formulations are possible, Proposition 1 simply has the fewest assumptions. Other formulations can eliminate the need for proofs \( pf_1, pf_2, \) and/or \( pf_3 \) if these relationships already exist in the context defining the hand-off.

Dynamic hand-off terms give FLAC programs a level of expressiveness and security not offered by other authorization logics. Observe that \( pc' \) may be chosen independently of the other principals. This means that although the \( pc \) prevents low-integrity principals from creating hand-off terms, a high-integrity principal may create a hand-off term and provide it to an arbitrary principal. Hand-off terms in FLAC, then, are similar to capabilities since even untrusted principals may use them to change the protection level of values. Unlike in most capability systems, however, the propagation of hand-off terms can be constrained using information flow policies.

Terms that have types of the form in Proposition 1 illustrate a subtlety of enforcing information flow in an authorization mechanism. Because these terms relabel information from one protection level to another protection level, the transformed information implicitly depends on the proofs of authorization. FLAC ensures that the information security of these proofs is protected—like that of all other values—even as the policies of other information are being modified. Hence, authorization proofs cannot be used as a side channel to leak information.
Syntax

\[ e ::= \ldots \mid \ll e \rr \ell \]

Evaluation contexts

\[ E ::= \ldots \mid \ll E \rr \ell \]

Evaluation rules

\[ [E\text{-APP}^*] \ (\lambda (x: \tau)[pc]. e) \ w \rightarrow \ll e[x \rightarrow w] \rr_{pc} \]
\[ [E\text{-TAPP}^*] \ (\Lambda X[pc]. e) \ \tau \rightarrow \ll e[X \rightarrow \tau] \rr_{pc} \]
\[ [E\text{-BINDM}^*] \ \text{bind } x = \eta \ w \ in \ e \rightarrow \ll e[x \rightarrow w] \rr \ell \]
\[ [O\text{-CTX}] \ \ll w \rr \ell \rightarrow w \]

Typing rules

\[ [\text{CTX}] \]
\[ \frac{}{\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \tau \quad \Pi \vdash pc \subseteq pc'}{\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \ll e \rr_{pc'} : \tau} \]

Fig. 9. Extensions to support protection contexts.

7. Semantic security properties of FLAC

7.1. Trace indistinguishability

We express our semantic results in terms of the traces of a program observable to an attacker. FLAC traces are simply the sequence of terms under the \( \rightarrow \) relation. That is, each evaluation step of the form \( e \rightarrow e' \) generates a new trace element \( e' \). We write the trace generated by taking \( n \) steps from \( e \) to \( e' \) as \( e \rightarrow^{*} e' \), where \( t[0] = e \) and \( t[n] = e' \).

FLAC traces are not fully observable to an attacker. Trace elements generated by protected information such as sealed values or protected contexts such as within a bind or lambda term are hidden from the attacker. This approach models the scenario where sealed values are implemented by encrypting and signing data, and computation may only be done on these values by hosts with access to the necessary cryptographic keys.\(^{18}\) An insecure program in this model allows an attacker to learn information by allowing protected information to flow to sealed values or contexts that are observable by the attacker.

Before formally defining what portions of program trace are available to an attack, we must first add some additional bookkeeping to our semantic rules. Specifically, we need additional notation for evaluating some intermediate expressions. The notation \( \ll e \rr \ell \) denotes an intermediate expression \( e \) evaluated in a context protected at \( \ell \). We extend our grammar in Figure 2 with this notation as below:

Figure 9 presents rules for introducing and eliminating protected contexts. Rules E-APP*, E-TAPP*, and E-BINDM* replace their counterparts in Figure 3 with rules that introduce a protected context based

\(^{18}\)DFLATE [22] makes this connection with cryptographic enforcement more explicit for a distributed extension of FLAC.
Fig. 10. Observation function definitions
on the relevant label. Rule O-CTX eliminates the protected context when the intermediate expression is fully evaluated.

The FLAC programs observable to an attacker are defined by an observation function \( O(e, \Pi, p, \pi) \), defined in Figure 10a. An expression \( e \) is observable by \( p \) in delegation context \( \Pi \) depending on the authority of \( p \) relative to the protected terms in \( e \). The projection \( \pi \) specifies whether to consider the confidentiality of protected terms (\( \pi = \rightarrow \)) or the integrity (\( \pi = \leftarrow \)). For example, sealed values such as \( \overline{\overline{\pi} w} \) are observable by principal \( p \) if \( p \) acts for \( \ell \), otherwise they are erased. Protected contexts like \( \overline{\overline{\cong} e} \) are treated similarly. To simplify our proofs, we collapse terms whose subterms have been erased. For example \( \langle \circ, \circ \rangle \) is collapsed to \( \circ \). For values with singleton types like \( \langle \cdot \rangle \) and \( \langle a \cong b \rangle \) we erase the value since no information is learned from the value itself.

Erasing delegations in the context of where terms essentially hides the delegations that justify a value’s flow from the attacker. This is consistent with the idea that attackers may learn implicit information from flows that introduce new delegations. In other words, by observing differences in outputs the attacker may infer the existence of different delegations, but they are not explicit in the output. In DFLATE [22], these delegations are explicit in the output, modeling values that carry certified justifications of why their flow was authorized by the program.

The observability of trace elements is defined in Figure 10b in terms of the observability function for terms. Note that duplicate entries (which may occur due to evaluation in protected contexts) are removed.

We now can define trace indistinguishability. Two traces \( t \) and \( t' \) are indistinguishable to a principal \( p^{\pi} \) in delegation context \( \Pi \) if the observable elements of \( t \) and \( t' \) are equal.

**Definition 1** (Trace indistinguishability).

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall \Pi \; t & \approx_{p^{\pi}} t' \iff \mathcal{O}(t, \Pi, p, \pi) = \mathcal{O}(t', \Pi, p, \pi) \\
\end{align*}
\]

### 7.2. Robust declassification

**Robust declassification** [46] requires disclosures of secret information to be independent of low-integrity information. Robust declassification permits some confidential information to be disclosed to an attacker, but attackers can influence neither the decision to disclose information nor the choice of what information is disclosed. Therefore, robust declassification is a more appropriate security condition than noninterference when programs are intended to disclose information.

Following Myers et al. [34], we extend our set of terms with a “hole” term \( \bullet \) representing portions of a program that are under the control of an attacker. We extend the type system with the following rule for holes:

**[HOLE]**

\[
\frac{\Pi \vdash \overline{H^\leftarrow} \triangleright pc^\leftarrow \quad \Pi \vdash pc^\leftarrow \subseteq \Delta(H^\leftarrow)}{\Pi; \Gamma; p : \bullet : \tau}
\]

Where \( \Delta(H^\leftarrow) \) is the view of principal \( H^\leftarrow \). The view of a principal is a dual notion to voice, introduced by Cecchetti et al. [15] to represent the confidentiality observable to a principal. Given a principal in normal form \( q^\rightarrow \wedge r^\rightarrow \), the view of that principal is

\[
\Delta(q^\rightarrow \wedge r^\rightarrow) \equiv q^\rightarrow \wedge r^\rightarrow
\]
Theorem 1

In other words \( \Delta(H^-) \) represents the confidentiality of information observable to the attacker \( H^- \). Therefore, the HOLE premises \( \Pi \vdash H^- \models pc^- \) and \( \Pi \models pc^- \subseteq \Delta(H^-) \) require that holes be inserted only in contexts that are controlled by and observable to the attacker.

We write \( e[\bullet] \) to denote a program \( e \) with holes. Let an attack be a vector \( \vec{a} \) of terms and \( e[\vec{a}] \) be the program where \( a_i \) is substituted for \( \bullet_i \).

**Definition 2** (\( \Pi \)-fair attacks). An attack \( \vec{a} \) is a \( \Pi \)-fair attack on a well-typed program with holes \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e[\bullet] : \tau \) if the program \( e[\vec{a}] \) is also well typed (thus \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e[\vec{a}] : \tau \)), and furthermore, for each \( a_i \in \vec{a} \), we have \( \Pi; \Gamma'; pc \vdash [a_i] : \tau' \) where each entry in \( \Gamma' \) has the form \( y : \ell \) says \( \tau'' \) and \( \forall y : \ell \) says \( \tau'' \in \Gamma' \), \( \Pi \models \ell \rightarrow \subseteq \Delta(H^-) \).

By specifying the relationships between confidential information labeled \( H^- \) and the integrity of the attacker \( H^- \), we can precisely express the authority an attacker is able to wield in its \( \Pi \)-fair attacks against protected information. Proposition 2 states the conditions under which a \( \Pi \)-fair attack is noninterfering. Condition 1 specifies that \( \tau' \) contains confidential information (labeled \( H^- \)), Condition 2 specifies that this information is not visible to the attacker (a principal with integrity \( H^- \)) since it does not flow to the attacker’s view. Finally, Condition 3 specifies that the attacker \( H^- \) has insufficient integrity to declassify information at label \( H^- \).

**Proposition 2** (Noninterfering fair attacks). For \( H \) such that

1. \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau' \)
2. \( \Pi \not\models H^- \subseteq \Delta(H^-) \)
3. \( \Pi \not\models H^- \not\models \nabla(H^-) \),

let \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau', \Gamma' ; pc \vdash \tau : \tau \). Then for all \( \Pi \)-fair attacks \( a \) where \( \Pi' \vdash \Pi' \supseteq \Pi \), and \( a[x \mapsto v_i] \longrightarrow a'_i \), \( a'_1 = a'_2 \).

**Proof.** By Definition 2, there exists some \( \Gamma'' \) such that \( \Pi; \Gamma'' ; pc \vdash a_i : \tau' \) where \( \forall y : \tau'' \in \Gamma' \). \( \Pi \vdash \tau'' \subseteq \Delta(H^-) \). Therefore since \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau' \), we have \( x \not\in \Gamma'' \) and thus \( a[x \mapsto v_i] = a \). Consequently, \( a'_1 = a'_2 \). \( \square \)

In other words, \( \Pi \)-fair attacks must be well-typed on variables observable to the attacker in delegation context \( \Pi \). Under the three conditions in Proposition 2, these attacks are noninterfering. Unfair or interfering attacks give the attacker enough power to break security directly by creating new declassifications without exploiting existing ones. Restricting attacks to noninterfering \( \Pi \)-fair attacks also rule out nonsensical scenarios such as when the “attacker” has the authority to read the confidential information. Noninterfering fair attacks represent an upper-bound on the power of the attacker over low-integrity portions of the program.

Our robust declassification theorem is stated in terms of an attacker’s delegation context \( \Pi_H \) which is used to specify the noninterfering \( \Pi_H \)-fair attacks on a program. The program itself is typed under a distinct delegation context \( \Pi \) that may be extended by assume terms to permit new flows of information, including flows observable to the attacker.

**Theorem 1** (Robust declassification). Suppose \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau', \Gamma' ; pc \vdash e[\bullet] : \tau \). For \( \Pi_H \) and \( H \) such that

1. \( \Pi_H \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau' \)
2. \( \Pi_H \not\models H^- \subseteq \Delta(H^-) \)
3. \( \Pi_H \not\models H^- \not\models \nabla(H^-) \),
Then for all $\Pi_H$-fair attacks $\vec{a}_1$ and $\vec{a}_2$ such that $\Pi; \Gamma, x: \tau', \Gamma'; pc \vdash e[\vec{a}_i] : \tau$, if $e[a_j][x \mapsto v_i] \xrightarrow{e} e'_{ij}$ for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, then the for the traces $t_{ij} = (e[a_j][x \mapsto v_i]) : e'_{ij}$, we have

$$t_{11} \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} t_{21} \iff t_{12} \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} t_{22}$$

**Proof.** By induction on the evaluation of $e$.

**Case E-APP* ($e = (\lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e''][a_i])$:** By Proposition 2 $x$ is not free in $a_i$, therefore

$$e'[x \mapsto v_i] = \lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e''][x \mapsto v_i][a_i]$$

Suppose $e''[x \mapsto v_1] \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} e''[x \mapsto v_2]$ then

$$(\lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e''[x \mapsto v_1])[a_j] \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} (\lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e''[x \mapsto v_2])[a_j]$$

Since $v_1$ and $v_2$ are closed, we also have

$$e''[x \mapsto v_1][y \mapsto a_j] \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} e''[x \mapsto v_2][y \mapsto a_j]$$

By a symmetric argument, we also have that $e''[x \mapsto v_1] \not\xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} e''[x \mapsto v_2]$ implies

$$e''[x \mapsto v_1][y \mapsto a_j] \not\xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} e''[x \mapsto v_2][y \mapsto a_j]$$

Then it remains to show that if $\mathcal{O}(\lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e'', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \circ$ then

$$\mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[x \mapsto v_1][y \mapsto a_1] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[x \mapsto v_2][y \mapsto a_1] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$$

$$\iff \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[x \mapsto v_1][y \mapsto a_2] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[x \mapsto v_2][y \mapsto a_2] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$$

This holds by the definition of $\mathcal{O}$ since $\mathcal{O}(\lambda(y: \tau'')[pc', e'', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \circ$ implies that $\Pi \not\vdash \Delta(H^-) \geq pc'$.  

**Case E-APP* ($e = a_j x$):** If $\mathcal{O}(v_1, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \neq \mathcal{O}(v_2, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$ then by definition $t[0]_{1j} \not\xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} t[0]_{2j}$. Thus $t_{1j} \not\xrightarrow{\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}} t_{2j}$. Therefore assume $\mathcal{O}(v_1, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(v_2, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$. Since $a_j$ has the form $\lambda(y: \tau)[pc']$, $e''$, we need to show that

$$\mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_1] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_2] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$$

$$\iff \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_1] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_2] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$$

Without loss of generality, assume $\Pi \vdash \Delta(H^-) \geq pc^-$. Then since $\mathcal{O}(v_1, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(v_2, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$, by the definition of $\mathcal{O}$, we also have

$$\mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_1] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = \mathcal{O}(\langle \! e''[y \mapsto v_2] \! \rangle_{pc'}, \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)$$
Case **E-TAPP***: Similar to E-App*.

Case **O-CTX**: \( e = \{ a_j \} \epsilon \) By Proposition 2.

Case **O-CTX**: \( e = \{ x \} \epsilon \) Trivial.

Case **E-CASE** \( e = \text{case } x \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). a^1_j | \text{inj}_2(y). a^2_j \): Not well typed since \( x \) cannot be a sum type.

Case **E-CASE** \( e = \text{case } a_j \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1 | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2 \): Observe

\[
e[x \mapsto v_i] = \text{case } a_j \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1[x \mapsto v_i] | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2[x \mapsto v_i]
\]

Suppose

\[
\text{case } a_j \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1[x \mapsto v_1] | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2[x \mapsto v_1]
\]

\[
\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}
\]

\[
\text{case } a_j \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1[x \mapsto v_2] | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2[x \mapsto v_2]
\]

then for \( k \in \{1, 2\} \) we have

\[
e_k[x \mapsto v_1] \cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} e_k[x \mapsto v_2]
\]

therefore since \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) are closed, we also have

\[
e_k[x \mapsto v_1][y \mapsto a_j] \cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} e_k[x \mapsto v_2][y \mapsto a_j]
\]

Now suppose

\[
\text{case } a_j \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1[x \mapsto v_1] | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2[x \mapsto v_1]
\]

\[
\not\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)}
\]

\[
\text{case } a_i \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(y). e_1[x \mapsto v_2] | \text{inj}_2(y). e_2[x \mapsto v_2]
\]

then by definition \( t[0]_{1j} \not\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} t[0]_{2j} \). Thus \( t_{1j} \not\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} t_{2j} \).

Case **E-BINDM*** \( e = \text{bind } y = \{ a_j \} \text{ in } e' \) Follows by an argument similar to that for E-App.

Case **E-BINDM*** \( e = \text{bind } y = x \text{ in } e'[a_j] \) By BINDM (wlog), \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : H^- \) says \( \tau' \Gamma', y : \tau'' ; pc \wedge H^- \vdash [a_j] : \tau \) and by HOLE, \( \Pi \vdash pc \wedge H^- \not\models \Delta(H^-) \). Therefore the value of \( x \) is distinguishable by \( \Delta(H^-) \) and \( t[0]_{1j} \not\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} t[0]_{2j} \).

Case **E-ASSUME** \( e = \text{assume } \langle p \not\geq q \rangle \text{ in } e[a_j] \): By Proposition 2, \( x \) is not free in \( a_j \), therefore \( e[a_j][x \mapsto v_i] = e[x \mapsto v_i][a_j] \) if

\[
O(e[x \mapsto v_1][a_j], \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \neq O(e[x \mapsto v_2][a_j], \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)
\]

then by definition \( t_{1j} \not\cong^\Pi_{\Delta(H^-)} t_{2j} \). If instead we have

\[
O(e[x \mapsto v_1][a_j], \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = O(e[x \mapsto v_2][a_j], \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow)
\]
then we need to prove that
\[ O(e_1', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = O(e_2', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \iff O(e_1'', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = O(e_2'', \Pi, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \]
where \( e' \) is of the form \( e'_{ij} = e[x \mapsto v_i][a_j] \) where \( \langle p \geq q \rangle \). Since \( x \) is not free in \( a_j \), if
\[ O(e[x \mapsto v_1][a_j], \Pi \cdot \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) = O(e[x \mapsto v_2][a_j], \Pi \cdot \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \]
for \( j = 1 \), then it holds for \( j = 2 \) as well. Similarly, if
\[ O(e[x \mapsto v_1][a_j], \Pi \cdot \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \neq O(e[x \mapsto v_2][a_j], \Pi \cdot \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Delta(H^-), \rightarrow) \]
for \( j = 1 \), then it holds for \( j = 2 \).

**Case W-App:** Similar to the assume case.

**Case W-Tapp:** Similar to the assume case.

**Case W-Unpair:** Trivial.

**Case W-Case:** Similar to the assume case.

**Case W-Bindm:** Similar to the assume case.

**Case W-Assume:** Similar to the assume case.

\[ \square \]

Our formulation of robust declassification is in some sense more general than previous definitions since it permits some endorsements. Previous definitions of robust declassification [34,46] forbid endorsement altogether; **qualified robustness** [34] permits endorsement but offers only possibilistic security.

Theorem 1 permits some declassifications that prior definitions reject. For example, our definition admits declassifications of \( x \) even if \( \Pi \models H^- \subseteq \tau' \). In other words, even though low-integrity attacks cannot influence declassification, it is possible to declassify a secret input that has low-integrity. Therefore, an attacker that is permitted to influence the secret input could affect how much information is revealed. This is an example of a **malleable information flow** [15], which neither FLAC nor prior definitions (in the presence of endorsement) prevent in general. Cecchetti *et al.* [15] present a language based on FLAC that replaces assume with restricted declassification and endorsement terms to enforce nonmalleable information flow.

### 7.3. Bracketed semantics

Theorem 1 demonstrates that the indistinguishability of FLAC program traces is invariant under fair attacks. However, this result is only meaningful if FLAC programs that process protected information actually generate indistinguishable traces when we expect them to. These expectations are formalized in our noninterference theorem, but to understand and prove that theorem, we need additional formal tools.

Our noninterference proof is based on the bracketed semantics approach used by Pottier and Simonet [37]. This approach extends FLAC with **bracketed expressions** which represent two executions of a program, and allows us to reason about noninterference in FLAC, a 2-safety **hyperproperty** [17], as **type safety** in the extended language.

Figure 11 presents the bracket extensions for FLAC. Where-values \( w \) and expressions \( e \) may be bracketed. New B-* evaluation rules propagate brackets out of subexpressions and ensure bracketed terms do not get stuck unless the unbracketed terms do. B-STEP evaluates expressions inside of brackets.
Syntax

\[ w ::= \ldots \mid (w \mid w) \]
\[ e ::= \ldots \mid (e \mid e) \]

Evaluation rules

\[ [\text{B-STEP}] \quad \frac{e_i \longrightarrow e_i'}{e_j \in \{1, 2\}} \quad (e_1 \mid e_2) \longrightarrow (e_1' \mid e_2') \]
\[ [\text{B-APP}] \quad (w_1 \mid w_2) \rightarrow (w_1 \mid w_1' \mid w_2 \mid w_2') \]
\[ [\text{B-TAPP}] \quad (w \mid w') \tau \rightarrow (w \tau \mid w' \tau) \]
\[ [\text{B-UNPAIR}] \quad \text{proj}_i (w \mid w') \rightarrow (\text{proj}_i w \mid \text{proj}_i w') \]
\[ [\text{B-BINDM}] \quad \text{bind } x = (w \mid w') \text{ in } e \rightarrow (\text{bind } x = w \text{ in } e_1 \mid \text{bind } x = w' \text{ in } e_2) \]
\[ [\text{B-CASE}] \quad \begin{cases} \{i, j\} = \{1, 2\} \\ \text{case } w \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x). e_1 \mid \text{inj}_2(x). e_2 \rightarrow \text{case } w' \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x). e_1 \mid \text{inj}_2(x). e_2 \end{cases} \]
\[ [\text{B-ASSUME}] \quad \text{assume } (w \mid w') \text{ in } e \rightarrow (\text{assume } w \text{ in } e_1 \mid \text{assume } w' \text{ in } e_2) \]

Typing rules

\[ [\text{BRACKET}] \quad e_1 = v_1 \iff e_2 \neq v_2 \]
\[ [\Pi \vdash (H^\pi \sqcup pc) \subseteq pc'] \quad [\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e_1 : \tau \quad [\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e_2 : \tau] \quad [\Pi \vdash H^\pi \subseteq \tau] \]
\[ [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (e_1 \mid e_2) : \tau] \]
\[ [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_1 \mid w_2) : \tau] \]
\[ [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w_1 : \tau \quad [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w_2 : \tau] \quad [\Pi \vdash H^\pi \subseteq \tau] \]
\[ [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_1 \mid w_2) : \tau] \]
\[ [\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_1 \mid w_2) : \tau] \]

Observation function

\[ \mathcal{O}(e_1 \mid e_2, \Pi, p, \pi) = \begin{cases} \circ & \mathcal{O}(e_1, \Pi, p, \pi) = \circ \\ (\mathcal{O}(e_1, \Pi, p, \pi) \mid \mathcal{O}(e_2, \Pi, p, \pi)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

Fig. 11. Extensions for bracketed semantics

The typing rules \text{BRACKET} and \text{BRACKET-VALUES} illustrate the primary purpose of the bracketed semantics: to link distinguishable evaluations of an expression to the expression’s type. \text{BRACKET} requires that the bracketed expressions \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) are typable at a \( pc' \) that protects \( H^\pi \sqcup pc' \) and have a type \( \tau \) protects \( H^\pi \). \text{BRACKET-VALUES} relaxes the restriction on \( pc \) for where-values.

Our first result on the bracketed semantics is that they are sound and complete with respect to the unbracketed semantics. By soundness, we mean that given a step in the bracketed execution, then at least one of the left or right projections take a step such that they are in relation with the bracketed execu-
tion. By completeness, we mean that given a left and right execution, we can construct a corresponding bracketed execution. We now prove the soundness of the bracketed semantics.

**Lemma 1 (Soundness).** If $e \longrightarrow e'$ then $[e]_k \longrightarrow^* [e']_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2\}$.

*Proof.* By induction on the evaluation of $e$. Observe that all bracketed rules in Figure ? except B-STEP only expand brackets, so $[e]_k = [e']_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2\}$. For B-STEP, $[e]_j \longrightarrow [e']_j$ and $[e]_j = [e']_j$. 

Before proving completeness, we prove if the bracketed term is stuck then either left or right execution are stuck.

**Lemma 2 (Stuck expressions).** If e gets stuck then $[e]_i$ is stuck for some $i \in \{1, 2\}$.

*Proof.* By induction on the structure of $e$. See Appendix A for complete proof.

**Lemma 3 (Completeness).** If $[e]_1 \longrightarrow^* v_1$ and $[e]_2 \longrightarrow^* v_2$, then there exists some $v$ such that $e \longrightarrow^* v$.

*Proof.* Assume $[e]_1 \longrightarrow^* v_1$ and $[e]_2 \longrightarrow^* v_2$. The extended set of rules in Figure ?? always move brackets out of subterms, and therefore can only be applied a finite number of times. Therefore, by Lemma 1, if $e$ diverges, either $[e]_1$ or $[e]_2$ diverge; this contradicts our assumption.

Furthermore, by Lemma 2, if the evaluation of $e$ gets stuck, either $[e]_1$ or $[e]_2$ gets stuck. Therefore, since we assumed $[e]_1 \longrightarrow^* v_1$, then $e$ must terminate. Thus, there exists some $v$ such that $e \longrightarrow^* v$.

Using the soundness and completeness results, we can relate properties of programs executed under the bracketed semantics to executions under the non-bracketed semantics. In particular, since bracketed expressions represent distinguishable executions of a program, and may only have types that protect $H^{-}$ (or $H^-$), it is important to establish that the type of a FLAC expression is preserved by evaluation. Lemma 4 states this formally. This lemma helps us reason about whether an expression is bracketed based on its type.

**Lemma 4 (Subject Reduction).** Let $\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau$. If $e \longrightarrow e'$ then $\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau$.

*Proof.* By induction on the evaluation of $e$. See Appendix A for complete proof and supporting lemmas.

### 7.4. Delegation invariance

FLAC programs dynamically extend trust relationships, enabling new flows of information. Nevertheless, well-typed programs have end-to-end semantic properties that enforce strong information security. These properties derive primarily from FLAC’s control of the delegation context. The ASSUME rule ensures that only high-integrity proofs of authorization can extend the delegation context, and furthermore that such extensions occur only in high-integrity contexts.

That low-integrity contexts cannot extend the delegation context turns out to be a crucial property. This property allows us to state a useful invariant about the evaluation of FLAC programs. Recall that assume terms evaluate to where terms in the FLAC semantics. Thus, FLAC programs typically compute values containing a hierarchy of nested where terms. The terms record the values whose types were used to extend the delegation context during type checking.
For a well-typed FLAC program, we can prove that certain trust relationships could not have been added by the program. Characterizing these relationships requires a concept of the minimal authority required to cause one principal to act for another. Although similar, this idea is distinct from the voice of a principal. Consider the relationship between \( a \) and \( a \land b \). The voice of \( a \land b \), \( \nabla(a \land b) \), is sufficient integrity to add a delegation \( a \land b \) to \( a \) so that \( a \triangleright a \land b \). Alternatively, having only the integrity of \( \nabla(b) \) is sufficient to add a delegation \( a \triangleright b \), which also results in \( a \triangleright a \land b \). To precisely characterize which trust relationships cannot be added by a program, we need to identify this minimal integrity \( \nabla(b) \) given the pair of principals \( a \) and \( a \land b \). The following definitions are in service of this goal.

The first definition formalizes the idea that two principals are considered equivalent in a given context if they act for each other.

**Definition 3 (Principal Equivalence).** We say that two principals \( p \) and \( q \) are equivalent in \( \Pi \), denoted \( \Pi \vDash p \equiv q \), if

\[
\Pi \vDash p \triangleright q \text{ and } \Pi \vDash q \triangleright p.
\]

Next, we define the factorization of two principals in a given context. For two principals, \( p \) and \( q \), their factorization involves representing \( q \) as the conjunction of two principals \( q_s \land q_d \) such that \( p \triangleright q_s \) in the desired context. Note that \( p \) need not act for \( q_d \).

**Definition 4 (Factorization).** A \( \Pi \)-factorization of an ordered pair of principals \( (p, q) \) is a tuple \( (p, q_s, q_d) \) such that \( \Pi \vDash q \equiv q_s \land q_d \) and \( \Pi \vDash p \triangleright q_s \).

A factorization is static if \( \Pi = \emptyset \) (and thus \( \mathcal{L} \vdash p \triangleright q_s \)).

Finally, the minimal factorization of \( p \) and \( q \) is a \( q_s \) and \( q_d \) such that \( q_s \) has greater authority and \( q_d \) has less authority than any other factorization of \( p \) and \( q \) in the same context.

**Definition 5 (Minimal Factorization).** A \( \Pi \)-factorization \( (p, q_s, q_d) \) of \( (p, q) \) is minimal if for any \( \Pi \)-factorization \( (p, q'_s, q'_d) \) of \( (p, q) \),

\[
\Pi \vDash q_s \triangleright q'_s \text{ and } \Pi \vDash q'_d \triangleright q_d.
\]

The minimal factorization \( (p, q_s, q_d) \) of \( p \) and \( q \) for a given \( \Pi \) and \( pc \) identifies the authority necessary to cause \( p \) to act for \( q \). Because \( q_s \) is the principal with the greatest authority such that \( p \triangleright q_s \) and \( q \equiv q_s \land q_d \), then speaking for \( q_d \) is sufficient authority to cause \( p \) to act for \( q \) since adding the delegation \( p \triangleright q_d \) would imply that \( p \triangleright q \). This intuition also matches with the fact that \( \Pi \vdash p \triangleright q_d \) if and only if \( q_d = \bot \), which is the case if and only if \( \Pi \vdash p \triangleright q \). Observe also that minimal \( \Pi \)-factorizations are also trivially unique up to equivalence.

Since the \( q_d \) component of minimal factorization can be thought of as the “gap” in authority between two principals, we use \( q_d \) to define the notion of principal subtraction.

**Definition 6 (Principal Subtraction).** Let \( (p, q_s, q_d) \) bet the minimal \( \Pi \)-factorization of \( (p, q) \). We define \( q - p \) in \( \Pi \) to be \( q_d \). That is, \( \Pi \vDash q - p \equiv q_d \). Note that \( q - p \) is not defined outside of a judgement context.

Lemma 5 proves that minimal factorizations exist for all contexts and principals, so principal subtract is well defined.

**Lemma 5 (Minimal Factorizations Exist).** For any context \( \Pi \) and principals \( p, q \), there exists a minimal \( \Pi \)-factorization of \( (p, q) \).
Proof. Given \((p, q)\), we first let \(q_s = p \lor q\). By definition, \(\Pi \vdash p \rightarrow p \lor q\), and for all factorizations \((p, q_s, q_d)\), \(\Pi \vdash p \rightarrow q_s\) and \(\Pi \vdash q \rightarrow q_s\), so \(\Pi \vdash q_s \rightarrow q_d\).

Now let \(D = \{ r \in \mathcal{L} | \Pi \vdash q \equiv q_s \land r\}\). All principals in \(\mathcal{L}\) can be represented as a finite set of meets and joins of names in \(\mathcal{N}\) so \(q\) and \(q_s\) are finite. \(\Pi\) is also finite, adding only finitely-many dynamic equivalences, so \(D\) is finite up to equivalence. Moreover, since \(\Pi \vdash q \equiv (p \lor q) \land q\) (by absorption) we have \(q \in D\). Therefore \(D\) is always non-empty and we can define \(q_d = \sqrt{D}\).

Now let \((p, q_s, q_d)\) be any II-factorization of \((p, q)\). We must show that \(\Pi \vdash q_d' \geq q_d\).

First, see that \(\Pi \vdash q \equiv q_s \land q_d'\) for one direction, observe that \(\Pi \vdash q \geq q_s\) and \(\Pi \vdash q \geq q_d\) (by Definition 3). For the other direction, since \(\Pi \vdash q_s \geq q_s'\), we have \(\Pi \vdash q_s \land q_d' \geq q_s' \land q_d\), so \(\Pi \vdash q_s \land q_d' \geq q\).

Therefore, by the definition of \(D\), we know \(q_d' \in D\), so by the definition of \(\lor\) and \(q_d\), \(\Pi \vdash q_d' \geq q_d\). Thus \((p, q_s, q_d)\) is a minimal II-factorization of \((p, q)\).

We can now state precisely which trust relationships may change in a given information flow context.\(^{19}\)

Lemma 6 (Delegation Invariance). Let \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau\) such that \(e \rightarrow^{*} e'\) where \(v\). Then

1. There exist \(r, t \in \mathcal{L}\) and \(\Pi' = \Pi, \langle r \geq t \rangle\) such that \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v : (r \geq t)\), \(\Pi \vdash pc \rightarrow \nabla(t)\) and \(\Pi'; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : \tau\).

2. For all principals \(p\) and \(q\), if \(\Pi \nvdash p \rightarrow q\) and \(\Pi \nvdash pc \rightarrow \nabla(q - p)\), then \(\Pi' \nvdash p \rightarrow q\).

Proof. We prove the first part using subject reduction (Lemma 4) to get \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : \tau\). Then, from WHERE we have \(\Pi'; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : \tau\).

We prove the second part by contradiction. Assume that

\[
\Pi' \vdash p \rightarrow q
\]

Let \((p, q_s, q_d)\) be the minimal II-factorization of \((p, q)\). So, \(\Pi \vdash p \rightarrow q_s\) Since \(\Pi \nvdash p \rightarrow q\), this implies that \(\Pi \nvdash p \rightarrow q_d\) but from (1), we have that

\[
\Pi' \vdash p \rightarrow q_d
\]

So any derivation of (2) must involve the derivation of \(\Pi' \vdash r \rightarrow t\) via R-ASSUME, since R-ASSUME is the only rule that uses the contents of \(\Pi\). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that either (a) \(\Pi \vdash r \rightarrow q_d\), or (b) for some \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) such that \(\Pi \vdash q_d \equiv q_1 \land q_2\), \(\Pi \vdash r \rightarrow q_1\) and \(\Pi \nvdash t \rightarrow q_2\); otherwise \(\Pi' \vdash r \rightarrow t\) is unnecessary to prove (2).

In fact, it must be the case that \(\Pi \vdash r \rightarrow q_d\) (or equivalently \(\Pi \vdash t \rightarrow q_1 \land q_2\)). To see why, assume \(\Pi \nvdash t \rightarrow q_1 \land q_2\); specifically, \(\Pi \vdash t \rightarrow q_1\) and \(\Pi \nvdash t \rightarrow q_2\). Since \(\Pi' \vdash p \rightarrow q_s \land (q_1 \land q_2)\) but \(\Pi \nvdash t \rightarrow q_2\), it must be that \(\Pi \nvdash p \rightarrow q_s \land q_2\), otherwise \(\Pi' \vdash p \rightarrow q_1 \land (q_1 \land q_2)\) wouldn’t hold.

Therefore \((p, q_s \land q_1, q_2)\) is a II-factorization of \((p, q)\). Since \((p, q_s, q_d)\) is a minimal II-factorization, we have that \(\Pi \vdash q_2 \geq q_d\). From R-TRANS, we now have that \(\Pi \vdash t \rightarrow q_d\), but since we assumed \(\Pi \nvdash t \rightarrow q_d\), we have a contradiction. Hence \(\Pi \vdash t \rightarrow q_d\).

\(^{19}\)The original delegation invariance lemma [5] was flawed due to a case where a minor delegation could have a cascading effect that enabled new delegations, breaking the desired invariant. This new (slightly more restrictive) formulation, stated in terms of principal subtraction, addresses more precisely the connection between the \(pc\) and the invariant trust relationships.
By the monotonicity of $\nabla(\cdot)$ with respect to $\geq$ (Proven in Coq for FLAM [7]), we have $\Pi \vdash_1 \nabla(t) \geq \nabla(q_d)$. As shown above, $\Pi \vdash pc \geq \nabla(t)$, so by R-TRANS, $\Pi \vdash pc \geq \nabla(q_d)$. However, recall that $\Pi \not\vdash q - p \equiv q_d$ (Definition 6) contradicting our assumption that $\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(q - p)$.

Therefore, we obtain that $\Pi \not\vdash p \geq q$.

7.5. Noninterference

Lemma 6 is critical for our proof of noninterference, a result that states that public and trusted output of a program cannot depend on restricted (secret or untrusted) information. Our proof of noninterference for FLAC programs relies on a proof of subject reduction under an extended semantics, based on the proof technique of Pottier and Simonet [37]. This technique is mostly standard, so we omit it here. The complete proof of subject reduction and other results are found in Appendix A.

In our noninterference results based on bracketed semantics, including [37], noninterference follows almost directly from the proof of subject reduction. This is because the subject reduction proof shows that evaluating a term cannot change its type. In FLAC, however, subject reduction alone is insufficient; evaluation may enable flows from secret or untrusted inputs to public and trusted types.

To see how, suppose $e$ is a well-typed program according to $\Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e : \tau'$. Furthermore, let $H$ be a principal such that $\Pi \vdash H \subseteq \tau$ and $\Pi \not\vdash H \subseteq \tau'$. In other words, $x$ is a “high” variable (more restrictive; secret and untrusted), and $e$ evaluates to a “low” result (less restrictive; public and trusted). In [37], executions that differ only in secret or untrusted inputs must evaluate to the same value, since otherwise the value would not be well typed. In FLAC, however, if the $pc$ has sufficient integrity, then an assume term could cause $\Pi'; pc \vdash H \subseteq \tau'$ to hold in a delegation context $\Pi'$ of a subterm of $e$.

The key to proving our result relies on using Lemma 6 to constrain the assumptions that can be added to $\Pi'$. Thus noninterference in FLAC is dependent on $H$ and its relationship to $pc$ and the type $\tau'$. For confidentiality, most of this reasoning occurs in the proof of Lemma 7, which does most of the heavy lifting for the noninterference proof. Specifically, Lemma 7 states that for a well-typed program $e$, if the $pc$ is insufficiently trusted to create new flows from $H \rightarrow$ to $\ell^{-}$, then if the portion of $[e]$, observable to $\ell^{-}$ under $\Pi$ is equal to the observable portion of $[e']_2$, then if $e \rightarrow^* e'$, the observable portions of $e'$ are still equal. A corresponding lemma for integrity holds by a similar argument.

**Lemma 7** (Erasure conservation). Suppose $\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau$, then for some $H$ and $\ell$ such that $\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(H^{-} - \ell^{-})$, if $O([e]_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O([e]_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$, then $e \rightarrow^* e'$ implies $O([e']_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O([e']_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$.

**Proof.** By induction on the evaluation of $e$, using the definition of $O$ and Lemma 6.

**Case E-APP**: We have $O(\{\lambda(x : \tau)[pc'], e' \, w\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O(\{\lambda(x : \tau)[pc'], e' \, w\}_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$.

We have to show that $O(\{e' \, x \rightarrow w\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O(\{e' \, x \rightarrow w\}_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$.

Depending on the observability of $pc'$, we have two subcases.

**Case $\Pi \not\vdash \ell^{-} \geq pc'$**: Here $O([w]_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O([w]_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$ and $O([e']_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O([e']_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$. And so, $O(\{e' \, x \rightarrow w\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O(\{e' \, x \rightarrow w\}_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow)$.

**Case $\Pi \vdash \ell^{-} \geq pc'$**: It remains to show that if $O(\{\lambda(x : \tau)[pc'], e'\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = \circ$ then $O(\{e' \, x \rightarrow w\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = \circ$. This holds by the definition of $O$ since $O(\{\lambda(x : \tau)[pc'], e'\}_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = \circ$ implies that $\Pi \not\vdash \ell^{-} \geq pc'$.

**Case E-TAPP**: Similar to the E-APP case.
Case E-BINDM*: We have

\[ O([\text{bind } x = \eta_\ell \ w \ in \ e'], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([\text{bind } x = \eta_\ell \ w \ in \ e'], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \]

Case \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg \ell'^\rightarrow \): Here \( O([e'], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([e'], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \) and \( O([w], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([w], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \).

Case \( \Pi \vdash \ell^\rightarrow > \ell'^\rightarrow \): It remains to show that if \( O([\eta_\ell \ w], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \) then \( O([\langle \ell' \rightarrow \ w \rangle], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). This holds by the definition of \( O \) since \( O([\eta_\ell \ w], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \) implies that \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg \ell'^\rightarrow \).

Case O-CTX: Given \( O([\langle w \rangle], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([\langle w \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \). We have to prove that

\[ O([w], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([w], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \]

We have two cases: either \( O([\langle w \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \neq \circ \) or \( O([\langle w \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). If \( O([\langle w \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \neq \circ \), then the proof is straightforward (since the \( O \) function is invoked on same term \( w \)). If \( O([\langle w \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \), then by inducing on the structure of \( w \), we will show that \( O([w], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). By CTX, we know \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \tau \). If \( \langle\langle w \rangle\rangle \neq \langle\langle w \rangle\rangle \), then \( w \) contains a bracket subexpression \( (w_1 | w_2) \). The “root” values \( v_i \) of \( w_i \) have one of the following forms:

Subcase \( v_i = \lambda(x : \tau')[pc']. e' \): By Lemma 4, WHERE, and LAM, we have \( \Pi'; \Gamma; pc; \vdash \lambda(x : \tau')[pc']. e' : \tau' \xrightarrow{pc} \tau'' \) (thus \( \tau = \tau' \xrightarrow{pc} \tau'' \)), where \( \Pi' \supseteq \Pi \). By BRACKET-VALUE and P-FUN, \( \Pi' \vdash H^\rightarrow \subseteq pc' \) and \( \Pi' \vdash H^\rightarrow \subseteq \tau'' \). By assumption, we have \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg \tau'' \). Therefore we know that \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg H^\rightarrow \) since otherwise (by Definition 6) \( \Pi \vdash \tau'' \). By the definition of \( O \), we have \( O(\lambda(x : \tau')[pc']. e', \Pi', \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \) and so \( O(w_i, 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \) (See the case where for the \( O \) function). Hence proved.

Subcase \( v_i = \lambda x [pc']. e' \): Similar to above case.

Subcase \( v_i = \eta_\ell \ w' \): By Lemma 4, WHERE, and SEALED, we have \( \Pi'; \Gamma; pc; \vdash \eta_\ell \ w' : \tau \), where \( \Pi' \supseteq \Pi \). By BRACKET-VALUE and P-LBL, \( \Pi' \vdash H^\rightarrow \subseteq \ell' \). By assumption, we have \( \Pi \not\vdash pc \gg \tau'' \). Therefore we know that \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg H^\rightarrow \) since otherwise (by Definition 6) \( \Pi \vdash \tau'' \). Involving DI (Lemma 6), we have that \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \gg \ell^\rightarrow \). Therefore, \( O(\eta_\ell \ w' \ell', \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \) and \( O(w_i, 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \).

Subcase \( v_i = \langle w_1 \rangle \langle w_2 \rangle \): Straightforward application of induction hypothesis.

Case ASSUME: Given that \( O([\text{assume } \langle p \gg q \rangle \text{ in } e], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([\text{assume } \langle p \gg q \rangle \text{ in } e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \). We have to prove that

\[ O([e \ where \ \langle p \gg q \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([e \ where \ \langle p \gg q \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \]

There are two cases: either \( O([\text{assume } \langle p \gg q \rangle \text{ in } e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \neq \circ \) or \( O([\text{assume } \langle p \gg q \rangle \text{ in } e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). Consider the former case. From the given conditions, we have \( O([e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([e], \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \). Therefore, \( O([e], 2, \Pi, \langle p \gg q \rangle, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = O([e], 2, \Pi, \langle p \gg q \rangle, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \). Hence proved.

Consider the latter case. That is, \( O([\text{assume } \langle p \gg q \rangle \text{ in } e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). By the definition of \( O \) and \([\cdot]\), we know that \( O([e], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) = \circ \). We will show that \( O([e \ where \ \langle p \gg q \rangle], 2, \Pi, \ell^\rightarrow, \rightarrow) \).
\(\therefore\) by induction on the structure of \(e\). From subject reduction (Lemma 4) and WHERE, we know \(\Pi; \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle; \Gamma, pc \vdash e : \tau\). The interesting cases are the terms whose observability depend on an acts-for judgment. Since \(\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(H^\rightarrow - \ell^\rightarrow)\), we have that \(\Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\). We now show for each case that DI (Lemma 6) implies \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\) that the delegation \(\langle p \updownarrow q \rangle\) cannot reveal new terms visible to \(\ell^\rightarrow\).

**Subcase** \([e]_i = \lambda(x : \tau')[pc']\), \(e'\): Suppose \(\Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq pc^{e'}\), then \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq pc^{e'}\).

Now suppose \(\Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq pc^{e'}\). Since \(\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(H^\rightarrow - \ell^\rightarrow)\), then by Lemma 6, \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\). But by Bracket-values, Lam, and P-Fun, we know \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \vdash pc^{e'} \geq H^\rightarrow\). Therefore, we have that \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq pc^{e'}\), since otherwise we could prove \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\) by transitivity.

**Subcase** \([e]_i = \Lambda X[pc']\), \(e'\): Similar to above case.

**Subcase** \(e = (\bar{\eta}e' w'_1 | \bar{\eta}e' w'_2)\): Suppose \(\Pi \vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq \ell^{e'}\), then \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq \ell^{e'}\) also.

Now suppose \(\Pi \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq \ell^{e'}\). Since \(\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(H^\rightarrow - \ell^\rightarrow)\), then by Lemma 6, \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\). But by Bracket-values, Sealed, and P-LBL, we know \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\). Therefore, we have that \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq \ell^{e'}\), since otherwise we could prove \(\Pi, \langle p \updownarrow q \rangle \not\vdash \ell^\rightarrow \geq H^\rightarrow\) by transitivity.

**Subcase** \([e]_i = \langle \ell^\rightarrow \rangle_{e'}\): Similar to above case.

Case **W-**: Similar to ASSUME case.

Case **B-STEP**: Straightforward application of induction hypothesis.

Case **B-**: Observe that, with the exception of B-STEP, all B-* rules step from \(e \longrightarrow* e'\) such that \([e]_i = [e']_i\). Therefore the lemma trivially holds.

**E-Unpair**: Trivial.

**E-Case**: Trivial.

**E-UnitM**: Trivial.

**E-Eval**: Straightforward application of induction hypothesis.

\[\square\]

For more precision, we specialize our noninterference theorem on confidentiality, but a noninterference theorem for integrity holds by a similar argument. Theorem 2 states that for some principal \(H^\rightarrow\) that flows to \(\tau'\) (Condition 1) but not \(\ell\) says \(\tau\) (Condition 2), if \(pc\) is insufficiently trusted to create new flows from \(H^\rightarrow\) to \(\ell^\rightarrow\) (Condition 3), then an execution of \(e\) that differs only in the value of \(\tau'\)-typed inputs, the computed values must be equal.

**Theorem 2** (Confidentiality Noninterference). Let \(\Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau'; pc \vdash e : \ell\) says \(\tau\) for some \(H\) such that

1. \(\Pi \vdash H^\rightarrow \wedge \top^\rightarrow \subseteq \tau'\)
2. \(\Pi \not\vdash H^\rightarrow \subseteq \ell^\rightarrow\)
3. \(\Pi \not\vdash pc \geq \nabla(H^\rightarrow - \ell^\rightarrow)\)

Then for all \(v_2, z \in \{1, 2\}\) such that \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v_2 : \tau'\), if \(e[x \mapsto v_2] \xrightarrow{t} v'\) such that \([v']_z = v'_z\) and \([t]_z = t_z\) for \(z = \{1, 2\}\). We will occasionally write \(v\) or \(v'\) as shorthand for \((v_1 | v_2)\) or \((v'_1 | v'_2)\).

Since \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v_2 : \tau'\) for \(z \in \{1, 2\}\), then we have \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (v_1 | v_2) : \tau'\) via Bracket-values. Therefore, by Lemma 15 (Variable Substitution) of \(\Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau'; pc \vdash e : \ell\) says \(\tau\), we have \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e \longrightarrow* e'\) such that \(e'\) satisfies the conditions of **W-**, **B-STEP**, and **B-**.

\[\square\]
\[ e[x \rightarrow (v_1 \mid v_2)] : \ell \text{ says } \tau. \] Then by repeatedly applying Lemma 4 for each step \( e[x \rightarrow v] \rightarrow^* e', \) we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : \ell \text{ says } \tau. \)

We now want to prove that \( t_1 \approx^\Pi \rightarrow t_2. \) First, consider \( e[x \rightarrow (v_1 \mid v_2)]. \) To prove that \( O(e[x \rightarrow v_1], \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O(e[x \rightarrow v_2], \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow), \) it suffices to show that \( O(v_1, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O(v_2, \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow). \) We do this by induction on the structure of \( v_2. \)

**Case** \( v_2 = (\cdot): \) Trivial.

**Case** \( v_2 = \text{inj}_i e': \) Not well typed since \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau' \) cannot hold for types of the form \( \tau_1 + \tau_2. \)

**Case** \( v_2 = \eta_{\ell'} w: \) Since \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau', \) by \textsc{unitm} and \textsc{p-lbl} we know \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \ell'. \) Therefore we have \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^- \supseteq \ell'^-, \) since otherwise we would have \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \ell'^-, \) contradicting our assumption that \( \Pi \not\vdash H^- \land \top^- \subseteq \ell. \) By the definition of \( O, \) \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^- \supseteq \ell'^- \) implies that \( O(\eta_{\ell'} w, \Pi, \ell'^-, \rightarrow) = 0 \) for \( z \in \{1, 2\}. \)

**Case** \( v_2 = \lambda(x: \tau'')[pc']. e': \) Since \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \tau', \) by \textsc{lam} and \textsc{p-fun} we know \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq pc'. \) Therefore we have \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^- \supseteq pc'^-, \) since otherwise we would have \( \Pi \vdash H^- \subseteq \ell'^-, \) contradicting our assumption that \( \Pi \not\vdash H^- \land \top^- \subseteq \ell. \) By the definition of \( O, \) \( \Pi \not\vdash \ell^- \supseteq pc'^- \) implies that \( O(\lambda(x: \tau''[pc']). e', \Pi, \ell'^-, \rightarrow) = 0 \) for \( z \in \{1, 2\}. \)

**Case** \( v_2 = \Delta x [pc']. e': \) Similar to above case.

**Case** \( v_2 = \langle v'_1, v''_2 \rangle: \) Straightforward application of the induction hypothesis.

Thus \( O([e[x \rightarrow v]_1], \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow) = O([e[x \rightarrow v]_2], \Pi, \ell^{-}, \rightarrow). \) Now, by Lemma 7, for any \( e' \) such that \( e \rightarrow^* e', \) we have \( O([e']_1, \Pi, \ell^-, \rightarrow) = O([e']_2, \Pi, \ell^-, \rightarrow). \) Therefore \( t_1 \approx^\ell \rightarrow t_2. \)

Noninterference is a key tool for obtaining many of the security properties we seek. For instance, noninterference is essential for verifying the properties of commitment schemes discussed in Section 5.1.

Unlike some definitions of noninterference, our definition does not prohibit all downgrading. Instead, Conditions 1 and 2 define relationships between principals \( H \) and \( \ell, \) and Condition 3 ensures (via Lemma 6) those relationships remain unchanged by delegations made within the program, and thus by Lemma 7, the trace of a program observable to an attack remains unchanged during evaluation.

8. Related Work

Many languages and systems for authorization or access control have combined aspects of information security and authorization (e.g., \{44,24,31,10,42,39\}) in dynamic settings. However, almost all are susceptible to security vulnerabilities that arise from the interaction of information flow and authorization [7]: probing attacks, delegation loopholes, poaching attacks, and authorization side channels.

DCC [4,2] has been used to model both authorization and information flow, but not simultaneously. DCC programs are type-checked with respect to a static security lattice, whereas FLAC programs can introduce new trust relationships during evaluation, enabling more general applications.

Boudol [14] defines terms that enable or disable flows for a lexical scope, similar to assume terms, but does not restrict their usage. Rx [40] and RTI [9] use labeled roles to represent information flow policies. The integrity of a role restricts who may change policies. However, information flow in these languages is not robust [34]: attackers may indirectly affect how flows change when authorized principals modify policies.

Some prior approaches have sought to reason about the information security of authorization mechanisms. Becker [10] discusses probing attacks that leak confidential information to an attacker. Garg and
Previous work has studied information flow control with higher-order functions and side effects. In the SLam calculus [23], implicit flows due to side effects are controlled via indirect reader annotations on types. Zdancewic and Myers [47] and Flow Caml [37] control implicit flows via pc annotations on function types. FLAC also controls side effects via a pc annotation, but here the side effects are changes in trust relationships that define which flows are permitted. Tse and Zdancewic [42] also extend DCC with a program-counter label but for a different purpose: their pc tracks information about the protection context, permitting more terms to be typed.

DKAL* [26] is an executable specification language for authorization protocols, simplifying analysis of protocol implementations. FLAC may be used as a specification language, but FLAC offers stronger guarantees regarding the information security of specified protocols. Errors in DKAL* specifications could lead to vulnerabilities. For instance, DKAL* provides no intrinsic guarantees about confidentiality, which could lead to authorization side channels or probing attacks.

The Jif programming language [33,35] supports dynamically computed labels through a simple dependent type system. Jif also supports dynamically changing trust relationships through operations on principal objects [16]. Because the signatures of principal operations (e.g., to add a new trust relationship) are missing the constraints imposed by FLAC, authorization can be used as a covert channel. FLAC shows how to close these channels in languages like Jif.

Dependently-typed languages are often expressive enough to encode authorization policies, information flow policies, or both. The F* [41] type system is capable of enforcing information flow and authorization policies. Typing rules like those in FLAC could probably be encoded within its type system, but so could incorrect, insecure rules. Thus, FLAC contributes a model for encodings that enforce strong information security. Aura [27] embeds a DCC-based proof language and type system in a dependently-typed general-purpose functional language. As in DCC, Aura programs may derive new authorization proofs using existing proof terms and a monadic bind operator. However, since Aura only tracks dependencies between proofs, it is ill-suited for reasoning about the end-to-end information-flow properties of authorization mechanisms.

9. Conclusion

Existing security models do not account fully for the interactions between authorization and information flow. The result is that both the implementations and the uses of authorization mechanisms can lead to insecure information flows that violate confidentiality or integrity. The security of information flow mechanisms can also be compromised by dynamic changes in trust. This paper has proposed FLAC, a core programming language that coherently integrates these two security paradigms, controlling the interactions between dynamic authorization and secure information flow. FLAC offers strong guarantees and can serve as the foundation for building software that implements and uses authorization securely. Further, FLAC can be used to reason compositionally about secure authorization and secure information flow, guiding the design and implementation of future security mechanisms.

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papers/csfw01.pdf.


A. New proof

A.1. Proofs for Noninterference

Before proving noninterference, we prove few supporting lemmas required for proving type preservation.

Lemma 8 (FLAC implies FLAM). Let $H(c) = \{ (p \triangleright q | \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow) | (p \triangleright q) \in \Pi \}$. If $\Pi \vdash p \triangleright q$, then $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$.

Proof. Proof is by induction on the derivation of the robust assumption $\Pi \vdash p \triangleright q$. Interesting case is R-ASSUME.

Case R-ASSUME: From the premises, we have that

$$\langle p \triangleright q \rangle \in \Pi$$

$$\Pi; pc; \ell \vdash \nabla(p^{-}) \triangleright \nabla(q^{-})$$

From (3) and DEL, we have that

$$H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$$

From [ Weaken], we get that $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$. From the (4) and R-LIFT we thus have $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$.

Case R-Static: Since $\mathcal{L} \vdash p \triangleright q$, we have from FLAM R-STATIC that $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$.

Case R-ConjR: Trivial.

Case R-DisjL: Trivial.

Case R-Trans: Trivial.

Case R-Weaken: Trivial.

\[\Box\]

Lemma 9 (FLAM implies FLAC). For a trust configuration such that, for all $n \neq c$, $\mathcal{H}(n) = \emptyset$, and for all $\langle p, q, \ell \rangle \in \mathcal{H}(c)$, $\ell = \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow$ and $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash \nabla(p \rightarrow) \triangleright \nabla(q \rightarrow)$, if

$$H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q,$$

then $\Pi \vdash p \triangleright q$.

Proof. (Sketch) By induction on the FLAM derivation. Without loss of generality, we assume that the derivation of $H; c; \perp \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow; \top \rightarrow \land \top \rightarrow \vdash p \triangleright q$ contains no applications of R-WAKEEN or R-FWD. Since all delegations are local to $c$, public, and trusted, they are unnecessary.
Next, observe that because delegations are public and trusted, any non-robust FLAM derivation may be lifted to a robust one by adding an application of FLAM’s R-Lift rule wherever a DEL rule occurs, and applying relevant robust rules in place of the non-robust rules. Rules corresponding to each non-robust rule are either part of the core robust rules or have been proven admissible [8]. The rule for R-TRANS is an exception, since it requires an additional premise to be satisfied, but since the query label is always \( \perp \to \top \), this is trivially satisfied.

**Lemma 10** (Robust Assumption). If \( \Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \nabla(b) \), then \( \Pi \cdot \langle a \triangleright b \rangle \vdash pc \triangleright \nabla(b) \) for any \( a, b \in \mathcal{L} \).

**Proof.** By inspection of the rules in Figure 5.

**Lemma 11** (Robust Protection). If \( \Pi \vdash pc \sqsubseteq \tau \), then \( \Pi \cdot \langle a \triangleright b \rangle \vdash pc \sqsubseteq \tau \) for any \( a, b \in \mathcal{L} \).

**Proof.** By Lemma 10 and inspection of the rules in Figure 7.

**Lemma 12** (II Extension). If \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \) then \( \Pi \cdot \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \) for any \( p, q \in \mathcal{L} \).

**Proof.** By Lemma 10, Lemma 11 and inspection of the typing rules.

The following lemma is required to prove the type preservation. It says that an expression \( e \) well-typed at \( pc \) is still well-typed at a reduced \( pc' \) that satisfies the clearance.

**Lemma 13** (PC Reduction). Let \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \). For all \( pc, pc' \), such that \( \Pi \vdash pc' \sqsubseteq pc \) then \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \tau \) holds.

**Proof.** Proof is by induction on the derivation of the typing judgment.

**Case VAR:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case UNIT:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case DEL:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case LAM:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case APP:** Given, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e e' : \tau \). From APP, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc & \vdash e : \tau_1 \xrightarrow{pc''} \tau_2 \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc & \vdash e' : \tau_1 \\
\Pi \vdash pc \sqsubseteq pc''
\end{align*}
\]

Applying induction to the premises we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \tau_1 \xrightarrow{pc''} \tau_2 \) and \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e' : \tau_1 \). From R-TRANS, we have \( \Pi \vdash pc' \sqsubseteq pc'' \). Hence we have all the premises.

**Case TLAM:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case TAPP:** Similar to App case.

**Case PAIR:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case UNPAIR:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case INJ:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case CASE:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case UNITM:** Given \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \eta \ell \ e : \tau \), by UNITM we have \( \Pi \vdash pc \sqsubseteq \ell \) and \( \Pi; pc \vdash e : \tau \). By the induction hypothesis, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \tau \), and since \( \Pi \vdash pc' \sqsubseteq pc \), then by R-TRANS, we have \( \Pi \vdash pc' \sqsubseteq \ell \). Therefore by UNITM we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash \eta \ell \ e : \tau \).
**Case SEALED:** Straightforward from the corresponding typing judgment.

**Case BINDM:** Given \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{bind } x = e \text{ in } e' : \tau \), by BINDM we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \ell \text{ says } \tau \\
\Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau'; pc \sqcup \ell \vdash e' : \tau \\
\Pi \vdash pc \sqcup \ell \subseteq \tau
\]  

(8)  

(9)  

(10)

Since \( \Pi \vdash pc' \subseteq pc \). By the monotonicity of join with respect to \( \subseteq \), we also have \( \Pi \vdash pc' \sqcup \ell \subseteq pc \sqcup \ell \). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis applied to 8 and 9, we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \ell \text{ says } \tau' \\
\Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau'; pc' \sqcup \ell \vdash e' : \tau
\]  

(11)  

(12)

and by R-TRANS we get \( \Pi \vdash pc \sqcup \ell \subseteq \tau \). Then via BINDM we get

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash \text{bind } x = e \text{ in } e' : \tau
\]

**Case ASSUME:** Given, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{assume } e \text{ in } e' : \tau \), by ASSUME we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : (p \gg q) \\
\Pi \vdash pc \gg \nabla(q) \\
\Pi \vdash \nabla(p^-) \gg \nabla(q^-) \\
\Pi; \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : \tau
\]

(13)  

(14)  

(15)  

(16)

Applying induction hypothesis to (13) and (16) we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : (p \gg q) \) and \( \Pi; \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e' : \tau \). Since \( \Pi \vdash pc' \subseteq pc \), we have \( \Pi \vdash pc' \gg \nabla(q) \). Combining, we have all the premises for ASSUME and thus \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash \text{assume } e \text{ in } e' : \tau \)

**Case WHERE:** Given, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v \text{ where } e : \tau \), by WHERE we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v : (p \gg q) \\
\Pi \vdash pc \gg \nabla(q) \\
\Pi \vdash \nabla(p^-) \gg \nabla(q^-) \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau
\]

(17)  

(18)  

(19)  

(20)

Applying induction hypothesis to (17) and (20), we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash v : (p \gg q) \) and \( \Pi; \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e : \tau \). Then by WHERE, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash v \text{ where } e : \tau \).

**Case BRACKET:** The premise \( \Pi \vdash H^\pi \sqcup pc \subseteq pc'' \) implies \( \Pi \vdash H^\pi \sqcup pc' \subseteq pc'' \).

**Case BRACKET-VALUES:** Applying induction to the premises gives the required conclusion.

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 14 (Values PC).** If \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \tau \), then \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w : \tau \) for any \( pc' \).
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation of \( w \). Observe that only \textsc{app}, \textsc{case}, \textsc{unitm}, \textsc{bindm}, and \textsc{assume} contain premises that constrain typing based on the judgment \( pc \), and these rules do not apply to \( w \) terms.

**Lemma 15** (Variable Substitution). If \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau' \vdash e : \tau \) and \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \tau' \), then \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e[x \rightarrow w] : \tau \).

Proof. Proof is by induction on the typing derivation of \( e \). Observe that by Lemma 14, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w : \tau' \) for any \( pc' \). Therefore, each inductive case follows by straightforward application of the induction hypothesis.

**Lemma 16** (Type Substitution). Let \( \tau' \) be well-formed in \( \Gamma, X, \Gamma' \). If \( \Pi; \Gamma, X, \Gamma'; pc \vdash e : \tau \) then \( \Pi; \Gamma, \Gamma'[X \rightarrow \tau'] ; pc \vdash e[X \rightarrow \tau'] : \tau[X \rightarrow \tau'] \).

Proof. Proof is by the induction on the typing derivation of \( \Pi; \Gamma, X, \Gamma'; pc \vdash e : \tau \).

**Lemma 17** (Projection Preserves Types). If \( \Pi; pc \vdash e : \tau \), then \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \lfloor e \rfloor_i : \tau \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \).

Proof. Proof is by induction on the typing derivation of \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \). The interesting case is \( e = (e_1 \mid e_2) \). By \textsc{Bracket}, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e_i : \tau \) for some \( pc' \) such that \( \Pi \vdash (H^\tau \sqcup pc) \subseteq pc' \). Therefore, by Lemma 13, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e_i : \tau \).

**Lemma 2** (Stuck expressions). If \( e \) gets stuck then \( \lfloor e \rfloor_i \) is stuck for some \( i \in \{1, 2\} \).

Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of \( e \).

Case \( w \): No reduction rules apply to terms in the syntactic category \( w \) (including \( (w \mid w') \)). Hence \( \lfloor x \rfloor_i \) is stuck as well.

Case \( x \): No reduction rules apply to a variable. Hence \( \lfloor x \rfloor_i \) is stuck as well.

Case \( \lfloor e_1 \mid e_2 \rfloor \): By \textsc{b-step}, \( e \) is only gets stuck if both \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) get stuck.

Case \( \lfloor e \mid e' \rfloor \): Since \( e \) is stuck, then \textsc{b-app}, \textsc{w-app}, \textsc{e-app} are not applicable. It follows that either (1) \( e \) is not of the form \( (w \mid w') \), \( w \) where \( v \), or \( \lambda(x:\tau)[pc'] \). \( e \) or (2) \( e \) has the form \( \lambda(x:\tau)[pc'] \). \( e \), but \( e' \) is stuck. For the first case, \( \lfloor e \rfloor_i \) is also not of the form \( \lambda(x:\tau)[pc'] \). \( e \), so \( \lfloor e' \rfloor_i \) is also stuck. For the second case, applying the induction hypothesis gives us that \( \lfloor e' \rfloor_i \) is stuck for some \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), so \( \lambda(x:\tau)[pc'][e e'] \) is stuck for the same \( i \).

Case \( \lfloor \eta \epsilon \rfloor \): Since \( \lfloor \eta \epsilon \rfloor \) is stuck, then \textsc{e-unitm} is not applicable, so \( \epsilon \) does not have the form \( w \). Therefore, \textsc{E-unitm} is also not applicable to \( \lfloor \eta \epsilon \rfloor_i \). Therefore, \( \epsilon \) must be stuck. Applying induction hypothesis, it follows that \( \lfloor \eta \epsilon \rfloor_i \) is also stuck and so \( \lfloor \eta \epsilon \rfloor_i \) is also stuck.

Case \( \text{proj}_j e \): Similar to the above case.

Case \( \text{inj}_j e \): Similar to the above case.

Case \( \langle e, e \rangle \): Similar to the above case.

Case \( \text{case e of inj}_j(x) \). \( e_1 \mid \text{inj}_j(x). e_2 \): Since \textsc{b-case}, \textsc{w-case}, and \textsc{e-case} are not applicable, it follows that \( e \) is not of the form \( (w \mid w') \), \( w \) where \( v \), or \( \text{inj}_j v \). It follows that \( \lfloor \text{case e of inj}_j(x). e_1 \mid \text{inj}_j(x). e_2 \rfloor_i \) is also stuck.

Case \( \text{bind} x = v \in e' \): Similar to the above case.
Using the above lemmas, we are now ready to prove type preservation.

**Lemma 4 (Subject Reduction).** Let \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \). If \( e \rightarrow e' \) then \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \).

**Proof.** Case **E-APP:** Given \( e = (\lambda(x:\tau)[pc'].e) w \) and \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (\lambda(x:\tau)[pc'].e) v : \tau_2 \). From **APP**, we have,

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau'; pc' &\vdash e : \tau \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc &\vdash w : \tau' \\
\Pi &\vdash pc' \sqsubseteq pc
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, via **PC reduction** (Lemma 13) and **Variable Substitution** (Lemma 15), we have that \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash e[x \mapsto w] : \tau \).

Case **E-TAPP:** Similar to above case, but using Lemma 16.

*Case E-CASE1:* Given \( e = \text{case}(\text{inj}_1 w) \) of \( \text{inj}_1(x) \). \( e_1 \mid e_2 \) and \( e' = e_1[x \mapsto v] \). Also, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{case}(\text{inj}_1 w) \) of \( \text{inj}_1(x) \). \( e_1 \mid e_2 : \tau \). From the premises we have, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{inj}_1 v : \tau' + \tau'' \) and \( \Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau'; pc \vdash e_1 : \tau \). From **INJ**, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v : \tau' \).

Invoking variable substitution lemma (Lemma 15), we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e_1[x \mapsto w] : \tau \).

*Case E-CASE2:* Similar to above.

Case **E-UNITM:** Given \( e = \eta_\ell w \) and \( e' = \eta_{\ell'} w \). Also, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \eta_\ell w : \ell \) says \( \tau \). From the premises it follows that \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \eta_{\ell'} w : \ell \) says \( \tau \).

Case **E-BINDM:** Given \( e = \text{bind} x = w \in e' \) and \( e' = e'[x \mapsto w] \). Also, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{bind} x = w \in e' : \tau \). From the premises, we have the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc &\vdash w : \tau' \\
\Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau'; pc \sqcup \ell &\vdash e' : \tau \\
\Pi &\vdash pc \sqcup \ell \sqsubseteq \tau \\
\Pi &\vdash p \geq pc
\end{align*}
\]

We have to prove that \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e'[x \mapsto w] : \tau \). Since we have that \( \Pi \vdash p \geq pc \), applying **PC reduction** (Lemma 13) to the premise (25), we have \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau'; pc \vdash e' : \tau \).

Invoking variable substitution lemma (Lemma 15), we thus have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e'[x \mapsto w] : \tau \).

Case **E-ASSUME:** Given \( e = \text{assume} (p \geq q) \in e' \) and \( e' = e' \) where \( (p \geq q) \). Also, \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{assume} (p \geq q) \in e' : \tau \). From **ASSUME**, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc &\vdash (p \geq q) : (p \geq q) \\
\Pi, (p \geq q); \Gamma; pc &\vdash e' : \tau \\
\Pi &\vdash pc \geq \nabla(q) \\
\Pi &\vdash \nabla(pl^{-*}) \geq \nabla(q^{-*})
\end{align*}
\]
We need to prove:

\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' \text{ where } \langle p \gg q \rangle : \tau \]

Comparing with the given premises, we already have the required premises.

\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \gg q \rangle : (p \gg q) \tag{32} \]
\[ \Pi; \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau \tag{33} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash \mathbf{pc} \gg \nabla(q) \tag{34} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash \nabla(p^\gamma) \gg \nabla(q^\gamma) \tag{35} \]

Hence proved.

**Case E-Eval:** For \( e = E[e] \) and \( e' = E[e'] \) where \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash E[e] : \tau \), we have \( \Pi'; \Gamma'; pc' \vdash e : \tau' \) for some \( pc' \), \( \tau' \), \( \Pi' \), and \( \Gamma' \) such that \( \Pi' \gg \Pi, \Gamma' \gg \Gamma \). By the induction hypothesis we have \( \Pi'; \Gamma'; pc' \vdash e' : \tau' \). Observe that with the exception of \texttt{SEALED} and \texttt{WHERE}, the premises of all typing rules use terms from the syntactic category \( e \). Therefore if a derivation for \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash E[e] : \tau \) exists, it must be the case that derivation for \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash E[e'] : \tau \) exists where the derivation of \( \Pi'; \Gamma'; pc' \vdash e : \tau' \) is replaced with \( \Pi'; \Gamma'; pc' \vdash e' : \tau' \). Rules \texttt{SEALED} and \texttt{WHERE} have premises that use terms from the syntactic category \( v \), but since these are fully evaluated, \( e \) cannot be equal to a \( v \) term since no \( e' \) exists such that \( v \rightarrow^* e' \).

**Case W-App:** Given \( e = (w \text{ where } \langle p \gg q \rangle) \) \( e \) and \( e' = (w e) \text{ where } \langle p \gg q \rangle \). We have to prove that

\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w e) \text{ where } \langle p \gg q \rangle : \tau \]

From \texttt{APP} we have:

\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w \text{ where } \langle p \gg q \rangle : \tau_1 \stackrel{pc'}{\rightarrow} \tau \tag{36} \]
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau_1 \tag{37} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash pc \subseteq pc' \tag{38} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash \mathbf{pc} \gg \nabla(q) \tag{39} \]

Rule \texttt{WHERE} gives us the following:

\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \gg q \rangle : (p \gg q) \tag{40} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash \mathbf{pc} \gg \nabla(q) \tag{41} \]
\[ \Pi \vdash \nabla(p^\gamma) \gg \nabla(q^\gamma) \tag{42} \]
\[ \Pi, \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \tau_1 \stackrel{pc'}{\rightarrow} \tau \tag{43} \]

We now want to show that \( e' \) is well typed via \texttt{WHERE}. The key premise is to show that the subexpression \( (w e) \) is well-typed via \texttt{APP}. That is,

\[ \Pi, \langle p \gg q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash w e : \tau \tag{44} \]
Applying Lemma 12 (extending delegation contexts for well-typed terms) to (37) and Lemma 10 (extending delegation contexts for assumptions) to (38), we have:

\[
\Pi; \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau_1
\]

\[
\Pi; \langle p \triangleright q \rangle \vdash pc \subseteq pc'
\]

Combining with (43), we have (44) which when combined with remaining premises ((40), (41) and (42)) give us \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w e) \) where \(\langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau\).

**Case W-TAPP:** Given \(e = (w \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle) \tau\) and \(e' = (w \tau')\) where \(\langle p \triangleright q \rangle\). We have to prove that

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w \tau') \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau'\]

From TAPP we have:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \forall X[pc']. \tau
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \subseteq pc'
\]

Rule WHERE gives us the following:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \langle p \triangleright q \rangle
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \nabla(q)
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash \nabla(p^-) \triangleright \nabla(q^-)
\]

\[
\Pi; \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \forall X[pc']. \tau
\]

We now want to show that \(e'\) is well typed via WHERE. The key premise is to show that the subexpression \((w \tau')\) is well-typed via TAPP. That is,

\[
\Pi; \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash w \tau' : \tau[X \leftrightarrow \tau']
\]

Applying Lemma 10 (extending delegation context for well-typed terms) to (48), we get:

\[
\Pi; \langle p \triangleright q \rangle \vdash pc \subseteq pc'
\]

Combining with (52), we have (53) which when combined with remaining premises ((49), (50) and (51)) give us \(\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w \tau') \) where \(\langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau[X \leftrightarrow \tau']\).

**Case W-UNPAIR:** Given \(e = \text{proj}_i \langle w_1, w_2 \rangle\) where \(\langle p \triangleright q \rangle\) and \(e' = (\text{proj}_i \langle w_1, w_2 \rangle)\) where \(\langle p \triangleright q \rangle\). We have to prove that

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{proj}_i \langle w_1, w_2 \rangle) \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau_i
\]

From UNPAIR, we have:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle w_1, w_2 \rangle \text{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau_1 \times \tau_2
\]
From (55) and WHERE, we have:

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \geq q \rangle : (p \geq q) \]  
(56)

\[ \Pi \vdash pc \geq \nabla(q) \]  
(57)

\[ \Pi \vdash \nabla(p^{-}) \geq \nabla(q^{-}) \]  
(58)

\[ \Pi, \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle w_{1}, w_{2} \rangle : \tau_{1} \times \tau_{2} \]  
(59)

From (59) and UNPAIR, we have: \( \Pi, \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{proj}_{i} \langle w_{1}, w_{2} \rangle : \tau_{i} \). Combining with remaining premises ((56) to (59)) we have \( \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{proj}_{i} \langle w_{1}, w_{2} \rangle \) where \( \langle p \geq q \rangle : \tau_{i} \).

**Case W-CASE:** Given \( e = \text{case } (w \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle) \) of \( \text{inj}_{1}(x) \cdot e_{1} | \text{inj}_{2}(x) \cdot e_{2} \) and \( e' = \text{case } w \text{ of } \text{inj}_{1}(x) \cdot e_{1} | \text{inj}_{2}(x) \cdot e_{2} \).

We have to prove that

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{case } w \text{ of } \text{inj}_{1}(x) \cdot e_{1} | \text{inj}_{2}(x) \cdot e_{2}) \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle : \tau \]

From CASE we have:

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash w \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle : \tau_{1} + \tau_{2} \]  
(60)

\[ \Pi \vdash pc \sqcup \ell \sqsubseteq \tau \]  
(61)

\[ \Pi \vdash pc \sqsubseteq \ell \]  
(62)

\[ \Pi, \Gamma, x : \tau_{1}; pc \sqcup \ell \vdash e_{1} : \tau \]  
(63)

\[ \Pi, \Gamma, x : \tau_{2}; pc \sqcup \ell \vdash e_{2} : \tau \]  
(64)

From (60) and rule WHERE, we get the following:

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \geq q \rangle : (p \geq q) \]  
(65)

\[ \Pi \vdash pc \geq \nabla(q) \]  
(66)

\[ \Pi \vdash \nabla(p^{-}) \geq \nabla(q^{-}) \]  
(67)

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \tau_{1} + \tau_{2} \]  
(68)

The key premise to prove is that:

\[ \Pi, \langle p \geq q \rangle, \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{case } w \text{ of } \text{inj}_{1}(x) \cdot e_{1} | \text{inj}_{2}(x) \cdot e_{2}) : \tau \]

which follows from (68) and extending delegations in equations (61) to (64) (Lemma 12). Combining with remaining premises, we have \( \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{case } w \text{ of } \text{inj}_{1}(x) \cdot e_{1} | \text{inj}_{2}(x) \cdot e_{2}) \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle : \tau \).

**Case W-BINDM:** Given \( e = \text{bind } x = (w \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle) \text{ in } e \) and \( e' = (\text{bind } x = w \text{ in } e) \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle \).

We have to prove that

\[ \Pi, \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{bind } x = w \text{ in } e) \text{ where } \langle p \geq q \rangle : \tau \]
From \texttt{BINDM} we have:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w \textrm{ where } \langle p \triangleright q \rangle) : \ell \ \text{says } \tau'
\]

\[
\Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau'; pc \sqcup \ell \vdash e : \tau
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \sqcup \ell \sqsubseteq \tau
\]

(69)  
(70)  
(71)

From (69) and rule \texttt{WHERE}, we get the following:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : (p \triangleright q)
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \triangleright \triangleright q
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash \triangleright (p^-) \triangleright \triangleright (q^-)
\]

\[
\Pi, \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash w : \ell \ \text{says } \tau'
\]

(72)  
(73)  
(74)  
(75)

We now want to show that \( e' \) is well typed via \texttt{WHERE}. That is, we need the following premises,

\[
\Pi, \langle p \triangleright q \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{bind } x = w \in e : \tau
\]

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : (p \triangleright q)
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \triangleright \triangleright q
\]

(76)  
(77)  
(78)  
(79)

Extending the delegation context (Lemma 12) in the premises (70), (71) and from (75) we have (76).

We already have (77) from (72); (78) from (73); (79) from (74). Combining, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (\text{bind } x = w \in e) \) where \( \langle p \triangleright q \rangle : \tau \).

\textbf{Case \texttt{W-ASSUME}}: Given \( e = \text{assume } w \ \text{where } \langle a \triangleright b \rangle \) in \( e \) and \( e' = \text{assume } w \ \text{in } e \) where \( \langle a \triangleright b \rangle \).

From \texttt{ASSUME}, we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v \ \text{where } \langle a \triangleright b \rangle : (r \triangleright s)
\]

\[
\Pi, \langle r \triangleright s \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : \tau
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \triangleright \triangleright s
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash \triangleright (r^-) \triangleright \triangleright (s^-)
\]

(80)  
(81)  
(82)  
(83)

Expanding the first premise using \texttt{WHERE}, we have

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle a \triangleright b \rangle : (a \triangleright b)
\]

\[
\Pi, \langle a \triangleright b \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash v : (r \triangleright s)
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \triangleright \triangleright b
\]

\[
\Pi \vdash \triangleright (a^-) \triangleright \triangleright (b^-)
\]

(84)  
(85)  
(86)  
(87)
We want to show
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \langle a \triangleright b \rangle : (a \triangleright b) \] (88)
\[ \Pi, \langle a \triangleright b \rangle; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{assume } v \text{ in } e : \tau \] (89)
\[ \Pi \vdash pc \triangleright \nabla(b) \] (90)
\[ \Pi \vdash \nabla(a^-) \triangleright \nabla(b^-) \] (91)

Extending delegation context (Lemma 12) in the premises (81), (82), (87) and combining with topmost premise we have the (89). Remaining premises follow from (84), (86) and (87).

**Case B-STEP:** Given \( e = (e_1 \mid e_2) \) and \( e' = (e'_1 \mid e'_2) \). Also \( \Pi; \Gamma; \Theta; p; pc \vdash (e_1 \mid e_2) : \tau \). We have to prove
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; \Theta; p; pc \vdash (e'_1 \mid e'_2) : \tau \]

Without loss of generality, let \( i = 1 \). Thus from the premises of B-STEP, we have \( e_1 \rightarrow e'_1 \) and \( e'_2 = e_2 \). Since sealed values can not take a step, inverting the well-typedness of bracket is only possible through Bracket and not through Bracket-Values. From Bracket, we have
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; e; p; pc' \vdash e_1 : \tau \] (92)
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; e; p; pc' \vdash e_2 : \tau \] (93)
\[ \Pi \vdash (H_\pi \sqcup pc) \subseteq pc' \] (94)
\[ \Pi \vdash H_\pi \subseteq \tau \] (95)

Since (92) holds, applying induction to the premise \( e_1 \rightarrow e'_1 \), we have that \( \Pi; \Gamma; \Theta; p; pc' \vdash e'_1 : \tau \). Combining with remaining premises ((93) to (95)) we thus have that \( \Pi; \Gamma; \Theta; p; pc \vdash (e'_1 \mid e'_2) : \tau \).

**Case B-APP:** Given \( e = (w_1 \mid w_2) \ w' \) and \( e' = (w'_1 \mid w'_2 \mid w_2 \mid w_1) \). Also given that \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_1 \mid w_2) \ w' : \tau_2 \) is well-typed, from APP, we have the following:
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_1 \mid w_2) : \tau_1 \overset{pc''}{\longrightarrow} \tau_2 \] (96)
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w' : \tau_1 \] (97)
\[ \Pi \vdash pc \subseteq pc'' \] (98)

Thus from Bracket-Values, we have \( \Pi \vdash H_\pi \subseteq \tau_1 \overset{pc''}{\longrightarrow} \tau_2 \). From P-Fun, we thus have
\[ \Pi \vdash H_\pi \subseteq \tau_2 \] (99)
\[ \Pi \vdash H_\pi \subseteq pc'' \] (100)

We need to prove
\[ \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w'_1 \mid w'_2 \mid w'_1) : \tau_2 \]
That is we need the following premises of Bracket.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w'_1 & : \tau_2 \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w'_2 & : \tau_2 \\
\Pi \vdash H^\pi \sqsubseteq pc \sqsubseteq pc' \\
\Pi \vdash H^\pi \sqsubseteq \tau_2
\end{align*}
\] (101) (102) (103) (104)

Let \( pc' = pc'' \). We have (103) from (98) and (100). We already have (104) from (99). To prove (101), we need the following premises:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w'_1 & : \tau_1 \xrightarrow{pc''} \tau_2 \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc' \vdash w'_2 & : \tau_2 \\
\Pi \vdash pc' \sqsubseteq pc''
\end{align*}
\] (105) (106) (107)

The last premise (107) holds trivially (from reflexivity). Applying Lemma 14 (values can be typed under any \( pc \)) to (96) we have (105). Applying Lemma 14 (values can be typed under any \( pc \)) and Lemma (17) (projection preserves typing) to (97) we have (106). Thus from APP, we have (101). Similarly, (102) holds. Hence proved.

**Case B-TAPP:** Similar to above (B-APP) case.

**Case B-UNPAIR:** Given \( e = \text{proj}_i (\langle w_{11}, w_{12} \rangle | \langle w_{21}, w_{22} \rangle) \) and \( e' = (w_{1i} | w_{2i}) \). Also \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash \text{proj}_i (\langle w_{11}, w_{12} \rangle | \langle w_{21}, w_{22} \rangle) : \tau_i \). We have to prove

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_{1i} | w_{2i}) : \tau_i
\]

From UNPAIR, we have:

\[
\Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (\langle w_{11}, w_{12} \rangle | \langle w_{21}, w_{22} \rangle) : \tau_1 \times \tau_2
\] (108)

Since they are already values, they can be inverted using Bracket-VALUES. This approach is more conservative.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi; \Gamma; pc & \vdash \langle w_{11}, w_{12} \rangle : \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \\
\Pi; \Gamma; pc & \vdash \langle w_{21}, w_{22} \rangle : \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \\
\Pi & \vdash H^\pi \sqsubseteq \tau_1 \times \tau_2
\end{align*}
\] (109) (110) (111)

From (109), (110) and UNPAIR, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w_{1i} : \tau_i \) and \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash w_{2i} : \tau_i \) for \( i = \{1, 2\} \). From (111) and P-PAIR, we have \( \Pi \vdash H^\pi \sqsubseteq \tau_i \). Combining with other premises, from Bracket-VALUES, we have \( \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash (w_{1i} | w_{2i}) : \tau_i \).
Case **B-BINDM**: Given $e = \text{bind } x = (\eta_1 \ w_1 \ | \ \eta_1 \ w_2) \text{ in } e$. Here $e' = (\text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_1 \text{ in } |e_1| \ | \text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_2 \text{ in } |e_2|)$. Also $\Pi; \Gamma; p \vdash (\eta_1 \ w_1 \ | \ \eta_1 \ w_2) \text{ in } e \ : \tau$. From **BINDM**, we have

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; p \vdash (\eta_1 \ w_1 \ | \ \eta_1 \ w_2) : \ell \text{ says } \tau' \tag{112}
$$

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; x : \tau' ; p \downarrow \ell \vdash e : \tau \tag{113}
$$

$$
\Pi \vdash p \downarrow \ell \subseteq \tau \tag{114}
$$

From (112) and **BRACKET-VALUES**, we have

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; p \vdash \eta_1 \ w_1 : \ell \text{ says } \tau' \tag{115}
$$

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; p \vdash \eta_1 \ w_2 : \ell \text{ says } \tau' \tag{116}
$$

$$
\Pi \vdash H^\tau \subseteq \ell \tag{117}
$$

We have to prove that

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; p \vdash (\text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_1 \text{ in } |e_1| \ | \text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_2 \text{ in } |e_2|) : \tau
$$

For some $\hat{pc}$ we need the following premises to satisfy **BRACKET**:

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; \hat{pc} \vdash \text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_1 \text{ in } |e_1| : \tau \tag{118}
$$

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; \hat{pc} \vdash \text{bind } x = \eta_1 \ w_2 \text{ in } |e_2| : \tau \tag{119}
$$

$$
\Pi \vdash (H^\tau \uparrow pc) \subseteq \hat{pc} \tag{120}
$$

$$
\Pi \vdash H^\tau \subseteq \tau \tag{121}
$$

A natural choice for $\hat{pc}$ is $p \downarrow \ell$. From Lemma 14 (values can be typed under any $pc$), we have

$$
\Pi; \Gamma; \hat{pc} \vdash \eta_1 \ w_1 : \tau' \tag{118}
$$

Applying Lemma 17 (bracket projection preserves typing) to (113), we have

$$
\Pi; \Gamma, x : \tau' ; \hat{pc} \vdash |e_1| : \tau
$$

From **BINDM**, we therefore have (118) and (119). Applying **R-TRANS** to (117) and (114), we have (121). Thus we have all required premises.

Case **B-CASE**: Does not occur. Not well-typed.

Case **B-ASSUME**: Does not occur. Not well-typed.
A Calculus for Flow-Limited Authorization

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Abstract—Real-world applications routinely make authorization decisions based on dynamic computation. Reasoning about dynamically computed authority is challenging. Integrity of the system might be compromised if attackers can improperly influence the authorizing computation. Confidentiality can also be compromised by authorization, since authorization decisions are often based on sensitive data such as membership lists and passwords. Previous formal models for authorization do not fully address the security implications of permitting trust relationships to change, which limits their ability to reason about authority that derives from dynamic computation. Our goal is a way to construct dynamic authorization mechanisms that do not violate confidentiality or integrity.

We introduce the Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC), which is both a simple, expressive model for reasoning about dynamic authorization and also an information flow control language for safely implementing various authorization mechanisms. FLAC combines the insights of two previous models: it extends the Dependency Core Calculus with features made possible by the Flow-Limited Authorization Model. FLAC provides strong end-to-end information security guarantees even for programs that incorporate and implement rich dynamic authorization mechanisms. These guarantees include noninterference and robust declassification, which prevent attackers from influencing information disclosures in unauthorized ways. We prove these security properties formally for all FLAC programs and explore the expressiveness of FLAC with several examples.

I. INTRODUCTION

Authorization mechanisms are critical components in all distributed systems. The policies enforced by these mechanisms constrain what computation may be safely executed, and therefore an expressive policy language is important. Expressive mechanisms for authorization have been an active research area. A variety of approaches have been developed, including authorization logics [1], [2], [3], often implemented with cryptographic mechanisms [4], [5]; role-based access control (RBAC) [6]; and trust management [7], [8], [9].

However, the security guarantees of authorization mechanisms are usually analyzed using formal models that abstract away the computation and communication performed by the system. Developers must take great care to faithfully preserve the (often implicit) assumptions of the model, not only when implementing authorization mechanisms, but also when employing them. Simplifying abstractions can help extract formal security guarantees, but abstractions can also obscure the challenges of implementing and using an abstraction securely. This disconnect between abstraction and implementation can lead to vulnerabilities and covert channels that allow attackers to leak or corrupt information.

A common blind spot in many authorization models is confidentiality. Most models cannot express authorization policies that are confidential or are based on confidential data. Real systems, however, use confidential data for authorization all the time: users on social networks receive access to photos based on friend lists, frequent fliers receive tickets based on credit card purchase histories, and doctors exchange patient data while keeping doctor–patient relationships confidential. While many models can ensure, for instance, that only friends are permitted to access a photo, few can say anything about the secondary goal of preserving the confidentiality of the friend list. Such authorization schemes may fundamentally require some information to be disclosed, but failing to detect these disclosures can lead to unintentional leaks.

Authorization without integrity is meaningless, so formal models are typically better at enforcing integrity. However, many formal models make unreasonable or unintuitive assumptions about integrity. For instance, in many models (e.g., [1], [2], [7]) authorization policies either do not change or change only when modified by a trusted administrator. This is a reasonable assumption in centralized systems where such an administrator will always exist, but in decentralized systems, there may be no single entity that is trusted by all other entities.

Even in centralized systems, administrators must be careful when performing updates based on partially trusted information, since malicious users may try to use the administrator to carry out an attack on their behalf. Unfortunately, existing models offer little help to administrators that need to reason about how attackers may have influenced security-critical update operations.

Developers need a better programming model for implementing expressive dynamic authorization mechanisms. Errors that undermine the security of these mechanisms are common [10], so we want to be able to verify their security. We argue that information flow control is a lightweight, useful tool for building secure authorization mechanisms. Using information flow control is attractive since it offers compositional, end-to-end security guarantees. However, applying information flow control to these mechanisms in a meaningful way requires building on a theory that integrates authority and information security. In this work, we show how to embed such a theory into a programming model, so that dynamic authorization mechanisms—as well as the programs that employ them—can be statically verified.

Approaching the verification of dynamic authorization mechanisms from this perspective is attractive for two reasons.
First, it gives a model for building secure authorization mechanisms by construction rather than verifying them after the fact. This model offers programmers insight into the sometimes subtle interaction between information flow and authorization, and helps programmers address problems early, during the design process. Second, it addresses a core weakness lurking at the heart of existing language-based security schemes: that the underlying policies may change in a way that breaks security. By statically verifying the information security of dynamic authorization mechanisms, we expand the real-world scenarios in which language-based information flow control is useful and strengthen its security guarantees.

We demonstrate that such an embedding is possible by presenting a core language for authorization and information flow control, called the Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC). FLAC is a functional language for designing and verifying decentralized authorization protocols. FLAC is inspired by the Polymorphic Dependency Core Calculus [2] (DCC).\(^1\) Abadi develops DCC as an authorization logic, but DCC is limited to static trust relationships defined externally to DCC programs by a lattice of principals. FLAC supports dynamic authorization by building on the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM) [12], which unifies reasoning about authority, confidentiality, and integrity. Furthermore, FLAC is a language for information flow control. It uses FLAM’s principal model and FLAM’s logical reasoning rules to define an operational model and type system for authorization computations that preserve information security.

The types in a FLAC program can be considered propositions [13] in an authorization logic, and the programs can be considered proofs that the proposition holds. Well-typed FLAC programs are not only proofs of authorization, but also proofs of secure information flow, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of authorization policies and of the data those policies depend upon.

FLAC is useful from a logical perspective, but also serves as a core programming model for real language implementations. Since FLAC programs can dynamically authorize computation and flows of information, FLAC applies to more realistic settings than previous authorization logics. Thus FLAC offers more than a type system for proving propositions—FLAC programs do useful computation.

This paper makes the following contributions.

- We present two authorization mechanisms implemented in FLAC, commitment schemes and bearer credentials, and demonstrate that FLAC ensures the programs that use these mechanisms preserve the desired confidentiality and integrity properties.
- We define FLAC, a language, type system, and semantics for dynamic authorization mechanisms with strong information security:
  - Programs in low-integrity contexts exhibit noninterference, ensuring attackers cannot leak or corrupt information, and cannot subvert authorization mechanisms.
  - Programs in higher-integrity contexts exhibit robust declassification, ensuring attackers cannot influence authorized disclosures of information.

\(^1\)DCC was first presented in [11]. We use the abbreviation DCC to refer to the extension to polymorphic types in [2].

We have organized our discussion of FLAC as follows. Section II introduces commitment schemes and bearer credentials, two examples of dynamic authorization mechanisms we use to explore the features of FLAC. Section III reviews the FLAM principal lattice [12], and Section IV defines the FLAC language and type system. FLAC implementations of the dynamic authorization examples are presented in Section V, and their properties are examined. Section VI explores aspects of FLAC’s proof theory, and Section VII discusses semantic security guarantees of FLAC programs, including noninterference and robust declassification. We explore related work in Section VIII and conclude in Section IX.

II. DYNAMIC AUTHORIZATION MECHANISMS

Dynamic authorization is challenging to implement correctly since authority, confidentiality, and integrity interact in subtle ways. FLAC helps programmers securely implement both authorization mechanisms and code that uses them. FLAC types support the definition of compositional security abstractions, and vulnerabilities in the implementations of these abstractions are caught statically. Further, the guarantees offered by FLAC simplify reasoning about the security properties of these abstractions.

We illustrate the usefulness and expressive power of FLAC using two important security mechanisms: commitment schemes and bearer credentials. We show in Section V that these mechanisms can be implemented using FLAC, and that their security goals are easily verified in the context of FLAC.

A. Commitment schemes

A commitment scheme [14] allows one party to give another party a “commitment” to a secret value without revealing the value. The committing party may later reveal the secret in a way that convinces the receiver that the revealed value is the value originally committed.

Commitment schemes provide three essential operations: commit, receive, and open. Suppose \(p\) wants to commit to a value to principal \(q\). First, \(p\) applies commit to the value and provides the result to \(q\). Next, \(q\) applies receive to the committed value. Finally, when \(p\) wishes to reveal the value, \(p\) applies the open operation to the received value, permitting \(q\) to learn it.

A commitment scheme must have several properties in order to be secure. First, \(q\) should not be able to receive a value that hasn’t been committed by \(p\), since this could allow \(q\) to manipulate \(p\) to open a value it had not committed to. Second, \(q\) should not learn any secret of \(p\) that has not been opened by \(p\). Third, \(p\) should not be able to open a different value than the one received by \(q\).

One might wonder why a programmer would bother to create high-level implementations of operations like commit.
receive, and open. Why not simply treat these as primitive operations and give them type signatures so that programs using them can be type-checked with respect to those signatures? The answer is that an error in a type signature could lead to a serious vulnerability. Therefore, we want more assurance that the type signatures are correct. Implementing such operations in FLAC is often easy and ensures that the type signature is consistent with a set of assumptions about existing trust relationships and the information flow context the operations are used within. These FLAC-based implementations serve as language-based models of the security properties achieved by implementations that use cryptography or trusted third parties.

B. Bearer credentials with caveats

A bearer credential is a capability that grants authority to any entity that possesses it. Many authorization mechanisms used in distributed systems employ bearer credentials in some form. Browser cookies that store session tokens are one example: after a website authenticates a user’s identity, it gives the user a token to use in subsequent interactions. Since it is infeasible for attackers to guess the token, the website grants the authority of the user to any requests that include the token.

Bearer credentials create an information security conundrum for authorization mechanisms. Though they efficiently control access to restricted resources, they create vulnerabilities and introduce covert channels when used incorrectly. For example, suppose Alice shares a remotely-hosted photo with her friends by giving them a credential to access the photo. Giving a friend such a credential doesn’t disclose their friendship, but each friend that accesses the photo implicitly discloses the friendship to the hosting service. Such covert channels are pervasive, both in classic distributed authorization mechanisms like SPKI/SDSI [4], as well as in more recent ones like Macaroons [5].

Bearer credentials can also lead to vulnerabilities if they are leaked. If an attacker obtains a credential, it can exploit the authority of the credential. Thus, to limit the authority of a credential, approaches like SPKI/SDSI and Macaroons provide constrained delegation in which a newly issued credential attenuates the authority of an existing one by adding caveats. Caveats require additional properties to hold for the bearer to be granted authority. Session tokens, for example, might have a caveat that restricts the source IP address or encodes an expiration time. As pointed out by Birgisson et al. [5], caveats themselves can introduce covert channels if the properties reveal sensitive information.

FLAC is an effective framework for reasoning about bearer credentials with caveats since it captures the flow of credentials in programs as well as the sensitivity of the information the credentials and caveats derive from. We can reason about credentials and the programs that use them in FLAC with an approach similar to that used for commitment schemes. That we can do so in a straightforward way is somewhat remarkable: prior formalizations of credential mechanisms (e.g., [5], [15], [16]) usually do not consider confidentiality nor provide end-to-end guarantees about credential propagation.

III. The FLAC Principal Lattice

Like many models, FLAC uses principals to represent the authority of all entities relevant to a system. However, FLAC’s principals and their algebraic properties are richer than in most models, so we briefly review the FLAC principal model and notation. Further details are found in the earlier paper [12].

Primitive principals such as Alice, Bob, etc., are represented as elements $n$ of a (potentially infinite) set of names $N$. In addition, FLAC uses $\top$ to represent a universally trusted principal and $\bot$ to represent a universally untrusted principal. The combined authority of two principals, $p$ and $q$, is represented by the conjunction $p \land q$, whereas the authority of either $p$ or $q$ is the disjunction $p \lor q$.

Unlike principals in other models, FLAC principals also represent information flow policies. The confidentiality of principal $p$ is represented by the principal $p^\top$, called $p$’s confidentiality projection. It denotes the authority necessary to learn anything $p$ can learn. The integrity of principal $p$ is represented by $p^\bot$, called $p$’s integrity projection. It denotes the authority to influence anything $p$ can influence. All authority may be represented as some combination of confidentiality and integrity. For instance, principal $p$ is equivalent to the conjunction $p^\top \land p^\bot$, and in fact any FLAC principal can be written $p^\top \land q^\bot$ for some $p$ and $q$. The closure of the set of names $N$ plus $\top$ and $\bot$ under the operators $\land, \lor, \leftarrow, \rightarrow$ forms a lattice $L$ ordered by an acts-for-relation $\succ$, defined by the inference rules in Figure 1. We write operators $\leftarrow, \rightarrow$ with higher precedence than $\land, \lor$; for instance, $p \land q^\bot$ is equal to $p^\top \land (p \lor q)^\bot$. Projections distribute over $\land$ and $\lor$, so, for example, $(p \land q)^\bot = (p^\bot \land q^\bot)$. The confidentiality and integrity authority of principals are disjoint, so the confidentiality projection of an integrity projection is $\bot$ and vice-versa: $(p^\bot)^\top = \bot = (p^\top)^\bot$.

An advantage of this model is that secure information flow can be defined in terms of authority. An information flow policy $q$ is at least as restrictive as a policy $p$ if $q$ has at least the confidentiality authority $p^\top$ and $p$ has at least the integrity authority $q^\bot$. This relationship between the confidentiality and integrity of $p$ and $q$ reflects the usual duality seen in information flow control [17]. As in [12], we use the following shorthand for relating principals by policy restrictiveness:

$$p \sqsubseteq q \triangleq (p^\top \land q^\bot) \Rightarrow (q^\top \land p^\bot)$$

$$p \sqcup q \triangleq (p \lor q)^\bot \Rightarrow (p^\bot \lor q^\bot)$$

$$p \sqcap q \triangleq (p \land q)^\top \Rightarrow (p \land q)^\top$$

Thus, $p \sqsubseteq q$ indicates the direction of secure information flow: from $p$ to $q$. The information flow join $p \sqcup q$ is the

2Using $N$ as the set of all names is convenient in our formal calculus, but a general-purpose language based on FLAC may wish to dynamically allocate names at runtime. Since knowing or using a principal’s name holds no special privilege in FLAC, this presents no fundamental difficulties. To use dynamically allocated principals in type signatures, however, the language’s type system should support types in which principal names may be existentially quantified.

3FLAC defines an additional set of operators called ownership projections, which we omit here to simplify our presentation.
least restrictive principal that both \( p \) and \( q \) flow to, and the information flow meet \( p \sqcap q \) is the most restrictive principal that flows to both \( p \) and \( q \).

Finally, in FLAM, the ability to “speak for” another principal is an integrity relationship between principals. This makes sense intuitively, because speaking for another principal influences that principal’s trust relationships and information flow policies. FLAM defines the voice of a principal \( p \), written \( \nabla(p) \), as the integrity necessary to speak for that principal. Given a principal expressed in normal form\(^4\) as \( q^- \land r^- \), the voice of that principal is

\[
\nabla(q^- \land r^-) \triangleq q^- \land r^-
\]

For example, the voice of Alice, \( \nabla(\text{Alice}) \), is Alice\(^-\). The voice of Alice’s confidentiality \( \nabla(\text{Alice}^-) \) is also Alice\(^-\).

### IV. FLOW-LIMITED AUTHORIZATION CALCULUS

FLAC uses information flow to reason about the security implications of dynamically computed authority. Like previous information-flow type systems [18], FLAC incorporates types for reasoning about information flow, but FLAC’s type system goes further by using Flow-Limited Authorization [12] to ensure that principals cannot use FLAC programs to exceed their authority, or to leak or corrupt information. FLAC is based on DCC [2], but unlike DCC, FLAC supports reasoning about authority deriving from the evaluation of FLAC terms. In contrast, all authority in DCC derives from trust relationships defined by a fixed, external lattice of principals. Thus, using an approach based on DCC in systems where trust relationships change dynamically could introduce vulnerabilities like delegation loopholes, probing and poaching attacks, and authorization side channels [12].

\(^4\)In normal form, a principal is the conjunction of a confidentiality principal and an integrity principal. See [12] for details.
and security of control flow. Viewed as an authorization logic, FLAC's type system has the unique feature that it expresses deduction constrained by an information flow context. For instance, if we have \( \varphi \xrightarrow{p^-} \psi \) and \( \varphi \), then (via APP) we may derive \( \psi \) in a context with integrity \( p^+ \), but not in contexts that don't flow to \( p^- \). This feature offers needed control over how principals may apply existing facts to derive new facts.

Many FLAC terms are standard, such as pairs \((e_1, e_2)\), projections \(\text{proj}_j e\), variants \(\text{inj}_j e\), polymorphic type abstraction, \(\Lambda x. e\), and case expressions. Function abstraction, \(\lambda(x: s)[pc]. e\), includes a \textbf{pc label} that constrains the information flow context in which the function may be applied. The rule \textbf{APP} ensures that function application respects these policies, requiring that the robust FLAC judgment \(\Pi; pc \vdash e : s\) holds. This judgment ensures that the current program counter label, \(pc\), flows to the function label, \(pc'\).

Branching occurs in \textbf{case} expressions, which conditionally evaluate one of two expressions. The rule \textbf{CASE} ensures that both expressions have the same type and thus the same protection level. The premise \(\Pi; pc \vdash pc \leq s\) ensures that this type protects the current pc label.\(^7\)

Like DCC, FLAC uses monadic operators to track dependencies. The monadic unit term \((\eta_e v)\) (\textbf{UNITM}) says that a value \(v\) of type \(s\) is \textit{protected at level} \(\ell\). This protected value has the type \(\ell\ says s\), meaning that it has the confidentiality and integrity of principal \(\ell\). Computation on protected values must occur in a protected context ("in the monad"), expressed using a monadic bind type. The typing rule \textbf{BINDM} ensures that the result of the computation protects the confidentiality and integrity of protected values. For instance, the expression \(\text{bind } x = (\eta_e v) \text{ in } (\eta_e x)\) is only well-typed if \(\ell'\) protects values with confidentiality and integrity \(\ell\). Since case expressions may use the variable \(x\) for branching, \textbf{BINDM} raises the pc label to \(pc \sqcup \ell\) to conservatively reflect the control-flow dependency.

\(^7\)This premise simplifies our proofs, but does not appear to be strictly necessary; \textbf{BINDM} ensures the same property.
Fig. 6: Inference rules for robust assumption, adapted from FLAC [12].

then $\ell'$ says $s$ protects information at $\ell$ (P-Lbl1).

Most of the novelty of FLAC lies in its delegation values and assume terms. These terms enable expressive reasoning about authority and information flow control. A delegation value serves as evidence of trust. For instance, the term $p \gg q$, read "$p$ acts for $q$", is evidence that $q$ trusts $p$. Delegation values have acts-for types; $(p \gg q)$ has type $(p \gg q)$. The assume term enables programs to use evidence securely to create new flows between protection levels. In the typing context $\emptyset; x : p \gg q$ says $s; q^{-}$ (i.e., $\Pi = \emptyset, \Gamma = x : p \gg q$ says $s$, and $pc = q^{-}$), the following expression is not well typed:

$$\text{bind } x' = x \text{ in } (\eta_q^{-} x')$$

since $p^{-}$ does not flow to $q^{-}$, as required by the premise $\Pi; pc \vdash \ell \leq s$ in rule BINDM. Specifically, we cannot derive $\Pi; pc \vdash p^{-} \gg q^{-}$ says $s$ since P-Lbl1 requires the FLAC judgment $\Pi; q^{-} \vdash p^{-} \subseteq q^{-}$ to hold.

However, the following expression is well typed:

$$\text{assume } (p^{-} \gg q^{-}) \text{ in bind } x' = x \text{ in } (\eta_q^{-} x')$$

The difference is that the assume term adds a trust relationship, represented by an expression with an acts-for type, to the delegation context. In this case, the expression $(p^{-} \gg q^{-})$ adds a trust relationship that allows $p^{-}$ to flow to $q^{-}$. This is secure since $pc = q^{-}$, meaning that only principals with integrity $q^{-}$ have influenced the computation. With $(p^{-} \gg q^{-} | q^{-})$ in the delegation context, added via the ASSUME rule, the premises of BINDM are now satisfied, so the expression type-checks.

Creating a delegation value requires no special privilege because the type system ensures only high-integrity delegations are used as evidence that enable new flows. Using low-integrity evidence for authorization would be insecure since attackers could use delegation values to create new flows that reveal secrets or corrupt data. The premises of the ASSUME rule ensure the integrity of dynamic authorization computations that produce values like $(p^{-} \gg q^{-})$ in the example above. The second premise, $\Pi; pc \vdash \ell \leq \text{unit}$, requires that the pc has enough integrity to be trusted by $q$, the principal whose security is affected. For instance, to make the assumption $p \gg q$, the evidence represented by the term $e$ must have at least the integrity of the voice of $q$, written $\bigwedge \gamma (q)$. Since the pc bounds the restrictiveness of the dependencies of $e$, this ensures that only information with integrity $\bigwedge \gamma (q)$ or higher may influence the evaluation of $e$. The third premise, $\Pi; pc \vdash \bigwedge \gamma (p^{-}) \gg \bigwedge \gamma (q^{-})$, ensures that principal $p$ has sufficient integrity to be trusted to enforce $q$'s confidentiality, $q^{-}$. This premise means that $q$ permits data to be relabeled from $q^{-}$ to $p^{-}$.

Assumption terms evaluate to where expressions (rule E-ASSUME). To simplify the formalization, these expressions are not part of the source language but are generated by the evaluation rules. The term $e$ where $v$ records that $e$ is evaluated in a context which includes the delegation $v$. The rule WHERE gives a typing rule for where terms; though similar to ASSUME, it requires only that there exist a sufficiently trusted label $pc'$ such that subexpression $e$ type-checks. In the proofs in Section VII, we choose $pc'$ using the typing judgment of the source-level assume that generates the where term.

V. Examples revisited

We can now implement our examples from Section II in FLAC. Using FLAC ensures that authority and information flow assumptions are explicit, and that programs using these abstractions are secure with respect to those assumptions. In this section, we discuss at a high level how FLAC types help enforce specific end-to-end security properties for commitment schemes and bearer credentials. Section VII formalizes the semantic security properties of all well-typed FLAC programs.

A. Commitment Schemes

Figure 8 contains the essential operations of a one-round commitment scheme—commit, receive, and open—

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8These premises are related to the robust FLAC rule LIFT.

9More precisely, it means that the voice of $q$'s confidentiality, $\bigwedge \gamma (q^{-})$, permits data to be relabeled from $q^{-}$ to $p^{-}$; Recall that $\bigwedge \gamma (Alice^{-})$ is just Alice's integrity projection: Alice$^{-}$.
implemented in FLAC. Typically, a principal $p$ commits to a value and sends it to $q$, who receives it. Later, $p$ opens the value, revealing it to $q$. The commit operation takes a value of any type (hence $\forall X$) with confidentiality $p^{-}$ and produces a value with confidentiality and integrity $p$. In other words, $p$ endorses [23] the value to have integrity $p^{-}$.

Attackers should not be able to influence whether principal $p$ commits to a particular value. The $pc$ constraint on commit ensures that only principal $p$ and principals trusted with at least $p$'s integrity, $p^{-}$, may apply commit to a value.10 Furthermore, if the programmer omitted this constraint or instead chose $\perp^{-}$, say, then commit would be rejected by the type system. Specifically, the assume term would not type-check via rule ASSUME since the pc does not act for $\nabla(p^{-}) = p^{-}$.

Next, principal $q$ accepts a committed value from $p$ using the receive operation. The receive operation endorses the value with $q$'s integrity, resulting in a value at $p \land q^{-}$, the confidentiality of $p$ and the integrity of both $p$ and $q$.

As with the commit operation, FLAC ensures that receive satisfies important information security properties. Other principals, including $p$, should not be able to influence which values $q$ receives—otherwise an attacker could use receive to subvert $q$'s integrity, using it to endorse arbitrary values. The $pc$ constraint on receive ensures in this case that only $q$ may apply receive. Furthermore, the type of $x$ requires received values to have the integrity of $p$. Errors in either of these constraints would result in a typing error, either due to ASSUME as before, or due to BINDM, which requires that $p$ must flow to $p \land q^{-}$.

Additionally, receive accepts committed values with confidentiality at most $p^{-}$. This constraint ensures that $q$ does not receive values from $p$ that might depend on $q$'s secrets: unopened commitments, for example. In cryptographic protocols, this property is usually called non-malleability [25], and is important for scenarios in which security depends on the independence of values. Consider a sealed-bid auction where participants submit their bids via commitment protocols. Suppose that $q$ commits a bid $b$, protected by label $q$. Then $p$ could theoretically influence a computation that computes a value $b + 1$ with label $p \land q^{-}$ since that label protects information at $q^{-}$, but only has $p^{-}$ integrity. If $q$ received values from $p$ that could depend on $q$'s secrets, then $p$ could outbid $q$ by 1 without ever learning the value $b$.

Finally, open reveals a committed value to $q$ by relabeling a value from $p \land q^{-}$ to $p^{-} \land q$, which is readable by principal $q$ but retains the integrity of both $p$ and $q$. Since open accepts a value protected by the integrity of both $p$ and $q$ and returns a value with the same integrity, the opened value must have been previously committed by $p$ and received by $q$. Since the open operation reveals a value with confidentiality $p^{-}$, it should only be invoked by principals that are trusted to speak for $p^{-}$. Otherwise, $q$ could open $p$'s commitments. Hence, the pc label of open is $\nabla(p^{-})$. For $p = Alice$, say, the pc label would be Alice$^{+}$. FLAC ensures these constraints are specified correctly; otherwise, open's implementation could not produce a value with label $p^{-} \land q$.

The implementation requires two assume terms. The outer term establishes that principals speaking for $q^{-}$ also speak for $p^{-}$ by creating an integrity relationship between their voices. With this relationship in place, the inner term may reveal the commitment to $q$.11

In DCC, functions are not annotated with pc labels and may be applied in any context. So a DCC function analogous to open might have type

$$\text{dcc\_open} : \forall X. p \land q^{-} \rightarrow p^{-} \land q \rightarrow X$$

However, dcc\_open would not be appropriate for a commitment scheme since any principal could use it to relabel information from $p$-confidential ($p^{-}$) to $q$-confidential ($q^{-}$).

To simplify the presentation of our commitment scheme operations, we make the assumption that $q$ only receives one value. Therefore, $p$ can only open one value, since only one value has been given the integrity of both $p$ and $q$. A more general scheme can be achieved by pairing each committed value with a public identifier that is endorsed along with the value, but remains public. If $q$ refuses to receive more that one commitment with the same identifier12, $p$ will be unable to open two commitments with the same value since it cannot create a pair that has the integrity of both $p$ and $q$, even if $p$ has multiple committed values (with different identifiers) to choose from. We present the simpler one-round

10 We make the reasonable assumption that an untrusted programmer cannot modify high-integrity code, thus the influence of attackers is captured by the pc and the protection levels of values. Enforcing this assumption is beyond the scope of FLAC, but has been explored in [24].

11 i.e., it satisfies the ASSUME premise $\Pi; pc \parallel \nabla(p^{-}) \Rightarrow \nabla(q^{-})$.

12 For cryptographic commitment schemes, the commitment ciphertext itself could act as a public identifier, and $q$ could rely on cryptographic assumptions that distinct values cannot (with high probability) have the same identifier instead of explicitly checking whether the identifier has been used before.
commitment scheme above since it captures the essential information security properties of commitment while avoiding the tedious digression of defining encodings for numeric values and numeric comparisons.

The real power of FLAC is that the security guarantees of well-typed FLAC functions like those above are compositional. The FLAC type system ensures the security of both the functions themselves and the programs that use them. For instance, the code should be rejected because it would permit $q$ to open $p$’s commitments:

$$\Delta X. \lambda(x:p \land q^\leftarrow \text{says } X)[q^\leftarrow]. \text{assume } \langle q \Rightarrow p \rangle \text{ in open } x$$

FLAC’s guarantees make it possible to state general security properties of programs using the commitment scheme, even if those programs are malicious. For example, we want the properties to hold for all principals $p$ and $q$, we want the properties to hold in an empty delegation context: $\Pi = \emptyset$. Below, we omit the delegation context altogether for brevity.

Using results presented in Section VII, we can prove that:

- **$q$ cannot receive a value that hasn’t been committed.** For any $e$ and $s'$ such that $\Gamma_{cro}: p; c_q \vdash e : p \land q^\leftarrow \text{says } s'$, the value that $e$ computes is independent of $x$.
- **$q$ cannot learn a value that hasn’t been opened.** For any $e$, $\ell$, and $s'$ such that $\Gamma_{cro}: p; c_q \vdash e : \ell \land q^\leftarrow \text{says } s'$, the value that $e$ computes is independent of $x$ and $y$.
- **$p$ cannot open a value that hasn’t been received.** For any $e$ such that $\Gamma_{cro}: p; c_p \vdash e : p^\leftarrow \land q \text{ says } s'$, the value that $e$ computes is independent of $x$.

For the first two properties, we consider programs using our commitment scheme that $q$ might invoke, hence we consider FLAC programs that type-check in the $\Gamma_{cro}: p; c_q$ context. In the first property, we are concerned with programs that produce values protected by policy $p \land q^\leftarrow$. Since such programs produce values with the integrity of $p$ but are invoked by $q$, we want to ensure that no program exists that enables $q$ to obtain a value with $p$’s integrity that depends on $x$, which is a value without $p$’s integrity. The second property concerns programs that produces values at $\ell \land q^\leftarrow$ for any $\ell$; these values are readable by $q$. Therefore, we want to ensure that no program exists that enables $q$ to produce such a value that depends on $x$ or $y$, which are not readable by $q$.

The final property considers programs that $p$ might invoke to produce values at $p^\leftarrow \land q$, thus we consider FLAC programs that type-check in the $\Gamma_{cro}: p; c_p$ context. Here, we want to ensure that no program invoked by $p$ can produce a value at $p^\leftarrow \land q$ that depends on $x$, an unreceived value. Complete proofs of these properties are found in Appendix B.

### B. Bearer Credentials

We can also use FLAC to implement bearer credentials, our second example of a dynamic authorization mechanism. We represent a bearer credential with authority $k$ in FLAC as a term with the type

$$\forall X. k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X \xRightarrow{\kappa^\leftarrow} k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X$$

which we abbreviate as $k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow$. These terms act as bearer credentials for a principal $k$ since they may be used as a proxy for $k$’s confidentiality and integrity authority. Recall that $k^\leftarrow = k^\leftarrow \land \bot^\leftarrow$ and $k^\leftarrow = k^\leftarrow \land \bot^\leftarrow$. Then secrets protected by $k^\leftarrow$ can be declassified to $\bot^\leftarrow$, and untrusted data protected by $\bot^\leftarrow$ can be endorsed to $k^\leftarrow$. Thus this term wields the full authority of $k$, and if $pc = \bot^\leftarrow$, the credential may be used in any context—any “bearer” may use it. From such credentials, more restricted credentials can be derived. For example, the credential $k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} \bot^\leftarrow$ grants the bearer authority to declassify $k$-confidential values, but no authority to endorse values.

We postpone an in-depth discussion of terms with types of the form $k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow$ until Section VI-B, but it is interesting to note that an analogous term in DCC is only well-typed if $k$ is equivalent to $\bot$. This is because the function takes an argument with $k^\leftarrow$ confidentiality and no integrity, and produces a value with $k^\leftarrow$ integrity and no confidentiality. Suppose $\mathcal{L}$ is a security lattice used type-check DCC programs with suitable encodings for $k$’s confidentiality and integrity. If a DCC term has a type analogous to $k^\leftarrow \Rightarrow k^\leftarrow$, then $\mathcal{L}$ must have the property $k^\leftarrow \subseteq \bot$ and $\bot \subseteq k^\leftarrow$. This means that $k$ has no confidentiality and no integrity. That FLAC terms may have this type for any principal $k$ makes it straightforward to implement bearer credentials and demonstrates a useful application of FLAC’s extra expressiveness.

The $pc$ of a credential $k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow$ acts as a sort of caveat: it restricts the information flow context in which the credential may be used. We can add more general caveats to credentials by wrapping them in lambda terms. To add a caveat $\phi$ to a credential with type $k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow$, we use a wrapper:

$$\lambda(x:k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow)[pc]. \Delta X. \lambda(y:\phi)[pc]. x X$$

which gives us a term with type

$$\forall X. \phi \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X$$

This requires a term with type $\phi$ (in which $X$ may occur) to be applied before the authority of $k$ can be used. Similar wrappers allow us to chain multiple caveats; i.e., for caveats $\phi_1 \ldots \phi_n$, we obtain the type

$$\forall X. \phi_1 \xRightarrow{s} \ldots \xRightarrow{s} \phi_n \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X \xRightarrow{s} k^\leftarrow \text{ says } X$$

which abbreviates to

$$k^\leftarrow \xRightarrow{\phi_1 \times \ldots \times \phi_n} k^\leftarrow$$
Like any other FLAC terms, credentials may be protected by flow information policies. So a credential that should only be accessible to Alice might be protected by the type Alice ⊢ says (k ⊢ \text{ph} → k⁺). This confidentiality policy ensures the credential cannot accidentally be leaked to an attacker. A further step might be to constrain uses of this credential so that only Alice may invoke it to relabel information. If we require pc = Alice⁺, this credential may only be used in contexts trusted by Alice: Alice ⊢ says (k ⊢ \varphi_{\text{Alice}⁺} → k⁺).

A subtle point about the way in which we construct caveats is that the caveats are polymorphic with respect to X, the same type variable the credential ranges over. This means that each caveat may constrain what types X may be instantiated with. For instance, suppose isEduc is a predicate for educational films; it holds (has a proof term with type isEduc X) for types like Bio and Doc, but not RomCom. Adding isEduc X as a caveat to a credential would mean that the bearer of the credential could use it to access biographies and documents, but could not use it to access romantic comedies. Since no term of type isEduc RomCom could be applied, the bearer could only satisfy isEduc by instantiating X with Bio or Doc. Once X is instantiated with Bio or Doc, the credential cannot be used on a RomCom value. Thus we have two mechanisms for constraining the use of credentials: information flow policies to constrain propagation, and caveats to establish prerequisites and constrain the types of data covered by the credential.

As a more in-depth example of using such credentials, suppose Alice hosts a file sharing service. For a simpler presentation, we use free variables to refer to these files; for instance, x₁ : (k₁ says ph) is a variable that stores a photo (type ph) protected by k₁. For each such variable x₁, Alice has a credential k₁ ⊢ Bob⁻ → k⁺, and can give access to users by providing this credential or deriving a more restricted one. To access x₁, Bob does not need the full authority of Alice or k₁—a more restricted credential suffices:

$$\lambda(c: k₁ \rightsquigarrow Bob⁻ \land k⁺) [Bob⁻].$$

bind $$x₁' = c \cdot x₁ \in (\eta_{Bob⁻ \land k⁺} \cdot x₁')$$

Here, c is a credential k₁ ⊢ Bob⁻ → k⁺ whose polymorphic type has been instantiated with the photo type ph. This credential accepts a photo protected at k₁ and returns a photo protected at Bob⁻ ∧ k⁺, which Bob is permitted to access.

The advantage of bearer credentials is that access to x₁ can be provided to principals other than k₁ in a decentralized way, without changing the policy on x₁. For instance, suppose Alice wants to issue a credential to Bob to access resources protected by k₁. Alice has a credential with type k₁ ⊢ Bob⁻ → k⁺, but she wants to ensure that only Bob (or principals Bob trusts) can use it. In other words, she wants to create a credential of type k₁ ⊢ Bob⁻ → k⁺, which needs Bob’s integrity to use.

Alice can create such a credential using a wrapper that derives a more constrained credential from her original one.

$$\lambda(c: k₁ \rightsquigarrow Bob⁻ \rightarrow k⁺)[Alice⁺].$$

$$\Lambda X.\lambda(y: k₁ \rightsquigarrow X)[Bob⁺].$$

bind $$y' = y \in (c \cdot X) (\eta_{Bob⁻ \land k⁺} \cdot y')$$

Then Bob can use this credential to access x₁ by deriving a credential of type k₁ ⊢ Bob⁻ → k⁺ ph using the function

$$\lambda(c: k₁ \rightsquigarrow Bob⁻ \rightarrow k⁺)[Bob⁺].$$

$$\lambda(y: k₁ \rightsquigarrow ph)[Bob⁺].$$

bind $$y' = c \cdot ph \cdot y \in (\eta_{Bob⁻ \land k⁺} \cdot y')$$

which can be applied to obtain a value readable by Bob. Bob can also use this credential to share photos with friends. For instance, the function

$$\lambda(c: k₁ \rightsquigarrow Bob⁻ \rightarrow k⁺)[Bob⁺].$$

assume ⟨Carol⁺ \Rightarrow Bob⁻⟩ in

$$\Lambda (\_ \cdot \text{unit})[Carol⁺].$$

bind $$x₁' = c \cdot ph \cdot x₁ \in (\eta_{Carol⁺ \land k⁺} \cdot x₁')$$

creates a wrapper around a specific photo x₁. Only principals trusted by Carol may invoke the wrapper, which produces a value of type Carol⁺ ∧ k⁺ says ph, permitting Carol to access the photo.

The properties of FLAC let us prove many general properties about such bearer-credential programs; here, we examine three properties. For i ∈ \{1,...,n\}, let

$$\Gamma_{bc} = x₁ : k₁ \cdot \text{i} : \text{Alice says} \ (k₁⁻ \rightsquigarrow k⁺)$$

where kᵢ is a primitive principal protecting the i-th resource of type sᵢ, and cᵢ is a credential for the i-th resource and protected by Alice. Assume kᵢ ∉ {Alice, Friends, p} for all i where p represents a (potentially malicious) user of Alice’s service, and Friends is a principal for Alice’s friends, (e.g., Friends = (Bob ∨ Carol)). Also, define pc_p = p⁻ and pc_A = Alice⁺.

- p cannot access resources without a credential. For any e, l, and s’ such that Γₗₑ : pc_p ⊢ e : l ∩ p⁻ says s’, the value of e is independent of xᵢ for all i.

- p cannot use unrelated credentials to access resources. For any e, l, and s’ such that

$$\Gamma_{bc}, c_p : (k₁⁺ \rightsquigarrow k⁺) \cdot pc_p \vdash e : l ∩ p⁻ \text{ says } s’$$

the value e computes is independent of xᵢ for i \neq 1.

- Alice cannot disclose secrets by issuing credentials. For all i and j \neq 1, define

$$\Gamma'_{bc} = x_i : k_i \cdot \text{i} : \text{Alice says} \ (k_i⁻ \rightsquigarrow k_j⁺),$$

$$c_{\text{Friends}} : \text{Friends says} \ (k_j⁺ \rightsquigarrow k_j⁻)$$

Then if Γ'ₗₑ : pc_A \vdash e : l ∩ p⁻ says (k_j⁺ \rightsquigarrow k_j⁻) for some e, l, and s’, the value of e is independent of xᵢ. These properties demonstrate the power of FLAC’s type system. The first two ensure that credentials really are necessary
for $p$ to access protected resources, even indirectly. In the first, $p$ has no credentials, and the type system ensures that $p$ cannot invoke a program that produces a value $p$ can read (represented by $\ell \in \pi \Rightarrow$) that depends on any variable $x_i$. In the second, a credential $c_p$ with type $k^- \equiv k^-_1$ is accessible to $p$, but $p$ cannot use it to access other variables. The third property eliminates covert channels like the one discussed in Section II-B. It implies that credentials issued by Alice do not leak information, in this case about Alice’s friends. By implementing bearer credentials in FLAC, we can demonstrate these three properties with relatively little effort.

VI. FLAC Proof Theory

A. Properties of says

FLAC’s type system constrains how principals apply existing facts to derive new facts. For instance, a property of says in other authorization logics (e.g., Lampson et al. [1] and Abadi [2]) is that implications that hold for top-level propositions also hold for propositions of any principal $\ell$:

$\vdash (s_1 \rightarrow s_2) \rightarrow (\ell \text{ says } s_1 \rightarrow \ell \text{ says } s_2)$

The pc annotations on FLAC function types refine this property. Each implication (in other words, each function) in FLAC is annotated with an upper bound on the information flow context it may be invoked within. To lift such an implication to operate on propositions protected at label $\ell$, the label $\ell$ must flow to the pc of the implication. Thus, for all $\ell$ and $s_i$,

$\vdash (s_1 \xrightarrow{pc, f} s_2) \xrightarrow{pc} (\ell \text{ says } s_1 \xrightarrow{pc} \ell \text{ says } s_2)$

This judgment is a FLAC typing judgment in logical form, where terms have been omitted. We write such judgments with an empty typing context (as above) when the judgment is valid for any $\Pi$, $\Gamma$, and $pc$. A judgment in logical form is valid if a proof term exists for the specified type, proving the type is inhabited. The above type has proof term

$\lambda(f : (s_1 \xrightarrow{pc, f} s_2))[pc]$

In order to apply $f$, we must first bind $x$, so according to rules BINDM and APP, the function $f$ must have a label at least as restrictive as $pc \sqcup \ell$. All theorems of DCC can be obtained by encoding them as FLAC implications with $pc = \top \Rightarrow$, the highest bound. Since any principal $\ell$ flows to $\top \Rightarrow$, such implications may be applied in any context.

These refinements of DCC’s theorems are crucial for supporting applications like commitment schemes and bearer credentials. Recall from Sections V-A and V-B that the security of these mechanisms relied in part on restricting the $pc$ to a specific principal’s integrity. Without such refinements, principal $q$ could open principal $p$’s commitments using open, or create credentials with $p$ authority: $p^- \xrightarrow{pc} p^-$.

Other properties of says common to DCC and other logics (cf. [26] for examples) are similarly refined by pc bounds. Two examples are: $\vdash s \xrightarrow{pc} \ell \text{ says } s$ which has proof term:

$\lambda(x : s)[pc]. (\eta \ell \text{ says } s)$

and

$\vdash \ell \text{ says } (s_1 \xrightarrow{pc, f} s_2) \xrightarrow{pc} (\ell \text{ says } s_1 \xrightarrow{pc} \ell \text{ says } s_2)$

with proof term:

$\lambda(f : \ell \text{ says } (s_1 \xrightarrow{pc, f} s_2))[pc]. \text{ bind } x' = x \text{ in } (\eta \ell \text{ says } s_2)$

As in DCC, chains of says are commutative in FLAC:

$\vdash \ell_1 \text{ says } \ell_2 \text{ says } s \xrightarrow{pc} \ell_2 \text{ says } \ell_1 \text{ says } s$

with proof term

$\lambda(x : \ell_1 \text{ says } \ell_2 \text{ says } s)[pc]. \
\text{ bind } y = x \text{ in } \text{ bind } z = y \text{ in } (\eta \ell_2 (\eta \ell_1 \text{ says } s))$

In some logics with different interpretations of says (e.g., CCD [27]) differently ordered chains are distinct, but here we find commutativity appealing since it matches the intuition from information flow control. When principal $\ell_1$ says that $\ell_2$ says $s$, we should protect $s$ with a policy at least as restrictive as both $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$, i.e., the principal $\ell_1 \sqcup \ell_2$. Since $\sqcup$ is commutative, who said what first is irrelevant.

B. Dynamic Hand-off

Many authorization logics support delegation using a “hand-off” axiom. In DCC, this axiom is actually a provable theorem:

$\vdash (q \text{ says } (p \Rightarrow q)) \rightarrow (p \Rightarrow q)$

where $p \Rightarrow q$ is shorthand for

$\forall X. (p \text{ says } X \rightarrow q \text{ says } X)$

However, $p \Rightarrow q$ is only inhabited if $p \sqcup q$ in the security lattice. Thus, DCC can reason about the consequences of $p \sqcup q$ (whether it is true for the lattice or not), but a DCC program cannot produce a term of type $p \Rightarrow q$ unless $p \sqcup q$.

FLAC programs, on the other hand, can create new trust relationships from delegation expressions using assume terms. The type analogous to $p \Rightarrow q$ in FLAC is

$\forall X. (p \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc} q \text{ says } X)$

which we wrote as $p \xrightarrow{pc} q$ in Section V-B. FLAC programs construct terms of this type from proofs of authority, represented by terms with acts-for types. This feature enables a more general form of hand-off, which we state formally below.

Proposition 1 (Dynamic hand-off). For all $\ell$ and $pc$, let pc = $\ell \Rightarrow \land \nabla (p^-) \land q^-$. Then

$\forall X. (p \text{ says } X \xrightarrow{pc} q \text{ says } X)$
Proof term.
\[ \lambda(pf_1 : (\nabla(q^-) \triangleright \nabla(p^-)))[pc]. \]
\[ \lambda(pf_2 : (p \sqsubseteq q))[pc]. \]

\text{assume } pf_1 \text{ in assume } pf_2 \text{ in }
\Lambda X. \lambda(x:p \text{ says } X)[pc], \text{ bind } x' = x \text{ in } (\eta_q x')

The principal \( pc = \ell \to \land \nabla(p^-) \land q^- \) restricts delegation (hand-off) to contexts with the integrity of \( \nabla(p^-) \land q^- \). The two arguments are proofs of authority with acts-for types: a proof of \( \nabla(q^-) \triangleright \nabla(p^-) \) and a proof of \( p \sqsubseteq q \). The \( pc \) ensures that the proofs have sufficient integrity to be used in assume terms since it has the integrity of both \( \nabla(p^-) \) and \( q^- \). Note that low-integrity or confidential delegation values must first be bound via bind before the above term may be applied. Thus the \( pc \) would reflect the protection level of both arguments. Principals \( \ell \to \) and \( pc' \) are unconstrained.

Dynamic hand-off terms give FLAC programs a level of expressiveness and security not offered by other authorization logics. Observe that \( pc' \) may be chosen independently of the other principals. This means that although the \( pc \) prevents low-integrity principals from creating hand-off terms, a high-integrity principal may create a hand-off term and provide it to an arbitrary principal. Hand-off terms in FLAC, then, are similar to capabilities since even untrusted principals may use them to change the protection level of values. Unlike in most capability systems, however, the propagation of hand-off terms can be constrained using information flow policies.

Terms that have types of the form in Proposition 1 illustrate a subtlety of enforcing information flow in an authorization mechanism. Because these terms relabel information from one protection level to another protection level, the transformed information implicitly depends on the proofs of authorization. FLAC ensures that the information security of these proofs is protected—like that of all other values—even as the policies of other information are being modified. Hence, authorization proofs cannot be used as a side channel to leak information.

VII. Semantic security properties of FLAC
A. Delegation invariance

FLAC programs dynamically extend trust relationships, enabling new flows of information. Nevertheless, well-typed programs have end-to-end semantic properties that enforce strong information security. These properties derive primarily from FLAC’s control of the delegation context. The \text{ASSUME} rule ensures that only high-integrity proofs of authorization can extend the delegation context, and furthermore that such extensions occur only in high-integrity contexts.

That low-integrity contexts cannot extend the delegation context turns out to be a crucial property. This property allows us to state a useful invariant about the evaluation of FLAC programs. Recall that \text{assume} terms evaluate to \text{where} terms in the FLAC semantics. Thus, FLAC programs typically compute values containing a hierarchy of nested \text{where} terms. The terms record the values whose types were used to extend the delegation context during type checking.

For a well-typed FLAC program, we can prove that certain trust relationships could not have been added by the program. Therefore, if these relationships exist, they must have existed in the original delegation context.

\text{Lemma 1 (Delegation invariance). Suppose } \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash e : s \text{ such that } e \rightarrow e' \text{ where } v. \text{ Then for some } \ell, p', q', \text{ and } \Pi', \text{ we have } \Pi; \Gamma; pc \vdash v : \ell \text{ says } p' \triangleright q', \text{ and } \Pi'; \Gamma; pc \vdash e' : s. \text{ Furthermore, for all } p \text{ and } q \text{ such that } \Pi; pc \triangleright pc \triangleright \nabla(q), \text{ we have } \Pi; pc \vdash p \sqsubseteq q \iff \Pi'; pc \vdash p \sqsubseteq q \text{.} \]

\text{Proof. See Appendix A.} \]

First, Lemma 1 says that at each step of evaluation, there exists a \( \Pi' \) such that \( e' \) is well typed. More importantly, this \( \Pi' \) has a useful invariant. If \( pc \) does not speak for a principal \( q \), then \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \) must agree on the trust relationships of \( q \).

B. Noninterference

Lemma 1 is critical for our proof of \text{noninterference}, a result that states that public and trusted output of a program cannot depend on restricted (secret or untrustworthy) information. Our proof of noninterference for FLAC programs relies on a proof of subject reduction under a bracketed semantics, based on the proof technique of Pottier and Simonet [20]. This technique is relatively standard, so we omit it here. The complete proof of subject reduction is in our technical report [28]; proofs for other results are found in Appendix A.

In other noninterference results based on bracketed semantics, including [20], noninterference follows almost directly from the proof of subject reduction. This is because the subject reduction proof shows that evaluating a term cannot change its type. In FLAC, however, subject reduction alone is insufficient; evaluation may enable flows from secret or untrusted inputs to public and trusted types.

To see how, suppose \( e \) is a well-typed program according to \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e : s' \). Furthermore, let \( H \) be a principal such that \( \Pi; pc \vdash H \leq s \) and \( \Pi; pc \not\vdash H \leq s' \). In other words, \( x \) is a “high” variable (more restrictive; secret and untrusted), and \( e \) evaluates to a “low” result (less restrictive; public and trusted). In [20], executions that differ only in secret or untrusted inputs must evaluate to the same value, since otherwise the value would not be well typed. In FLAC, however, if the \( pc \) has sufficient integrity, then an \text{assume} term could cause \( \Pi'; pc \vdash H \leq s' \) to hold in a delegation context \( \Pi' \) of a subterm of \( e \). The key to proving our result relies on using Lemma 1 to constrain the assumptions that can be added to \( \Pi' \). Thus noninterference in FLAC is dependent on \( H \) and its relationship to \( pc \) and the type \( s' \).

Theorem 1 states that for some principal \( H \) that flows to \( s \) but not \( \ell \) says \text{bool}, if \( pc \) has low integrity relative to \( \nabla(H^-) \) and the integrity of \( \ell \), and if the evaluation of \( e \) differs only in the value of \( s \)-typed inputs, the computed values are equal.14

It is standard for noninterference proofs in languages with higher-order functions to restrict their results to non-function types (cf. [20], [11], [29]). In this paper, we prove noninterference for boolean types, encoded as

\[ \text{bool} = (\text{unit} + \text{unit}). \]

With an appropriate equivalence relation on terms, this noninterference result can be lifted to more general types.
Theorem 1 (Noninterference). Let \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e : \ell \) says bool such that

1) \( \Pi; pc \vdash H \leq s \)

2) \( \Pi; pc \not\vdash H \leq \ell \) says bool

3) \( \Pi; pc \not\vdash \triangledown(H(\ell^\rightarrow)) \)

Then \( e[x \mapsto v_1] \rightarrow^* v'_1 \) and \( e[x \mapsto v_2] \rightarrow^* v'_2 \) implies \( v'_1 = v'_2 \).

Proof. See Appendix A.

Condition 1 identifies \( s \) as a “high” type—at least as restricted as \( H \). Condition 2 identifies \( \ell \) says bool as a “low” type, to which information labeled \( H \) should not flow. Condition 3 identifies \( pc \) as having low integrity compared to the voice of \( H \rightarrow \) and \( \ell \rightarrow \), the integrity of the expression \( e \). If \( e \) evaluates to \( v'_1 \) and \( v'_2 \), then \( v'_1 = v'_2 \).

Noninterference is a key tool for obtaining many of the security properties we seek. For instance, noninterference is essential for verifying the properties of commitment schemes discussed in Section V-A. The proofs of these properties are described in Appendix B.

C. Robust declassification

Using our noninterference result, we obtain a more general semantic security property for FLAC programs. That property, robust declassification [30], requires disclosures of secret information to be independent of low-integrity information. Robust declassification permits some confidential information to be disclosed to an attacker, but attackers can influence neither the decision to disclose information nor the choice of what information is disclosed. Therefore, robust declassification is a more appropriate security condition than noninterference when programs are intended to disclose information.

Programs and contexts that meet the requirements of Theorem 1 trivially satisfy robust declassification since no information is disclosed. In higher-integrity contexts where the \( pc \) speaks for \( H \rightarrow \) (and thus may influence its trust relationships), FLAC programs exhibit robust declassification.

Following Myers et al. [31], we extend our set of terms with a “hole” term \([\bullet]\) representing portions of a program that are under the control of an attacker. We extend the type system with the following rule for holes with lambda-free types:

\[
[\text{HOLE}]
\]

\[
\Pi; pc \vdash H \leq t \quad \Pi; pc \vdash \triangledown(H(\ell)) \quad \Pi; \Gamma; \text{pc} \vdash [\bullet] : t
\]

We write \( e[\bullet] \) to denote a program \( e \) with holes. Let an attack be a vector \( \vec{a} \) of terms and \( e[\vec{a}] \) be the program where \( a_i \) is substituted for \( \bullet_i \). An attack \( \vec{a} \) is a fair attack [30] on a well-typed program with holes \( e[\bullet] \) if the program \( e[\vec{a}] \) is also well typed. Unfair attacks give the attacker enough power to break security directly, without exploiting existing declassifications.

Theorem 2 (Robust declassification). Given a program \( e[\bullet] \) such that \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e[\bullet] : \ell \) says bool, where the following conditions hold,

1) \( \Pi; pc \vdash H \leq s \)

2) \( \Pi; pc \not\vdash H \leq \ell \) says bool

3) \( \Pi; pc \not\vdash \triangledown(H(\ell^\rightarrow)) \)

Choose any \( \vec{a} \) and \( \vec{b} \) such that \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e[\vec{a}] : \ell \) says bool and \( \Pi; \Gamma, x : s; pc \vdash e[\vec{b}] : \ell \) says bool. Then, suppose \( e[\vec{a}][x \mapsto v_i] \rightarrow^* v'_i \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) such that \( v'_1 \approx v'_2 \). Then \( e[\vec{b}][x \mapsto v_i] \rightarrow^* v'_i \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), \( v'_1 \approx v'_2 \).

Proof. See Appendix A.

Our formulation of robust declassification is more general than previous definitions since it permits some endorsements, albeit restricted to untrusted principals that cannot influence the trust relationships of \( \ell \rightarrow \), the integrity of the result. Previous definitions of robust declassification [31, 30] forbid endorsement altogether; qualified robustness [31] permits endorsement but offers only possibilistic security.

VIII. RELATED WORK

Many languages and systems for authorization or access control have combined aspects of information security and authorization (e.g., [32], [33], [35], [8], [35], [9]) in dynamic settings. However, almost all are susceptible to security vulnerabilities that arise from the interaction of information flow and authorization [12]; probing attacks, delegation loopholes, poaching attacks, and authorization side channels.

DCC [11], [2] has been used to model both authorization and information flow, but not simultaneously. DCC programs are type-checked with respect to a static security lattice, whereas FLAC programs can introduce new trust relationships during evaluation, enabling more general applications.

Boudol [36] defines terms that enable or disable flows for a lexical scope, similar to assume terms, but does not restrict their usage. Rx [8] and RTI [9] use labeled roles to represent information flow policies. The integrity of a role restricts who may change policies. However, information flow in these languages is not robust [31]: attackers may indirectly affect how flows change when authorized principals modify policies.

Some prior approaches have sought to reason about the information security of authorization mechanisms. Becker [37] discusses probing attacks that leak confidential information to an attacker. Garg and Pfennig [38] present a logic that ensures assertions made by untrusted principals cannot influence the truth of statements made by other principals.

Previous work has studied information flow control with higher-order functions and side effects. In the SLam calculus [39], implicit flows due to side effects are controlled via indirect reader annotations on types. Zdancewic and Myers [40] and Flow Caml [20] control implicit flows via pc annotations on function types. FLAC also controls side effects via a pc annotation, but here the side effects are changes in trust relationships that define which flows are permitted. Tse and Zdancewic [22] also extend DCC with a program-counter label but for a different purpose: their pc tracks information about the protection context, permitting more terms to be typed.
DKAL* [41] is an executable specification language for authorization protocols, simplifying analysis of protocol implementations. FLAC may be used as a specification language, but FLAC offers stronger guarantees regarding the information security of specified protocols. Errors in DKAL* specifications could lead to vulnerabilities. For instance, DKAL* provides no intrinsic guarantees about confidentiality, which could lead to authorization side channels or probing attacks.

The Jif programming language [21], [42] supports dynamically computed labels through a simple dependent type system. Jif also supports dynamically changing trust relationships through operations on principal objects [43]. Because the signatures of principal operations (e.g., to add a new trust relationship) are missing the constraints imposed by FLAC, authorization can be used as a covert channel. FLAC shows how to close these channels in languages like Jif.

Dependently-typed languages are often expressive enough to encode authorization policies, information flow policies, or both. The F* [44] type system is capable of enforcing information flow and authorization policies. Typing rules like those in FLAC could probably be encoded within its type system, but so could incorrect, insecure rules. Thus, FLAC contributes a model for encodings that enforce strong information security. Aura [45] embeds a DCC-based proof language and type system in a dependently-typed general-purpose functional language. As in DCC, Aura programs may derive new authorization proofs using existing proof terms and a monadic bind operator. However, since Aura only tracks dependencies between proofs, it is ill-suited for reasoning about the end-to-end information-flow properties of authorization mechanisms.

IX. CONCLUSION

Existing security models do not account fully for the interactions between authorization and information flow. The result is that both the implementations and the uses of authorization mechanisms can lead to insecure information flows that violate confidentiality or integrity. The security of information flow mechanisms can also be compromised by dynamic changes in trust. This paper has proposed FLAC, a core programming language that coherently integrates these two security paradigms, controlling the interactions between dynamic authorization and secure information flow. FLAC offers strong guarantees and can serve as the foundation for building software that implements and uses authorization securely. Further, FLAC can be used to reason compositionally about secure authorization and secure information flow, guiding the design and implementation of future security mechanisms.

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Syntax extensions

\[
\begin{align*}
    v & : = \ldots | (v \mid v) \\
    e & : = \ldots | (e \mid e)
\end{align*}
\]

Typing extensions

\[
\begin{align*}
    \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc \vdash e_1 : s & \quad \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc \vdash e_2 : s \\
    \Pi ; pc \vdash H \subseteq pc & \quad \Pi ; pc \vdash H \subseteq \leq s \\
    \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc \vdash (e_1 \mid e_2) : s
\end{align*}
\]

Evaluation extensions

\[
\begin{align*}
    e_1 \rightarrow e_1' & \quad e_2 = e_j' \quad \{i, j\} = \{1, 2\} \\
    e_1 \rightarrow e_2 & \quad \Pi ; \Gamma \vdash (e_1 \mid e_2)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
    (v_1 \mid v_2) v \rightarrow (v_1 [v_1'] \mid v_2 [v_2']) & \quad (v_1 \mid v_2) s \rightarrow (v_1 s \mid v_2 s) \\
    \text{case } (v_1 \mid v_2) \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x). e_1 \mid \text{inj}_2(x). e_2 & \rightarrow \text{B-CASE} \\
    \{ \text{case } v_1 \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x). [e_1]_1 \mid \text{inj}_2(x). [e_2]_1 \\
    \text{case } v_2 \text{ of } \text{inj}_1(x). [e_1]_2 \mid \text{inj}_2(x). [e_2]_2 \}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{assume } (v_1 \mid v_2) \text{ in } e & \rightarrow \text{B-ASSUME} \\
    \text{assume } v_1 \text{ in } e \mid \text{assume } v_2 \text{ in } e
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 9. Extensions for bracketed semantics

Proof. By inspection of the rules in Figure 4 and Figure 9.

Lemma 3 (Completeness). If \( [e]_1 \rightarrow^* v_1 \) and \( [e]_2 \rightarrow^* v_2 \), then there exists some \( v \) such that \( e \rightarrow^* v \).

Proof. Assume \( [e]_1 \rightarrow^* v_1 \) and \( [e]_2 \rightarrow^* v_2 \). The extended set of rules in Figure 9 always move brackets out of subterms, and therefore can only be applied a finite number of times. Therefore, by Lemma 2, if \( e \) diverges, either \( [e]_1 \) or \( [e]_2 \) diverge; this contradicts our assumption.

It remains to be shown that if the evaluation of \( e \) gets stuck, either \( [e]_1 \) or \( [e]_2 \) gets stuck. This is easily proven by induction on the structure of \( e \). Therefore, since we assumed \( [e]_1 \rightarrow^* v_1 \), then \( e \) must terminate. Thus, there exists some \( v \) such that \( e \rightarrow^* v \).

Lemma 4 (Robust transitivity). If \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash p \supseteq q \) and \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash q \supseteq r \), then \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash p \supseteq r \).

Proof. This is a consequence of the FLAM’s Factorization Lemma [12]. See [46] for Coq proof.

Lemma 5 (Voices). If \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash p \supseteq q \) then \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash \nabla(p) \supseteq \nabla(q) \).

Proof. By induction on the derivation of \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash p \supseteq q \). \( \ell \supseteq p \supseteq q \) implies \( \Pi ; pc \vdash \nabla(p) \supseteq \nabla(q) \) (verified in [46]), and each \( (p \supseteq q \mid pc; \ell) \in \Pi \) has \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash \nabla(p^-) \supseteq \nabla(q^-) \), so \( (p \supseteq q \mid pc; \ell) \in \Pi \) implies \( \Pi ; \ell \vdash \nabla(p) \supseteq \nabla(q) \). The remaining cases are trivial.

Lemma 6 (\( pc \) reduction). If \( \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc' \vdash e : s \) and \( \Pi ; pc \vdash pc \subseteq pc' \), then \( \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc \vdash e : s \).

Proof. By induction on the derivation of \( \Pi ; \Gamma ; pc' \vdash e : s \) and Lemma 4.
Theorem 3 (Subject reduction). Suppose II; Γ; pc ⊢ e : s and [e]i → [e’]i. If i ∈ {1, 2} then assume II; pc ⊢ H ⊆ pc. Then II; Γ; pc ⊢ e’ : s.

Proof. By induction on the derivation of [e]i → [e’]i. See the technical report [28] for details.

Lemma 1 (Delegation invariance). Suppose II; Γ; pc ⊢ e : s such that e → e’ where v. Then for some p’, and q’, and II’, we have III: Γ; pc ⊢ v : (p’ ⊆ q’), II’; Γ; pc ⊢ e’ : s. Furthermore, for all p and q such that III: Γ; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(q).

II; pc ⊢ p ⊢ q ↔ II’; pc ⊢ p ⊢ q Proof. If e’ is not a where term, choose II’ = II. Otherwise e’ = (e’ where v), and II’ = II, (p’ ⊆ q’ | pc; ℓ).

Assume II; pc ⊢ p ⊢ q, then III: pc ⊢ p ⊢ q by R-Weak. In the other direction, assume III: pc ⊢ p ⊢ q, but for contradiction, also assume that III: pc ⊬ p ⊢ q. By Theorem 3, we have III: Γ; pc ⊢ e’ where v. By Where with pc’ = pc, III: Γ; pc ⊢ v : (p’ ⊆ q’), II’; Γ; pc ⊢ e’ : s, II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(q).

Suppose III: pc ⊢ q’ ⊢ q. Then we have II; pc ⊢ ∇(q’’) ⊢ ∇(q) by Lemma 5. But II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(q’’) implies III: pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(q), a contradiction.

Therefore II; pc ⊢ q’ ⊢ q, and for all p’’ such that II; pc ⊢ p’’ ⊢ q’, we have III: pc ⊬ p’’ ⊢ q. Thus, since p’’ did not act for q in II (II; pc ⊢ p ⊢ q), it also does not act for q in II’; pc ⊬ p ⊢ q, which contradicts our assumption.

Theorem 1 (Noninterference). Let II; Γ, x : s; pc ⊢ e : ℓ says bool such that

1) II; Γ; pc ⊢ H ≤ s
2) II; pc ⊬ H ≤ ℓ says bool
3) II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ−

Then e[x ↦ v1] →* v1’ and e[x ↦ v2] →* v2’ implies v1’ = v2’.

Proof. Assume v1’ ≠ v2 and e[x ↦ v1] →* v1’ for i ∈ {1, 2}. By Lemma 3, there is some v’ such that e[x ↦ (v1 | v2)] →* v’. Furthermore, [v’]i = v’i by Lemma 2.

We prove [v’]i = [v’]j by showing, via induction on the structure of v’, that v’ contains no bracketed terms. Without loss of generality, assume v’i = w1 where w1. By Theorem 3 and Lemma 1, and WHERE with pc = pc, there exists a P’ such that P’; Γ; pc ⊢ u1 : s and

II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ− ↔

P’; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ−

Then, since II; pc ⊬ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ−, it must be the case that either P’; pc ⊬ H ⊆ pc or P’; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) or P’; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ℓ−, so we have II’; pc ⊬ H ≤ ℓ says bool. Therefore v’ cannot be a bracketed value, so [v’]i = [v’]j.

Theorem 2 (Robust declassification). Given a program e[•] such that II; Γ, x : s; pc ⊢ e[•] : ℓ says bool, where the following conditions hold,

1) II; pc ⊢ H ≤ s
2) II; pc ⊢ H ≤ ℓ says bool
3) II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ H− ⊆ ℓ−
4) pc ⊢ pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ℓ−

Choose any a and b such that II; Γ, x : s; pc ⊢ e[a] : ℓ says bool and II; Γ, x : s; pc ⊢ e[b] : ℓ says bool. Then, suppose e[a][x ↦ vi] →* v’i for i ∈ {1, 2} such that v’i ≈ v’i. Then e[b][x ↦ vi] →* v’i for i ∈ {1, 2}, v’i ≤ v’i.

Proof. Assume v1 ≠ v2 and e[a][x ↦ vi] →* v’i such that v’i = v’i, and e[b][x ↦ vi] →* v’i for i ∈ {1, 2}. We want to show that v’i = v’i.

Suppose for contradiction e[b][x ↦ vi] →* v’i for i ∈ {1, 2} but v’i ≠ v’i. Then b must contain some element bj such that bj[x ↦ vi] ≠ bj[x ↦ v2].

By induction on II; Γ, x : s; pc ⊢ e[•] : s’, Lemma 1, and Lemma 6, there exists a II’; Γ′ where II’ ⊆ II and Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that II’; Γ′; pc ⊢ e[•] : ℓ says bool, II’; Γ′; pc ⊢ bj : ℓ says bool, and

II; pc ⊢ r ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ− ↔

II’; pc ⊢ r ⊢ ∇(H−) ∧ ℓ−

Therefore, since II; pc ⊬ pc ⊢ ℓ−, we have II’; pc ⊬ pc ⊢ ℓ−. So, by HOLE, II’; pc ⊢ ℓ− ≤ s’, Finally, by Theorem 1, the evaluation of bj does not depend on x, so no bj exists such that bj[x ↦ vi] ≠ bj[x ↦ v2]. Thus v’i = v’i.

Appendix B

Commitment Scheme Verification

To prove the desired properties of commitment schemes for boolean values, let s = bool and recall:

Γcros = commit, receive, open, x : p,x → s says bool, y : p ∧ q → s says s

- q cannot receive a value that hasn’t been committed. Let H = p,x → q. For any e and Γcros; pc ⊢ e : p ∧ q says bool, observe that II; pc ⊢ H ≤ p,x → s says bool, II; pc ⊢ H ⊆ p,x → s, II; pc ⊢ H ⊆ p ∧ q saysbool, and II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ⊆ (p ∧ q)− 1. Therefore, by Theorem 1, if e[x ↦ v1] →* v1 and e[x ↦ v2] →* v2, then v1 ≈ v2.

- q cannot learn a value that hasn’t been opened. Let H = p,x → q. For any e, and Γcros; pc ⊢ e : ℓ ⊆ q says bool. Observe that both II; pc ⊢ H ≤ p,x → s says bool and II; pc ⊢ H ≤ p ∧ q saysbool. Therefore, Theorem 1 applies as above for both x and y. Thus if e[x ↦ v1] →* v1 and e[x ↦ v2] →* v2, then v1 ≈ v2. If e[x ↦ v1] →* v1 and e[x ↦ v2] →* v2, then v1 ≈ v2.

- p cannot open a value that hasn’t been received. Let H = p,x → q. For any e and Γcros; pc ⊢ e : p,x → q says bool, observe that II; pc ⊢ H ≤ p,x → s says bool, II; pc ⊢ H ⊆ p,x → q, II; pc ⊢ H ⊆ p ∧ q saysbool, and II; pc ⊢ pc ⊢ ∇(H−) ⊆ (p ∧ q)− 1. Therefore, by Theorem 1, if e[x ↦ v1] →* v1 and e[x ↦ v2] →* v2, then v1 ≈ v2.